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The European Network for Energy Economics Re-
search (ENER).  
 
Thematic Network of the European Union Fifth 
Framework Programme (ENERGIE) 
 
ENER Forum 1: Integrating the Kyoto Mecha-
nisms into the National Framework, Krakow, Po-
land, 8-9 February 2001 
 
Abstract  
On its ENER Forum 1, held on February 8/9 in Kra-
kow, Poland, the European Network for Energy Eco-
nomics Research ENER discussed the Kyoto flexibil-
ity instruments (international emission trading IET, 
Joint Implementation JI, Clean Development Mecha-
nism CDM) and their integration into the national 
framework of domestic policies and measures within 
the EU. These instruments are considered important 
pillars in combating climate change, supplemental to 
domestic policies and measures for the reduction of 
greenhouse gas emissions. In three parts, the ENER 
Bulletin 23 presents  the results of the discussions: 
• Part 1 focuses on project-based instruments (JI 
and CDM) 
• Part 2 is linked to the introduction of national 
and EU-wide emission trading schemes  
• Part 3 investigates the specific role of EU candi-
date countries in the introduction of the flexibil-
ity instruments 
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The European Network for Energy Eco-
nomics Research (ENER)  
Energy policies, traditionally national preserves, have 
become increasingly determined in international ar-
eas, and nowhere more so than in the European Un-
ion. In view of these movements towards more inter-
national and more environmentally responsive energy 
policies, researchers from IEFE (Institute of Energy 
Economics, Bocconi University, Milan), IEPE (Insti-
tute of Energy Policy and Economics, University of 
Grenoble), and SPRU (Science and Technology Pol-
icy Research, University of Sussex) made a coopera-
tion agreement in September 1985 to promote better 
communication among the groups and stimulate joint 
research activities. Since then the activities of the 
Network have been financially supported by the 
European Commission's Directorates General for 
Energy and for Research.  
ENER has since then grown to include FhG/ISI 
(Fraunhofer Institute of Systems and Innovation Re-
search, Karlsruhe) in 1988, CEEETA (Centre for the 
Economic Study of Energy, Transport and the 
Environment, Lisbon) in 1989, GIEE (Inter Univer-
ronment, Lisbon) in 1989, GIEE (Inter University 
Group on Energy Studies, Madrid) in 1992. In 1995, 
the Systems Analysis Department of Risø National 
Laboratory, Roskilde, the Policy Study Unit of the 
Netherlands Energy Research Foundation (ECN), 
Petten, and the Study Centre on Technology, Energy 
and Environment (STEM, University of Antwerpen) 
joined the network. Lund University, Department of 
Environmental and Energy System Studies became a 
member in 1996, the Institute of Energy Economics 
at the Vienna Technical University (IEW) in 1997. 
With the current series of Forums the ENER Net-
work is opening up to the accession countries with 
participants from Poland (Polish Foundation for En-
ergy Efficiency FEWE Center in Krakow / University 
of Mining and Metallurgy UMM), Czech Republic 
(SRC International CS), Hungary (Energia Klub), 
Romania (Institute of Power Studies and Design 
ISPE) and to Switzerland (Centre for Energy Policy 
and Economics CEPE). 
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Preface 
The objective of the Forum of the European Network 
for Energy Economics Research ENER is to create a 
debate between relevant stakeholders in academia, 
industry and NGOs in important fields in relation to 
energy, climate change and economics. It also aims at 
strengthening the links between national centres in 
energy / environment policy and economics research 
in particular with Eastern European countries, in view 
of their accession to the EU. It is hoped that the 
common activities with the partner institutes in those 
countries as well as with stakeholders participating in 
the events organised by ENER will contribute to con-
tinued co-operation in the same way as the one initi-
ated among the ENER institutes in the current EU 
Member States one decade ago.  
For this purpose, a Thematic Network was set up, 
financially supported by DG Research under the EN-
ERGIE Programme. The Thematic Network co-
ordinated by the Fraunhofer Institute for Systems and 
Innovation Research FhG-ISI/Germany gathers 16 
institutes from EU countries, Eastern European ac-
cession countries and Switzerland which bring in 
their skills and experience in both qualitative and 
model-based analyses. Within the Thematic Network, 
four ENER forums are to be held, all of which in the 
EU accession countries, under the common theme of 
Paths for Energy Policy between Policy Challenges 
and Market Domination. 
The current ENER Bulletin contains the proceed-
ings of the ENER Forum 1 held in Krakow, Poland, 
February 2001 on the topic Integrating the Kyoto 
Mechanisms into the National Framework.  
At the 3rd Conference of the Parties (COP 3) to the 
United Nation Framework Convention of Climate 
Change (UNFCCC), the Kyoto Protocol was 
agreed upon. Annex B Parties committed themselves 
to reduce overall greenhouse gas emissions by 5.2 % 
in 2008-2012, compared to 1990 levels. To meet their 
targets in a cost-effective way, the Protocol author-
ises these Parties to use flexible mechanisms such as 
Joint implementation, a Clean Development Mecha-
nism and Emissions Trading, collectively termed 
Kyoto Mechanisms.  
 
These mechanisms have been under international 
negotiation at COP 6, held at the Hague in November 
2000 which ended in failure. Followed the United 
States' withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol an-
nounced by President Bush in March, which meant 
that the entry-into-force of the Kyoto Protocol re-
quires its ratification by a broad range of other indus-
trialised and developing countries, including the 
Candidate Countries, Russia and Japan. COP 6 was 
resumed in July 2001 in Bonn reaching a break-
through although substantial compromises were nec-
essary in order to reach agreement. The 7th Confer-
ence of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (COP 7) is held in Marrakech 
from 29 October to 9 November 2001. The objective 
of this conference is to translate the political agree-
ment on the main outstanding issues concerning the 
implementation of the Kyoto Protocol that was 
reached at the resumed 6th Conference of the Parties 
in Bonn into legal text. The European Union has 
taken a major political initiative by presenting a pro-
posal for an early ratification of the Protocol just be-
fore COP 7 (see addendum to the presentation by Mr. 
M. Wemaere EC on emission trading in the EU). 
Principles, rules, modalities and guidelines of the 
flexibility instruments, which shall supplement do-
mestic policies and measures in order to fulfil Kyoto 
obligations, have not been settled yet, reflecting the 
need for further discussion. The current ENER Fo-
rum 1 focuses on the integration of the Kyoto flexi-
bility mechanisms into national frameworks, in par-
ticular issues relating to the interference of flexibility 
mechanisms with other, already existing, policy in-
struments in both EU and accession countries. In 
three sessions, aspects of project based Kyoto 
mechanism, of a framework for emission trading and 
of the perspective and role for the enlargement coun-
tries with respect to the flexibility instruments are 
discussed. The summary and the main conclusions 
from each of the three sessions are presented on the 
following pages. 
 
Fraunhofer Institute for Systems and Innovation Re-
search FhG-ISI, Karlsruhe, Germany,  
 
October 2001 
 
Wolfgang Eichhammer / Regina Betz 
 
ENER Internet site: 
www.eu.fhg.de/ ENER/Enerhome.htm 
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Abbreviations 
 
AIJ Activities Implemented Jointly 
AOSIS Alliance of Small Island States 
B&C Baseline and Credit (trading) 
C&T Cap and Trade 
CBI Confederation of British Industry 
CCL Climate Change Levy 
CDM Clean Development Mechanisms 
CER Certified Emission Reduction 
CH4  Methane 
CHP Combined heat and power 
CO2  Carbon dioxide 
COP Conference of the Parties 
DC Developing Countries 
DETR Now DTLR: Deportment for Transport, Local Government and the Re-
gions, UK 
DG Directorate General (European Commission) 
DTI Department of Trade and Industry (UK) 
EBRD European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
EC European Commission 
ECCP European Climate Change Programme 
ERU Emission Reduction Unit 
ERUPT Emission reduction units procurement tender 
ET Emission trading 
ETG Emission Trading Group (UK) 
ETS Emission Trading System 
EU European Union 
GDP Gross domestic product 
GEF Global Environment Fond 
GHG Greenhouse gas(es) 
IEA International Energy Agency 
IET International Emission Trading 
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
IPPC Integrated Pollution Prevention Control 
ISPA Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession (EU Programme 
which finances environment and transport projects) 
JI Joint Implementation 
KP Kyoto Protocol 
MAC Marginal Abatement Cost 
MARKAL MARKetALlocation (optimisation model used by the IEA) 
NGO Non-Government Organisation 
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
PHARE EU Programme for candidate countries 
RT Relative cap Trading 
SAPARD Special Action Programme for Agriculture and Rural Development (EU 
Programme for candidate countries in the agricultural sector) 
SME Small and Medium sized Enterprises 
SO2 Sulphur dioxide 
TEPS Tradable Emission Permit System 
UN United Nations 
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
UNIPEDE Union Internationale des Producteurs et Distributeurs d'Energie Electri-
que 
VOC Volatile organic compound  
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How flexible are the Flexible 
Mechanisms after the Hague? 
Regina Betz, Fraunhofer Institute for System and 
Innovations Research, FhG-ISI, Germany. 
 
Keywords. Kyoto mechanisms, flexibility instruments, 
international emissions trading, Joint Implementation JI, 
Clean Development Mechanism CDM, Kyoto Protocol, 
climate change. 
 
Abstract. Three flexibility mechanisms have been 
proposed under the Kyoto Protocol in order to sup-
plement domestic action to reduce greenhouse gases: 
• Under Joint Implementation, an Annex I Party 
invests in an emissions reduction project in an-
other Annex I Party (e.g. transition country). 
• Under the CDM, an Annex I Party invests in an 
emission-reduction project in a Non-Annex I 
Party (developing country). 
• International emissions trading: trading of green-
house gas permits among Annex I Parties. 
The paper introduces the main questions linked to 
these flexibility mechanisms. 
Introduction 
A 92 page text with over 1000 square brackets 
formed the basis for the negotiations of the Kyoto 
mechanisms in the Hague. Alongside the formal ne-
gotiations of the parties in plenary, negotiations also 
took place behind closed doors in informal groups of 
varying participants. Whereas the parties involved in 
the formal negotiations hardly waived their positions, 
compromises emerged in most areas in the informal 
groups. 
There was great disappointment on the penultimate 
day of negotiations when the Dutch President of the 
World Conference on Climate Change (COP6), Jan 
Pronk, revealed that work would be suspended for the 
time being on the negotiation texts. It would be begun 
again only after a consensus had been reached on the 
large political crunch issues. It was clear from the 
start that that would not occur until after the next 
meeting of the COP6-bis in July 2001 in Bonn. How-
ever, to a large extent, there was consensus on many 
issues at the close of the Climate Conference at the 
Hague. This paper aims to describe the compromises 
emerging from the present state of negotiations. 
Joint Implementation (JI) 
Under Joint Implementation, an Annex I Party invests 
in an emissions reduction project in another Annex I 
Party (e.g. transition country). Under the Kyoto Pro-
tocol, the credits so called emission reduction units 
(ERUs) can only be counted within the commitment 
period (2008-12).  
 
 
 
Investor and host Party
 fulfil eligibility requirements
Host Party does not fulfil eligibility
requirements
FAST TRACK:
Parties involved agree on amount of
Emissions Reductions Units
CDM-Rules
                                      Eligibility requirements
- Party has in place a national system in accordance with Art. 5.1 KP
- Party has established a national registry
- Party has established the Initial Assigned Amount
- Party has submitted annual inventory in accordance with provisions of Art. 5.2 & 7.1
 
Figure 1. Two track approach JI (ISI) 
 
At the Hague, a two track approach for joint im-
plementation was discussed, on which there is mainly 
consensus: the so-called Fast Track represents a 
greatly simplified method for JI projects. The second 
variant (Slow Track) applies to those states in 
which the host country of the JI project does not fulfil 
the conditions for the fast track. In order to be eligi-
ble for the fast track, all Parties involved in a project 
must meet the following eligibility requirements: 
The Parties must have submitted a report to the Cli-
mate Secretariat and may not have received a 
negative response from the Compliance Committee 
within a certain period1. The report is used to prove 
that they 
                                                           
1 The enforcement branch under the compliance committee 
makes a decision whether the eligibility requirements have 
been met or not based on the information of the review 
teams. The exact composition of this Committee is not yet 
clear.  
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(1) have established a national system to estimate 
the GHG emissions from sources and the en-
hancement of sinks, 
(2) have a computerised national registry in accor-
dance with the international requirements, 
(3) have submitted a report to determine the initial 
assigned amounts, 
(4) have submitted an inventory for the last year 
which meets the requirements of the Kyoto Pro-
tocol (Article 5.2 and 7.1) - this is probably the 
year 2006.2  
In addition the parties must comply with the annual 
reporting requirements. Otherwise they can lose their 
right to use the Fast Track. In the Fast Track, the 
emission reductions (ERU) are negotiated between 
the host and the investor country, this makes a com-
plicated baseline determination unnecessary (see be-
low).  
If the host country does not meet one of the condi-
tions listed, then it is most likely that the same rules 
and project cycle will apply as for the Clean Devel-
opment Mechanism (CDM).  
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) 
Under the CDM, an Annex I Party invests in an emis-
sion-reduction project in a Non-Annex I Party (de-
veloping country). The emission reductions - so-
called certified emission reduction (CERs) - can be 
gained from 2000 onwards, and will be issued retro-
spectively as soon as the rules have been fixed. 
At the current state of debate, the same eligibility 
requirements as for the Fast Track of Joint Implemen-
tation (see above) apply to the Annex I Parties which 
have made reduction commitments under the Kyoto 
Protocol. Essentially, the host countries (developing 
countries) wanting to participate in CDM have to 
have ratified the Kyoto Protocol. 
The following procedure is planned for the project 
cycle: the project participants (the investor and the 
organisation carrying out the project) draw up a pro-
ject design document. Based on this, they apply for 
the letters of approval, to have the project recog-
nised as a CDM project by the government of the 
host country and the investor country. The host coun-
tries thus give their approval that the activity satisfies 
their sustainable development requirements. The next 
step is the validation of the project by an appointed 
Operational Entity (OE), which evaluates the pro-
ject using the project design document with regard to 
the CDM criteria. OE are independent bodies which 
                                                           
2 In addition, several Parties are demanding that the Parties 
involved should be bound by the compliance system. The 
reason behind this is that Article 18 (compliance) of the 
Kyoto Protocol for binding sanctions provides for an 
amendment which would require a separate ratification (in 
addition to the ratification of the Kyoto protocol), in order 
to be binding. At present, a direct modification of the pro-
tocol is also being discussed - i.e. both would be ratified at 
the same time - which could, however, involve delays for 
the ratification. The above demand would then, however, 
be superfluous. 
have been accredited by a panel of experts of the 
Executive Board (EB).  
The EB is the central authority for CDM, which is 
responsible for monitoring the CDM and which is 
elected from representatives of the member states. 
The exact number of its members and their composi-
tion have not yet been agreed upon. After a project 
has been validated, the documents are passed on to 
the EB for registration - i.e. formal acceptance as a 
CDM project. Subsequently, monitoring takes place. 
This is a task of the project participants. The verifica-
tion, which takes place at regular intervals, is also 
conducted by an OE (different to OE of validation) 
which checks ex-post the accuracy of the estimated 
CERs. The certification involves the written assur-
ance of the OE that the project has resulted in the 
verified emission reductions within a certain period. 
The certification report actually represents an appli-
cation for the issuing of emission credits to the 
amount of the verified emission reductions. The EB 
issues the CERs, unless there is an application sub-
mitted by a third party within a certain time to re-
examine the CDM project. When issued, the CERs 
are individually marked with a serial number, the 
Share of Proceeds3 is deducted and the remaining 
CERs credited to the account/s of the project partici-
pants. 
 
Validation
Project design
Project implementation
CDM project proposal
Verification and 
Certification
CER-Issuance
Monitoring
Registration
Ex-Ante-data
Ex-Post-data
Operational Entity (OE I)
Approval Host /
Investor Party Executive Board
Project participant (+OE II)
Operational Entity
Executive Board
Project participant
 
Figure 2. Project cycle (ISI) 
The assumption of a baseline - the amount of an-
thropogenic emissions which would occur if the pro-
ject did not take place - is of crucial significance for 
the amount of obtainable credits of a CDM project. 
The difference between the actual emissions and the 
baseline is used to calculate the CERs. It is becoming 
apparent that the baseline is set according to one of 
two possibilities: 
a) a baseline method approved by COP/MOP, the 
highest committee of all parties of the Kyoto Pro-
tocols, or approved by the EB and recognised by 
the OE as suitable for the project and appropri-
ately applied or 
                                                           
3 The Share of Proceeds consists of a certain percentage of 
CERs (Pronks proposal 2%), which will be put in a fund 
which is managed on the account of the EB. The fund shall 
mainly be used to finance adaptation measures for countries 
most affected by climate change and, to a lesser extent, the 
administrative costs of the EB.  
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b) an alternative baseline method, provided that the 
COP/MOP or the EB approves the method sub-
mitted by the OE. 
A reference manual is to be developed for the base-
line method to further elaborate the following options 
for the baseline (e.g. country-specific figures for cer-
tain technologies):  
(a) current or historical emissions4, 
(b) emissions of a technology which represents an 
economically attractive course of action taking 
barriers to investment into account, 
(c) average emissions of such activities which were 
recently undertaken in Annex I Parties (i.e. indus-
trial countries), or in host countries or an appro-
priate region. Closer specifications are still con-
troversial. 
It is still open whether the lowest option, i.e. the 
most conservative baseline should be selected, or the 
one judged by the project participants to be the most 
appropriate reference scenario. In the latter case the 
project participants have to have a pertinent reason. 
When discussing CDM, one of the main topics is 
determining the additionality of CDM projects. The 
rule of additionality aims to guarantee that activities 
reduce emissions below those that would have oc-
curred in the absence of the project activity so that no 
additional environmental pollution is caused com-
pared to the situation without the CDM project.  
In order to determine additionality, two approaches 
are being debated: on the one hand, achieving addi-
tionality using a strict baseline - on the other, a so-
called two-stage procedure (first a strict additionality 
test5 and then issuing the credits compared to a base-
line which the USA believe should be more lax). 
Consensus was reached in the Hague on the special 
promotion of small projects. This concerns simplifi-
cations (e.g. omitting the additionality test for renew-
able energies or the assessment of environmental im-
pact), standardised baselines and simplified monitor-
ing requirements for projects up to a certain size. 
However, the definition of these small projects is still 
open. Figures between 1 MW  60 MW for fossil fuel 
projects and 5-75 MW for renewables are being dis-
cussed. 
Furthermore, it is definite that the funds for CDM 
projects should be additional to current development 
aid and Global Environment Fund (GEF) money. It 
also became clear that there will be no exclusive 
positive list for project types to be permitted under 
                                                           
4 This option can only be applied if the replacement of 
existing plants (existing sources) is involved.  
5 Threshold Approach: the project has to reach a perform-
ance level which is clearly above the average, compared 
with comparable activities/institutions conducted recently 
in the host country, in a comparable geographical region or 
even in an industrial country. This must be proven with the 
aid of a quantitatively based method approved by the EB 
and found to be suitable and correctly applied according to 
OE. 
CDM. Nuclear power projects will, however, in all 
probability, be excluded from CDM. 
There is no consensus as yet with regard to the in-
clusion of sink projects in CDM. However, a restric-
tion or the introduction of a procedure to resolve this 
issue seem likely. 
International Emissions Trading  
There is a large degree of consensus that Parties 
wanting to participate in emission trading under Arti-
cle 17 should have to fulfil the same eligibility re-
quirements as those described for the Fast Track un-
der Joint implementation. Emission trading then 
functions as follows: 
From 2008, Annex B Parties may sell the emission 
permits they do not use themselves to other Annex B 
Parties. The latter can use these to meet their com-
mitments  i.e. add them to their initial assigned 
amount.  
The system of sanctions will probably not act as a 
sufficient deterrent on an international level. This is 
due to the fact that there will most likely not be any 
financial sanctions in a real sense; instead the emis-
sions exceeded are deducted from the country's future 
assigned amount, plus a penalty rate. Therefore, an 
additional system to reduce the misuse of overselling 
will be necessary. Otherwise, in an extreme case, a 
country could sell its entire initial assigned amount 
and then withdraw from the Kyoto Protocol or par-
ticipate in the next commitment period only under the 
possibility of taking a lax target. The following sug-
gestion, the so-called Commitment Period Reserve, 
is emerging as a compromise from the five options 
being negotiated. The following principle is involved: 
each committed Party determines an amount of emis-
sion rights (reserve) which it has to keep in its na-
tional register during the commitment period and 
may not sell. The following clarifications are based 
on the example of Jan Pronk's proposal of a 70% re-
serve.  
This reserve should be the lowest of the following 
options, where for option b) adjustments are made 
based on recently obtained inventory data:  
(a) 70% of the initial assigned amount, 
(b) 70% of the emissions of the most recently re-
viewed inventory (times 5), 
(c) 70% of the reviewed projected emission data, 
based on the last five years. 
Two different cases can be distinguished (see dia-
gram): 
(1) The emissions of Party A are below the initial 
assigned amount (net sales country). It is thus al-
lowed to sell the surplus emission permits plus 
the 30 %.  
(2) The emissions of Party B are above its initial 
assigned amount (for options (b) and (c)). For 
this country, variant a) will be the lowest and the 
initial assigned amount minus the 70% may be 
sold freely under pure seller liability. 
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Figure 3. Commitment Period Reserve (ISI) 
 
It is obvious that the danger of overselling is di-
rectly linked to the percentage demanded. I.e. the 
higher the reserve to be held, the lower the risk of 
overselling. The European Union therefore demands 
a percentage of 98 for the reserve. It wonders why 
countries of Type B, which would actually have to 
purchase net emission permits in order to meet their 
commitments, should also be given the opportunity to 
sell such a high percentage (30%) and thus take the 
risk of overselling. The main argument in favour of 
these countries being allowed to sell as well is made 
in the context of company participation in emission 
trading. Companies in country B should be given the 
opportunity through the sale of emission permits to 
procure funds to finance reduction possibilities. This 
may seem a reasonable argumentation at first sight, 
but it should be considered whether this justifies the 
higher risk of overselling and whether other solutions 
might be possible. Firstly, it could be argued that 
companies can sell emission permits freely within 
their own country and thus provide advance financing 
for reduction activities. Furthermore, in countries in 
which capital is scarce, there is still the possibility of 
a JI project financing. If a JI solution is not accepted, 
nor can buyers be found within the country, the gov-
ernment of such a country could purchase these emis-
sion permits, e.g. from their companies, at the inter-
national market price, since it definitely needs addi-
tional emission permits to meet its target. So that it is 
clear that there are other solutions available and that 
the reserve should be higher, e.g. at 98%, in order to 
reduce the risk of overselling to a minimum, espe-
cially as there are not sufficient sanctions. 
Supplementarity  
The Kyoto Mechanisms should be supplemental to 
the domestic policies and measures of Annex I Par-
ties  
According to the Kyoto Protocol, all three Kyoto 
mechanisms should only be additions to the domestic 
efforts of Annex I Parties - Parties are not allowed to 
completely buy themselves out of the necessity to 
pursue measures at home.  
The EU has always supported a quantitative restric-
tion, the so-called ceiling; however, this has been 
rejected by the USA and other countries. The Pronk 
proposal tried to offer a compromise by removing the 
quantitative restriction and replacing this with a 
qualitative obligation for each individual Party in 
order to prove progress at home. This is to be exam-
ined by the Compliance Committee. Whether the EU 
will agree to such a watering down of supplementar-
ity will be revealed in Bonn in July when the nego-
tiations are re-continued.  
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Session 1: Project Based Kyoto Mechanisms 
Rapporteurs Summary. Jim Watson, SPRU, University of Sussex, UK 
 
Introduction 
The first session of the Forum focused on the project 
based Kyoto flexibility mechanisms  Joint Imple-
mentation (JI) and the Clean Development Mecha-
nism (CDM). JI allows Annex I countries to meet 
some of their emissions reductions by investing in 
greenhouse gas abatement projects in other Annex I 
countries. The CDM is specifically designed to facili-
tate investment in abatement projects in developing 
countries by Annex I countries. 
The session looked at these two mechanisms from 
a variety of different angles. Lenka Kovarova of the 
Czech Environment Ministry started with an analysis 
of the pilot phase of Activities Implemented Jointly 
(AIJ), the predecessor to JI and the CDM, by focus-
ing on experiences in the Czech Republic. Remko 
Ybema of ECN followed this with a look at the flexi-
bility mechanisms from the point of view of a donor 
country initiative  the ERUPT programme in the 
Netherlands. The third contribution by Josef Janssen 
from the University of St Gallen focused on the issue 
of risk management and explored management 
strategies for both donors and project hosts. Denise 
Cavard of IEPE rounded off the session with a look 
at the CDM, and some of the issues that will influ-
ence its future development. 
The Experience so Far 
Perhaps the most immediate issue that emerged from 
the four presentations is the uncertainty caused by the 
failure of the sixth Conference of the Parties (COP6) 
to reach an agreement in November 2000. The break-
up of negotiations without final agreement has 
slowed down JI and CDM initiatives in some coun-
tries. For example, the second call for prospective JI 
projects under for the Dutch ERUPT programme has 
been delayed. In addition, ERUPTs CDM pro-
gramme is currently on hold until the final CDM 
rules are agreed. 
It is hoped that the resumed COP6 talks in summer 
2001 will reach agreement on broad rules for both JI 
and the CDM. In the absence of such an agreement, 
many Forum participants felt it was extremely diffi-
cult to develop their approaches to JI projects in ac-
cession States to the EU.  
The uncertainties are perhaps greater for the CDM 
than for JI. Denise Cavard highlighted different ex-
pectations of the CDM amongst developing coun-
tries. Some semi-industrialised countries (e.g. Brazil) 
wish to pursue projects unilaterally on their own 
terms whilst others (e.g. China and India) are pushing 
for a more bilateral approach. Smaller poorer coun-
tries tend to favour a multilateral approach since they 
do not have the resources to arrange financing and 
implementation themselves. It is clear that all of these 
various approaches will have to be taken into account 
when the final CDM rules are agreed. 
Once the rules have been agreed, it will be impor-
tant to draw on experiences from projects imple-
mented under the AIJ pilot phase. Whilst the rules for 
JI and CDM projects are likely to differ significantly 
from those for AIJ, the Forum participants felt that 
their experiences were still relevant.  
Many of the contributions about AIJ pilot projects 
focused on the issue of additionality. It is important 
to ensure that future JI and CDM projects produce 
additional reductions in emissions that exceed those 
which would have occurred without these mecha-
nisms. 
It became clear that some of the AIJ projects im-
plemented to date have been challenged on addition-
ality grounds. As a result, there was some debate 
about ways in which a non-additional projects could 
be excluded from the JI and CDM. Many contributors 
agreed that there was a balance to be struck between 
adequate scrutiny of projects to ensure additionality 
and the need to minimise transaction costs and en-
courage investors to come forward. As the Dutch 
ERUPT programme has shown, there is still work to 
be done to educate potential investors and host coun-
tries about the benefits of JI and CDM projects. 
Issues to be Resolved 
The contributions to the session highlighted many 
potential problems that need to be addressed for JI 
and the CDM to function effectively once they are 
established. Some of the most important of these are 
de-tailed below: 
Setting baselines 
A number of discussions of project baselines took 
place during the session. For each project approved 
under JI or the CDM, a baseline is required against 
which emissions reductions are measured and credits 
awarded. 
There is considerable debate about the best method 
for setting baselines. Some have argued for project-
specific baselines since they may be the most accu-
rate. The drawback of this approach, particularly for 
small projects, is that a lot of time and effort is re-
quired to set the baseline. The investor has to make a 
case for the emissions reductions they aim to achieve. 
In addition, an independent regulatory authority must 
scrutinise this case to check whether it is genuine. 
The alternative approach is to establish generic 
base-lines for each type of facility (gas-fired electric 
power plants, steel mills etc.). Projects that exceed 
this base-line in their emissions reductions will be 
permitted to proceed. However, this method also has 
problems since it may not take into account the wide 
variation in environmental performance in a particu-
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lar industrial sector. Therefore, projects that would 
reduce emissions might be excluded unintentionally. 
Project eligibility 
A second related issue for resolution when the COP6 
negotiations resume is the extent to which only cer-
tain technologies should be offered support under JI 
and the CDM. During the COP6 negotiations, there 
was considerable pressure to exclude large hydro and 
nuclear power plants from the CDM. 
Whether or not these options are eventually ex-
cluded, decisions will need to be made by individual 
countries about the establishment of positive tech-
nology lists. For example, during the session, it was 
suggested that the Czech Republic may wish to fa-
vour JI projects using renewable energy technologies. 
Similarly some semi-industrialised developing coun-
tries have ex-pressed a wish to draw up their own 
lists of favoured projects and technologies. 
Distributing credits 
Another issue that has not yet been resolved by nego-
tiators is the distribution of emissions credits once JI 
and CDM projects are implemented. There was some 
debate during the session about the division of emis-
sions credits between the host country and/or com-
pany and the donor country and/or company. It is not 
yet clear when the rules governing emissions credits 
will be established, and how much flexibility they 
will contain. 
Managing risk 
Another consideration that will be important for all 
parties involved in JI and CDM projects is risk man-
agement. In his presentation, Josef Janssen showed 
that it will be important for both investors and hosts 
to develop portfolios of projects to spread risk. 
For potential investors considering CDM and JI 
projects alongside other types of investment, the 
Kyoto mechanisms have some added uncertainties. 
For example, the financial return for an investor in a 
JI project will depend heavily on the price of emis-
sions credits and the actual environmental perform-
ance of the project. It was pointed out that there are 
large variations in the price of emissions permits and 
credits expected by studies that have been carried out 
so far. This increases the risk for potential investors. 
A possible solution would be for new funds to be 
established to invest in large portfolios of projects on 
behalf of groups of investors. The World Bank Proto-
type Carbon Fund was cited as an example of this. 
AIJ projects in the Czech Repub-
lic.  
Lenka Kovarova, Department of Integrated Financ-
ing, Ministry of the Environment, Czech Republic 
 
Keywords.. Activities Implemented Jointly, Czech Repub-
lic, Joint Implementation, Kyoto mechanisms 
 
Abstract. The paper is focused on AIJ projects in the 
Czech Republic. It gives an overview on approved AIJ 
projects, short description of projects, baseline calculation 
and costs of GHG reduction, and issues, which arise as 
barriers to move towards Joint Implementation. 
Introduction 
The Czech Republic is one of the parties to the Kyoto 
Protocol to the United Nations Framework Conven-
tion on Climate Change. As most of economies in 
transition, Czech Republic shall comply with the 
Kyoto target, which has been set at 98% according to 
1989 GHG emissions, without any difficulties. Due 
to low abatement costs it is considered as host coun-
try for AIJ/JI projects. 
Background of AIJ  
Activities Implemented Jointly (AIJ) is the pilot 
phase of Joint Implementation (JI), one of the flexible 
mechanisms included in the Kyoto Protocol. Joint 
activities shall allow the Annex I countries to realise 
measures, which lead towards emission reduction, in 
other Annex I countries, where abatements costs are 
lower. The process shall ensure that GHG emission 
reduction will be achieved at lowest costs. During the 
AIJ phase there shall not be any transfer of the emis-
sion credits to the investor, AIJ serves as a pilot 
phase only. 
It has been expected that the pilot phase will be ter-
minated in the year 2000, but due to the strong 
interests of developing countries the termination has 
been post-pound until international rules for flexible 
mechanisms will be approved. The last Conference of 
the Parties  COP 6, which was hold in Hague in 
November 2000, has shown that there is lot of issues 
which need to be developed more. 
Institutional Setting of AIJ Projects 
Within the Czech Republic, the Ministry of Environ-
ment (MoE) is the responsible body to the Conven-
tion and MoE shall ensure compliance with the Pro-
tocol and participation in Kyoto mechanisms. 
After the COP2 in 1996, the National Focal Point 
for AIJ has been established within the Foreign Rela-
tions Department and MoE published first rules for 
AIJ projects in April 1997. The rules were very gen-
eral and except the general rules (e.g. submission of 
the application to the MoE, additionally, etc.), there 
are no specification of the approval process and of 
other technical issues, e.g. baselines. 
In 1999 Strategy to Mitigate the Climate Change 
has been approved by the Ministry of the Environ-
ment of the Czech Republic. The Strategy is the first 
complex governmental document in the field of cli-
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mate change. It sets the priorities for domestic meas-
ures to mitigate climate change as, for example, to 
promote energy efficiency, use of renewable energy 
sources, public transport, afforestation, etc. Concern-
ing the use of Kyoto mechanisms in the Czech Re-
public, Kyoto mechanisms shall be considered as 
additional to domestic action. Within the Kyoto 
mechanisms, the priority is given to the project based 
mechanisms, i.e. joint implementation. 
AIJ Projects in the Czech Republic 
During the period 1996-1999 five AIJ projects were 
approved in the Czech Republic by MoE. They are of 
different types in different regions. One of projects is 
fuels switch, one switch to biomass heating, two in-
dustrial installations improving the energy efficiency, 
one on afforestation. All of them were approved by 
MoE individually. Detailed description of specific 
projects is given below (data from the Uniform Re-
porting Format: Activities Implemented Jointly under 
the Pilot Phase given by UNFCCC Secretariat). 
Decin (1996, USA) 
The project City of Decin: Fuel switching for Dis-
trict Heating involves fuel-switching, co-generation 
and efficiency improvements at the Bynov district 
heating plant, located in the North Bohemia. The 
project has converted the plant from a coal (lignite) 
burning facility to a natural gas-fired plant, which 
provides both heat and potable hot water to local 
apartment blocks. A co-generation facility for the 
production of steam and electricity has been built, 
and improvements have been made to the distribution 
network to enhance the system energy efficiency. 
The foreign investors are private companies from 
United States. The total costs of the project are about 
8 mill. USD, the AIJ component is 7.5% investment 
in the form of soft loan from US private companies 
(600,000 USD). 
The facility became operational in September 1996. 
For the baseline calculation GHG emissions from old 
plant are used, i.e. it is based on coal burning. The 
GHGs reduction has been achieved on-site as a result 
of the fuel switch from coal to gas and energy effi-
ciency improvements, and off-site as a result of elec-
tricity production from co-generation, which will 
reduce the electricity consumption from national grid. 
Achieved GHG emissions reduction is based on 
difference between baseline scenario and projected 
scenario. The annual GHGs reduction is about 24,000 
tons of CO2, which is about 607,150 t of CO2 during 
the lifetime of the project. The unit costs of CO2 re-
duction is 13 USD per ton in the whole project or 
2.1 USD for AIJ component only. 
FACE (1997, The Netherlands) 
The project Forest rehabilitation in Krkonose and 
Sumava national Parks includes afforestation of 
14,000 hectares in two national parks  Krkonose in 
north-east Bohemia (9,000 ha) and Sumava in south-
west Bohemia (5,000 ha). 
The foreign investor of the project is the FACE 
foundation from The Netherlands. The total costs are 
about 60.5 mill. USD, AIJ component covered by 
FACE is about 80% (48 mill. USD). FACE funds the 
planting of forests and their maintenance for the first 
three years. 
The CO2 emissions reduction is calculated by the 
dynamic computation model CO2FIX, which has 
been developed by the Dutch Institute for Forestry 
and Nature Research. Sequestration of CO2 is pro-
jected at about 734,000 t per year in lifetime of 99 
years. The unit cost was estimated at about 1 USD 
per ton of CO2 in the whole life time, URF6 shows the 
cost till the year 2008 and it is about 6 USD per ton 
of CO2. 
Cizkovice7 (1997, France) 
The project Modernisation of the Cizkovice Cement 
Factory is realised in private company Lafarge 
Czech Republic, when the Lafarge Group is making 
all the investment in its own daughter company. The 
aim of the project is to improve energy efficiency. 
The emission reduction is estimated at about 
33,600 tonnes of per ton of CO2 per year. Total in-
vestment is 31.9 mil. USD, investment into emissions 
reduction about 6 mill. USD, which represents 35 
USD per ton of CO2. 
Hostetin 
The Hostetin Biomass Heating Project is a demon-
stration project for use of wood chips and solar panel 
for domestic heating in the village Hostetin, which is 
located in east Moravia in White Carpatian region. It 
includes the installation of 600 kW biomass burner 
(wood-chips), construction of district heating system 
for 68 houses in the village, installation of solar pan-
els (about four) and establishment of an information 
centre for biomass energy and other renewable en-
ergy sources. 
The calculation of baseline is primarily based on 
the consumption of coal and brown coal used in local 
households heating. Also the methane (CH4) emis-
sions from biological degrading processes of wood, 
CO2 emissions from electricity production in power 
plant and transport of the fuel (coal) is incorporated. 
The net GHGs emission reduction is achieved by 
the fuel substitution, energy efficiency improvement 
(in some houses). The achieved emission reduction is 
lower by the CO2 emissions of transport of biomass 
(the transport of biomass is realised from shorted 
distances than coal). The total emission reduction is 
estimated on 3,350 t CO2 eq. per year, of which about 
1,910 (60%) are CH4 emissions avoided from wood 
biological degrading. In the 15 years lifetime of the 
project it represents about 50,250 t CO2 eqv. 
The project was put into operation in autumn 2000. 
Total costs of the project are 860,000 USD, the AIJ 
component covered by the government of The Neth-
                                                           
6 Uniform Reporting Format 
7 Data from Karlik, Hlobil (2000) 
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erlands is 470,000 USD. Foreign contribution repre-
sents installation of the Dutch biomass burner, train-
ing of local employees and establishing of the infor-
mation centre. The emissions reduction costs are 
about 17 USD per ton of CO2 eq., in the case only 
AIJ component is used, than it is about 9 USD per ton 
of CO2 eq. 
Skoda (1999, Germany) 
The project Co-generation station SKODA plant 
Mlada Boleslav includes modernisation and renova-
tion of a combined heat and power generation in the 
private company Skoda. The project is located in the 
middle Bohemia. 
An old co-generation plant using lignite and gas 
with low efficiency was replaced by a new co-
generation plant using hard coal and gas with higher 
efficiency (coal fired boiler  93%, gas fired boiler  
94%). Project it provides heat for Skoda plant ant the 
town Mlada Boleslav and electricity for Skoda plant. 
The project is realised by the SKO-ENERGO, a 
Czech-German consortium. The project is fully fi-
nanced from private sources of Sko-energo and 
Skoda, the total costs are about 110 mill. USD mainly 
covered by the commercial loan. 
The calculation of the baseline CO2 is based on the 
comparison of fuel switch, improved energy effi-
ciency and it includes also lower consumption of 
electricity from the grid caused by the increased pro-
duction of electricity in co-generation. The annual 
amount of CO2 emissions reduction is about 272,000 
tons, which is about 5.4 mill. ton of CO2 during the 
20 years of lifetime of the plant. The unit costs are 
estimated on about 20 USD per ton of CO2.  
Weak points 
The approval process of above-mentioned projects 
was based on very general rules, similar wit the first 
come - first serve principle. There are many issues, 
which led to difficulties in current days: 
• although all of projects are approved as AIJ pro-
jects, i.e. no emission transfer, some of investors 
plan to negotiate credit sharing, 
• due to lack of capacity within MoE, projects are 
not assessed by the host country, 
• there are no baseline methodologies, 
• types of projects vary from municipal to pure 
private sector, from renewable energy use to im-
provement of energy efficiency in industrial sec-
tor. 
New AIJ rules 
Due to the unsolved issues, mainly no approval proc-
ess, new rules for AIJ projects have been developed 
in the Czech Republic. The aim of prepared rules is 
to serve as a basis for future JI projects, when emis-
sion credits will be transferred to the host country. 
The main rules include following: 
1. project will lead to decrease in GHG emissions 
by at least 10% in comparison with the baseline; 
2. the project must not lead to transferring of pollu-
tion between the individual components of the 
environment (air - water - soil); 
3. priority areas for AIJ Projects: 
• Utilization of renewable energy sources, 
• Thermal savings in heating of buildings (insu-
lation, regulation) in the public sector, 
• Thermal savings in heating of apartment 
buildings (insulation, regulation), 
• Utilization of waste industrial heat in existing 
installations, 
• Construction of collection systems for landfill 
gases in old landfills and use of energy 
thereof, 
• Gasification of public transport, 
• Afforestation. 
• Other installations leading to substantial de-
crease in GHG emissions shall also be eligi-
ble. 
4. applicant must provide the evidence of financial 
sources; 
5. the submitted project must include the following 
information according: 
a) transparent calculation of the reduction of 
GHG emissions 
b) economic effectiveness of the project  
c) other environmental effects; 
6. other criteria will also be assessed: additionality, 
compliance with the priorities of the State Envi-
ronmental Policy, best available technology, 
know-how and new technologies, employment; 
7. no transfer of emission credits to the investor 
country. 
The Czech Republic has the capacity to host joint 
projects, but to ensure future compliance with the e 
Kyoto target, quantitative limitation for flexible 
mechanisms was set at 10 Mt of CO2 eq. till 2008, the 
amount is based on estimates of future GHGs emis-
sions. So the total emission reduction of the approved 
projects shall no exceed approximately 750 kt of CO2 
eq. annually. 
In order to ensure transparency of the process, the 
National Reference Centre (NRC) has been estab-
lished within the Ministry of Environment in order to 
administrate the processes and the Expert Committee 
for AIJ Projects Evaluation in order to select projects 
for approval. Unfortunately, human resources are still 
limited. 
Joint Implementation projects 
JI mechanism is considered as a source of available 
financing for support of energy efficiency improve-
ment and of renewable energy sources in the Czech 
Republic. Although current AIJ rules bind the process 
of project approval, there are many crucial issues not 
solved. 
1. Orientation of JI projects: shall JI mechanism be 
used for all varieties of projects or shall the sup-
port be focused on support of not very profitable 
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projects, e.g. use of renewable energy sources or 
municipal sector only. Shall private sector be in-
cluded, if the project is realised in a daughter 
branch of foreign investor? Than domestic inves-
tors doing the same measure would not be 
awarded by emission credits. 
2. Additionality: the issue of additionality is not 
much tackled yet. Is the project additional, if it is 
realised only to fulfil legislation in host country? 
3. Baseline estimation: shall the baseline calculation 
be done on project to project base or specific 
methodologies for specific types shall be ap-
proved (it would decrease the transaction costs of 
the project). For example, NGOs advised to use 
gas baseline for projects on renewable energy 
use8. 
4. Verification: who approves project, incl. baseline. 
Who pays the verification. 
5. Credit sharing: shall credits be transferred for the 
whole lifetime of the project or for 5 years only 
(2008-2012). How to calculate credit sharing, ac-
cording to share of investment? How estimate if 
JI part of investment in not a grant but loan. 
6. Price of the credit: Shall the price of  the credit be 
fully depended on actual project costs or shall the 
investor country set a minimum price? How to 
ensure not to sell low-hanging-fruits and at the 
same time to ensure economic efficiency of pro-
jects. 
Future orientation 
In the light of latest development at COP6 in Hague, 
it should be considered that if the procedures of JI 
and CDM will be similar, JI projects will be discour-
aged due to high transaction costs. Although JI pro-
jects shall be given priority against emission trading 
due to theirs direct environmental benefit achieved by 
real measures taken, the economic efficiency, based 
on low transaction costs, favours emissions trading. 
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How to integrate JI and CDM in 
national climate policy - the ex-
ample of the Netherlands.  
Remko Ybema, ECN Policy Studies, Netherlands 
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Abstract. The Netherlands has implemented a substantial 
part of its climate policy to achieve its Kyoto target. Both 
domestic measures and actions abroad are part of it. After a 
brief introduction to Dutch domestic climate policy, this 
paper focuses on one part of the Dutch climate policy: 
ERUPT, which is the Joint Implementation programme. 
The characteristics are introduced and some early experi-
ences are given. Insights are also shared on new emission 
projections for the Netherlands and the consequences this 
may have. 
 
Introduction 
In confronting climate change, domestic policy mak-
ers are faced with a complex environmental problem 
that has implications for the economy and society at 
large. The long time frames related to climate change, 
and the uncertainty surrounding possible futures, pre-
sent a particular dilemma to politicians and policy 
makers. In Kyoto in 1997, signatories of the UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change negoti-
ated legally binding targets for Annex I countries to 
reduce emissions in 2008-2012. The Kyoto Protocol 
provides flexibility to Parties to achieve some portion 
of the required emission reductions beyond their own 
borders through the use of a variety of innovative 
economic instruments: Joint Implementation (Article 
6), Clean Development Mechanism (Article 12) and 
emission trading (Article 17). They are expected to 
significantly enhance the cost-effectiveness of green-
house gas limitation policies.  
In addition the Protocol allows Parties to work to-
gether to collectively share the formalised agreements 
among themselves. Accordingly, the EU has reached 
agreement on internal burden sharing. For the Nether-
lands this has resulted in a 6% emission target. 
Domestic policy makers have to find a balance 
what part of their obligation will be met with domes-
tic policies and what part abroad. The Netherlands 
Government searched for such a balance and has de-
veloped two Climate Policy Implementation Plans 
that contain the climate policy initiatives. The first 
and second Implementation Plans deal respectively 
with domestic actions and actions abroad.   
The present paper gives an introduction on the 
Dutch climate policy programme. The main elements 
of the domestic measures and the policy for actions 
abroad are covered. Special attention is given to the 
Dutch JI programme that was launched in May 2000 
and to recent developments relevant to domestic ac-
tions and actions abroad. The paper concludes with a 
preliminary evaluation of the Dutch climate policy 
programme and recommendations. 
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Balance between domestic action and emis-
sion reduction abroad 
The emission target for the Netherlands is generally 
perceived to be difficult to achieve. Therefore the 
Dutch government aims to achieve a substantial part 
of emission reduction abroad. The EU position in the 
climate negotiations is that countries should make no 
more than 50% of their total effort outside their own 
borders. In the Implementation Plan the Dutch Cabi-
net starts from the supposition that 50% of the total 
policy shortfall, should be achieved with domestic 
measures. Part I of the Dutch Climate Policy Imple-
mentation Plan deals with these domestic measures. 
The share to be achieved with measures outside the 
Netherlands is covered in Part II, which was issued in 
summer 2000. 
Domestic actions 
The rational of the Dutch is that climate policy must 
not cost society more than is necessary. In selecting 
the measures to be taken in the Netherlands attention 
was therefore devoted primarily to cost effectiveness. 
A second criterion was the distribution of the effort 
across the various greenhouse gases. CO2 emissions 
are the core of the problem. Therefore a balance was 
sought between measures that contribute to deflecting 
the trend in the growth of CO2 emissions and meas-
ures that reduce large amounts of emissions of the 
non-CO2 greenhouse gases relatively inexpensively. 
In order to generate commitment for the measures 
within society, as balanced as possible a distribution 
across target groups was also sought (Ministry of 
VROM, 1999). 
Table 1: Distribution reductions across sectors 
sector reduction in 2010 in 
Mtons CO2-eq.  
Industry (including refineries) 10.0 
Energy companies 8.0 
Agriculture 2.0 
Traffic 3.0 
Households 2.3 
Trade, services, government  1.0 
 
The domestic measures selected have been divided 
into three packages. The basic package contains 
measures which can be taken now and which offer a 
reasonable degree of certainty. These measures 
should be good for a total reduction of 25 Mtons 
CO2-equivalent per year compared to the baseline 
scenario (see Table 1). In putting together the na-
tional policy, a reserve package was also formed in 
addition to the basic package. The reserve package 
contains measures that will be prepared and that can 
be taken if things go different than expected during 
the run-up to the 2008-2012 period. Policies may be 
less successful than is currently assumed, or external 
circumstances may turn out less favourably than ex-
pected. The reserve package gives an added edge of 
certainty that the commitment to reduce emissions 
will actually be met. Finally, a third package of 
measures has been adopted, containing initiatives 
intended to lead to innovation. It is expected that fur-
ther reductions of greenhouse gas emissions will be 
needed after 2008-2012. The innovation package 
contains steps that the Netherlands will take to pre-
pare for that situation. Innovation for long-term emis-
sion reduction by means of transitions is the central 
theme for the new environmental policy plan to be 
issued in the course of 2001. 
Actions abroad 
In Part II of the Climate Policy Implementation Plan 
(issued mid 2000) emphasis is given to the two pro-
ject-based flexible instruments JI and CDM. Emis-
sion trading is also considered as a prospective in-
strument but priority is given to JI and CDM. Al-
though the precise rules for the use of and participa-
tion in, the flexible mechanisms remain to be de-
cided, the main elements are becoming clear. For this 
reason and to gain early experience, the Netherlands 
is willing to be one of the first countries active in JI 
and CDM. Its strategy for both JI and CDM is to seek 
a balance between national programmes and multi-
national programmes, e.g. via the World Bank or 
regional development banks. For JI the Netherlands is 
participating in the Prototype Carbon Fund of the 
World Bank and the Netherlands has started ERUPT, 
the first real JI programme. The CDM programme is 
currently under development. A CDM unit at the 
Ministry of Environment is expected to be opera-
tional from the first of April 2001. 
Design of Dutch JI program ERUPT 
The purpose of ERUPT (Emission reduction units 
procurement tender) is to obtain the ERUs from 
countries in Central and Eastern Europe. The Nether-
lands is probably the first investor country with a real 
JI programme. The program has been named ERUPT 
and falls under the Dutch Ministry of Economic Af-
fairs. They want it to be environmentally credible and 
attractive for businesses. To achieve this the experi-
ences from the Dutch Activities Implemented Jointly 
(AIJ) programme. These AIJ insights cover among 
others the following: 
• JI is a complex instrument that requires involve-
ment of many actors; 
• It takes efforts to get projects started; 
• Investors perceive many risks; 
• It takes efforts to get projects approved by host 
countries;  
• Realising a Letter of Intent takes long; 
• Transaction costs are significant. Therefore, a JI 
program should primarily aim at larger projects; 
The first tender of ERUPT was opened between 
May and July 2000. The following description of 
ERUPT applies to the characteristics of this first ten-
der. For the design of ERUPT the challenge was to 
meet the following requirements: 
• The program needs to be attractive for investing 
industries; 
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• The projects in the program need to lead to credi-
ble emission reduction; 
• The program should lead to the purchase of 
ERUs at a price that is competitive to realising 
emission reduction within the Netherlands; 
• The program should be in accordance with EU 
regulation. 
The host countries must be willing to approve 
transfer of ERUs claims to The Netherlands. The 
governments of Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia 
have signed Memoranda of Understanding in which 
they support JI transactions with the Netherlands to 
facilitate approval of transfer of ERUs. 
ERUPT aims at larger projects. The size of offers 
to the first tender of ERUPT should at least be the 
equivalent of 0.5 Mton CO2. ERUPT could only be 
an interesting option for smaller-scale ventures if 
they have an umbrella project management. Depend-
ing on the specific type of investment, the sale of 
claims on ERUs could enable between 10 and 40 
percent of a JI projects funding requirement to be 
secured. 
ERUPT aims to be a transparent programme for 
which the different steps that have to be taken are in 
accordance with the way a project developer views a 
project cycle.  
ERUPT is run as a public tender in accordance with 
standard EU procurement formats. This implies that 
suppliers are invited during the prescribed tender 
periods to submit their offers to a body experienced 
in running programmes (Senter Internationaal), for 
assessment against two criteria: (i) price per ERU, 
and (ii) feasibility. ERUPT consists of two phases, a 
selection phase and a contract awarding phase. In the 
selection phase those submitting tenders can submit 
an Expression of Interest form to the tendering au-
thority. Companies that have expressed their interest 
are screened, assessed by means of a set of selection 
criteria and ranked. 
In the project selection phase project developers 
must show they are financially able to deliver claims 
and have the proper technical capacity. 
Contracting (Phase II), delivery of claims by the 
project developer and the consequent transfer of 
ERUs shall take place as described by the following 
procedure: 
1. The project is approved by the host country as a 
JI project. Project approval is laid down in a Let-
ter of Approval by the host country; 
2. Next, if the proposal is accepted by the tendering 
authority, the ERUPT-contract between the ten-
dering authority and project developer arranges 
the approval of the project by The Netherlands 
and sets the legal base for the financial transac-
tions between the tendering authority and the 
supplier; 
3. ERUs become official once certified during the 
commitment period; 
Based on the Letter of Approval and the ERUPT 
contract, the Netherlands can exercise the claims, and 
transfer of ERUs from the host country to the Nether-
lands will take place. The host country and the Neth-
erlands will jointly report the transfer to the 
UNFCCC Secretariat. 
Before submitting an offer, a projects baseline 
study must be validated by an independent verifica-
tion organisation. This organisation must work ac-
cording to the Operational Guidelines for validation 
and verification of baselines and emission reductions. 
This can be any validation organisation already work-
ing in the field of validation and certification.  
Contracts will be awarded on the basis of economic 
attractiveness. Then, the following shall be taken into 
consideration: 
1. Price; 
2. Technical feasibility; 
3. Financial basis; 
4. Project organisation (so that the ERUs can be 
delivered during the commitment period); 
5. Absence of significant negative environmental or 
social effects; 
6. Economic stability of the recipient country 
No formal price limit applies to Claims on ERUs. 
Senter Internationaal has estimated that the market 
price for a Claim on ERUs will come in the 4.5  to 
9   range. Although the delivery of claims on ERUs 
will be deferred until the commitment period (2008-
2012), Senter Internationaal will proceed with pre-
payment with effect from the date of contracting. In 
view of milestones as are reached in the course of 
investment implementation, up to 80 percent of the 
contract price could be disbursed in advance. 
Activities supporting ERUPT 
The Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs realised that 
to make ERUPT successful, it would require addi-
tional actions. The main supporting activities are 
given here. 
MoUs with host countries  
The Dutch Governments has signed Memoranda of 
Understanding (MoUs) with host countries. In these 
agreements host countries agree to put aside a certain 
amount of emission reduction that can be transferred 
to the Dutch Government as a framework for JI pro-
jects. The MoUs contain obligations for the Nether-
lands with respect to capacity building.  
Capacity building 
Capacity building comprises support of the institu-
tional set-up and staff of a JI unit, support in the de-
velopment of procedures and decision-making, trans-
fer of knowledge and training in Joint Implementa-
tion and ERUPT. The Netherlands Government has 
started projects for capacity building in Bulgaria and 
Romania. The longer-term perspective to secure the 
continuity of capacity building is also covered. The 
secondary objective of the assignment is therefore to 
contribute to a sustainable capacity in Bulgaria and 
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Romania in the field of Joint Implementation and 
climate change. 
It is the intention of the Ministry of Economic Af-
fairs to support initial capacity building activities for 
a limited time period. On a longer term other donor 
countries are envisaged to make use of the same unit. 
To achieve this it is important to have a sustainable 
unit that has a base of broad support within the host 
country. 
Operational guidelines for baseline studies 
Operational guidelines for baseline studies, valida-
tion, monitoring and verification have also been de-
veloped by request of the Ministry of Economic Af-
fairs. A key requirement is that the emission reduc-
tion9 from the project is real, measurable and long-
term. In order to determine the impact on greenhouse 
gas reduction so-called baseline studies and moni-
toring reports are required. The baseline study esti-
mates the emissions in absence of the project and 
compares it with the emissions related to the imple-
mentation of the project. They should therefore be 
used as a tool to estimate the anticipated emission 
reductions. Monitoring reports are required when the 
project is in operation to check if the emission reduc-
tion took place. 
The set of guidelines was developed by Det Norske 
Veritas and ECN and reviewed by an international 
expert panel. It provides operational guidelines and 
background information on the development of base-
line studies and monitoring reports for Joint Imple-
mentation (JI) projects under the first tender of the 
ERUPT.10 The guidelines aim to provide guidance 
applicable to all kinds of JI projects. The guidelines 
provide a 11 clear steps that need to be considered in 
the design of a baseline study. The guidelines opt for 
baselines that will not be modified before the first 
crediting period as long as the project is not modified. 
Other support 
Several other supporting activities were organised. 
This included workshops for project developers aim-
ing to explain the structure and procedure of ERUPT 
and to give practical instructions how to set up a 
baseline study. Workshops for validators were also 
organised to train them in the validation of baseline 
studies. The Dutch Government has accepted various 
validators. The validators have to compete for valida-
tion and monitoring activities. 
Another kind of support was a limited financial 
transfer to project developers to lower transaction 
cost associated with baseline studies and validation. 
Early experiences with ERUPT 
The experience with ERUPT so far is satisfying. 
Twenty-six Expressions of Interest were received for 
                                                           
9 It should be noted that in these guidelines the term emis-
sion reduction also covers sequestration and sink enhance-
ment projects. 
10 The first tender of ERUPT was open between May 15 
and July 17, 2000 for expressions of interest. 
JI projects in Phase I of the first ERUPT tender. This 
covered a range of countries in Eastern Europe that 
included MoU countries as well as countries that 
have not signed a MoU with the Netherlands.  About 
half the project developers is from the Netherlands, 
the other half is from other Western European coun-
tries.  
From these 26 projects 9 were selected for the sec-
ond phase. This selection includes cogeneration (dis-
trict heating), wind energy, hydropower, biomass, 
reforestation and landfill gas extraction. The contract 
value of the nine projects totals  72 million on a 
total investment volume of almost  500 million. As 
claimed in the Expressions of Interest, the CO2 emis-
sion reduction amounts to 9 Mton for the first budget 
period, or 1.8 Mton per year. If this claimed emission 
reduction will be supported by the baseline study and 
validated, the average price would amount to 8 
/ERU. This price is at the higher end of the esti-
mated price range. The host countries for the projects 
include Romania, Poland and the Czech Republic 
By February 15 2001 these project developers have 
to submit detailed project design documents, a vali-
dated baseline and a Letter of Approval from the host 
country. Senter expects the first contracts to be 
signed by April 2001. 
Recent developments in climate policy and 
emission projections 
At CoP-6 Parties failed to reach an agreement on the 
rules and guideline for the mechanisms. This failure 
has consequences for the Dutch JI and CDM activi-
ties. Before CoP-6 the second tender of ERUPT was 
scheduled for early 2001. A consequence of the fail-
ure of CoP-6 in The Hague is that the second tender 
is postponed. If CoP-6 Part II will be able to nail 
down details on the flexible mechanisms, the second 
tender of ERUPT may start after the summer of 2001. 
For CDM, the Dutch have the intention to start 
ERUPT-CDM before the summer of 2001 if prepara-
tions to set up the programme go smoothly. 
The first evaluation moment for the Dutch climate 
policy is early 2002. Therefore information will be 
collected in the course of 2001 on the success of pol-
icy measures and emission projections with the re-
lated uncertainties.  
Early evidence from energy statistics shows that 
despite high economic growth, emissions have grown 
less than the latest set of scenarios projected. The 
main reason is that the economic structure has 
changed more rapidly than expected. Other causes are 
the implemented energy conservation instruments 
and the increased import of electricity. Recent emis-
sion projections confirm this: CO2 emissions for 2010 
are expected to be about 23 less than emissions from 
the scenario that was used to as policy reference (see 
Figure 1). 
ENER Forum 1. Integrating the Kyoto Mechanisms into the National Framework,  
Krakow, Poland, 8-9 February 2001  
ENER 23.01 19 
 
100
120
140
160
180
200
220
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
M
to
n 
C
O
2 New projection
GC
DE
EC
 
Figure. 1. CO2 emission projections: new projection 
and earlier scenarios (GC, EC and DE) (Ybema et al, 
2001) 
Conclusions 
There are many ways to integrate CDM and JI in a 
national climate policy. The Netherlands has taken its 
own decisions. With the experience gained so far it 
can be concluded that: 
• The Netherlands is at the forefront in implement-
ing climate policy; 
• A balance should be aimed at between domestic 
measures and measures abroad; 
• The experience with ERUPT so far indicates that 
a pragmatic approach works. It is recommended 
to built and refine JI and CDM programmes on 
experience gained 
• Future JI and CDM activities of the Dutch Gov-
ernment will depend on the outcome of CoP-6 
Part II, GHG emission trends for the Netherlands 
and the relative success of other JI and CDM 
tenders. 
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Abstract. The Kyoto flexibility instruments, in particular 
Joint implementation (JI) and Clean Development Mecha-
nism (CDM) have underlying risks which need adequate 
risk management strategies. After having discussed the 
main difference between International Emissions Trading 
(IET) and Joint Implementation (both involve exchange of 
emission permits among Annex 1 countries to the Kyoto 
Protocol), the paper points out the main risk components, 
mainly associated to the quantity of emission credits, the 
price of emission permits, the costs in period t, the uncer-
tainty in the discount rate and in project (crediting) lifetime. 
Risks can be diminished by the strategy of portfolio diver-
sification, in particular by suitable blends between JI and 
CDM projects through carbon funds or Kyoto funds. An-
other issue to consider is the commercial insurance associ-
ated to the Kyoto flexibility instruments. The discussion of 
these risk strategies shows that a variety of research ques-
tions are still in an earlier stage and need to be further clari-
fied by R&D projects and pilot projects.  
Introduction 
What I want to do today is to share with you a few 
thoughts on risk management of investments in JI 
projects, and I will do this in the following order. 
First of all, talking about Joint Implementation (JI) 
we need to have some common understanding what 
we mean by JI, and I will try to put forward some 
thoughts on the nature of JI. Talking about risk man-
agement we need to identify what are the risks. Next, 
after having identified the risks, we can think about 
managing or hedging those risks, and one option is to 
diversify risks through carbon funds or Kyoto funds, 
and I will explain the basic idea behind that. A classi-
cal risk management instrument is commercial insur-
ance by insurance companies. I will also put forward 
some thoughts on this tool before I conclude. 
Nature of Joint Implementation JI 
We all know the Kyoto mechanisms of the Kyoto 
Protocol encompass three mechanisms: (i) Joint Im-
plementation JI, that are basically projects in Annex 1 
countries and transfer of resulting emission permits 
or so-called ERUs to another Annex 1 country. (ii) 
CDM projects, i.e. climate protection projects in non-
Annex 1 countries,  and resulting  emission permit 
transfer again to Annex 1 countries. (iii) International 
emissions trading that is basically international trans-
fer of emission permits again among Annex 1 coun-
tries. 
 
                                                           
11 Transcription of the oral presentation by J. Janssen. 
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What strikes one at the first glance is that there are 
two instruments for the international transfer of emis-
sion permits among Annex 1 countries. What is the 
difference between these two instruments? Several 
criteria have been proposed to distinguish JI and In-
ternational emissions trading. One criteria relates to 
trading between governments versus legal entities, 
the private sector or companies. It has been argued 
that international emissions trading is only for gov-
ernments. Consequently, if the companies want to 
have an international transfer of emission permits, 
they need to refer to JI. This is one idea for distin-
guishing the two instruments, though it is not my 
opinion. It is just a criteria.  
 
Another criterion is that the production of emission 
permits might or might not involve international in-
vestments. It has been argued that for JI projects 
some international investments are needed. Otherwise 
they would not qualify as JI. Consequently, if there is 
no international investment we would have some 
kind of international emissions trading. I would argue 
it is not a necessary condition to have international 
investments in JI projects. To illustrate this: if we 
have a foreign investor investing in Poland for exam-
ple, and subsequently emission permits would be 
transferred to another entity in Poland, this would not 
be an JI project. So international investments are not 
a distinguishing feature of JI. What is necessary is 
that we have international transfer of emission per-
mits irrespective if we have international investments 
or not. For example a Polish company investing in an 
emission protection project in Poland and subse-
quently transferring emission permit to Switzerland, 
that would be a perfect JI project.  
 
Another criteria, which is very convincing:  
We have different trading systems in general. In the 
literature we find the cap-and-trade system (a very 
prominent example is the US SO2 trading system and 
we will hear later on the European proposal, and also 
the Cap-and-Allowances trading system in Denmark 
and in the UK. In the UK they have a mixture of both 
systems). Cap-and-allowances is basically that we 
define a cap, a maximum limit of emissions for a 
group and then that cap is allocated to single partici-
pants who have to stick to that cap. The cap is de-
fined in terms of absolute  emissions.  A second sys-
tem is the baseline-and-credit system. International 
emission trading and JI can be characterised by the 
type of underlying trading system.  
 
In summary the Kyoto flexibility mechanisms, in-
cluding the CDM, might be characterised according 
to the following list of criteria: 
 
Risks of Investments in JI Projects 
Why is it relevant to carry out risk management for JI 
projects? 
• JI investors are first of all interested in attractive 
risk return profiles of the project. 
K
J 
K
JI
JI
JI 
JI 
JI
ENER Forum 1. Integrating the Kyoto Mechanisms into the National Framework,  
Krakow, Poland, 8-9 February 2001  
ENER 23.01 21 
 
• Second, realisation of potential welfare gains 
involved with JI projects takes place only if in-
vestment risks are low enough. 
• Third, efficient and effective global mitigation 
policy requires availability of risk management 
tools. 
The risk management process takes place along the 
following lines: 
• Determining objectives of risk management 
• Identifying risks 
• Evaluating risks 
• Selecting risk treatment devices 
• Implementing the decision 
• Evaluating and reviewing 
The basic starting point for the risk analysis of JI 
Projects is given by the following formula for the 
investment value, the components of which will be 
discussed in the following. 
 
The revenue can be further decomposed into the 
price of the permit and the quantity  of emission per-
mits generated by the JI (or CDM) project. 
 
Risk Component: Quantity of Emission Credits 
Determining the Quantity of Emission Credits is 
based on the following definitions: 
• JI involves: reductions in emissions...that are 
additional to any that would otherwise occur. 
• CDM involves: reductions in emissions that are 
additional to any that would occur in the absence 
of the ... project activity. 
• Both statements are based on the issue of envi-
ronmental additionality (which includes the base-
line issue). 
 
Just to bring it to your mind again: there is the 
baseline and the actual project emissions and the dif-
ference are the emission credits or permits we have 
generated. Now, several methods are discussed in the 
international debate, how to determine baselines. 
Without entering details, there are on the one hand 
project-specific baselines, and they apply to a con-
crete single project, and we have multi-project base-
lines which apply to multiple project types. In this 
case one tries to standardise emission levels or rates 
or intensities or procedures for defining baselines. 
There is some excellent service by the OECD on 
baseline determination for your further information. 
 
Another distinction that is relevant is that we could 
define baselines in absolute  emission levels (e.g. the 
baseline of a project could just be 100 t CO2  per 
year). or we could define baselines in terms of emis-
sion rates or intensities, relative to the product output 
of the project (x tonnes of CO2  per kWh or per tonne 
of cement produced). Both approaches are valid. We 
do not have any decision so far on which approach 
should prevail, but they have fundamentally different 
implications. This aspect  has been neglected in the 
international debate which has focussed rather on the 
technical details. Another aspect of baselines is that 
they might be adjusted during the lifetime of projects.  
J
J
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Just to have a more thorough understanding of the 
quantity of emission permits in the case of baselines 
defined as emission rates: The quantity is basically 
the difference between our baseline emission stan-
dard and our actual emission rate multiplied with the 
product output.  If we actually manage to be below 
the baseline and if we increase product output  we 
will also have an increase of emission permits gener-
ated by the project.  That is the danger of intensities.  
Finally, at the aggregate level, we could end up with 
being below our baselines but we will not reach our 
target because the production of the product has in-
creased so much . That is also a major concern of the 
European Union about the negotiate agreements with 
industry, because industry wants to have emission 
rates but there is no certainty that with intensities we 
will reach our Kyoto target. 
 
If we look at the other case were we have baselines 
in terms of levels: obviously actual emissions of the 
project  again depend on our product output and on 
actual emission rates.  This is a different formula and 
it has completely different implications.  If we pro-
duce more of a product then, at the same time, we 
will have a reduction in emission permits generated 
(see the sign of the first derivative which is negative 
in this case).  And here we have different risk factors, 
for example the product output cannot be controlled 
necessarily; it depends on the demand on the market. 
The actual emission rate is effected by technological 
risks. Baseline emissions are affected by political 
risks in terms of rules  for baseline determination.  
 
With non-CO2  emissions, additional risks are 
added with respect to the quantity of emissions: 
 
Risk Component: Price of Emission Permits 
So far a few thoughts about risks related to the quan-
tities of our project. The other component of revenue 
is price. There are some price projections as listed 
below for a few models. There you see huge uncer-
tainties in terms of future prices. Which price will I 
get for my permits?  I do not know! Everybody is 
telling another story.  But just to have a rough idea, a 
guidance, we could try to take the average, which is 8 
US$ per tonne of CO2 .  The average is not always a 
good indicator. If we have a very wide dispersion in 
our estimates we might want to have an idea what is 
the median. The median is 7 US$ per tonne of CO2  
which is quite close to the average. There are already 
some transactions in the revert (e.g. in New York, 
London and Oslo). The (forward) price they get now 
for permission permits to be delivered in 2010 (i.e. 
not a spot price) is around 1.25 to 2.5 US$ per tonne 
of CO2 .  The World Bank Prototype Carbon Fund is 
aiming at a price of 5.5 US$/tonne CO2 . BP had an 
internal trading scheme, and so far prices revealed by 
the internal trading scheme is around 20 US$/tonne 
CO2 , but they are very hopeful that prices will go 
down further.   
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Risk Component: Costs in Period t 
On the cost side basic risk components of the permits 
stem from the fact that: 
• abatement or mitigation costs are uncertain 
• transaction costs are uncertain, e.g. due to 
• Baseline determination 
• Project approval 
• Project verification and certification 
• Adaptation and administration levy on CDM 
(and JI?) projects 
• Brokerage fees 
• etc.  
Risk Component: Discount Rate 
Next component is the discount rate; we need to dis-
count our cash flows. There is a formula to calculate 
your discount rate which you should apply as a com-
pany (based on the capital asset pricing model). 
There are some components in it which all will 
change during time.  
 
Risk Component: Project lifetime 
The next component is the T, i.e. the time horizon or 
the duration of the project. This is the issue of the 
crediting lifetime of JI projects.  The crediting life-
time is the time during which the project can generate 
emission credits.  This is still an open question. Rules 
are not yet decided. What is very probable from the 
perspective of an investor is that a country will not 
approve a baseline beyond 2012, because it does not 
know what would be the commitment by that time. It 
would be foolish for the host country to approve a 
baseline after 2012.  
 
Risk Diversification through Kyoto Funds 
How can we manage those risks? One standard ap-
proach in managing risks of assets in finance is risk 
diversification. That relies on the fact that the risk of 
a portfolio of several more risky assets is reduced 
compared to the risk of one individual asset. 
 
That is statistical fact used in finance. It occurs if 
the risks of the different individual assets are not per-
fectly correlated with each other.  
 
 
What are the implications or the recommendations 
from this? If you want to build up a portfolio of dif-
ferent projects, put those projects in your portfolio 
which have a negative or a weak positive risk correla-
tion. This is a basic underlying principle of carbon 
funds or Kyoto funds. Below is the formula for calcu-
lating the risk, which is a standard statistical formula  
J
J
J
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Just to have a visual idea of its implication. Lets 
consider a JI project that has an expected return of 5. 
The project has some risk, and we are not sure that 
the project really gets a return of 5. This risk can be 
depicted by some probability density function. The 
risk can be measured by the variance or in equivalent 
terms by the standard deviation. And lets say this is 
30 in our case. If we have then another project, a 
CDM project, here our expected return is 10, i.e. 
higher than in the previous case, but we have also a 
higher risk. For an investor it is difficult to say, which 
project to choose.    
 
But we have some criteria for the decision (some of 
which are quite weak): 
 
In the case of our two projects, if we combine them 
in a portfolio, we end up with the following risk re-
turn profile: Higher return than our investment in the 
JI project only, and the risk is lower. So it is good not 
to invest all our money in the JI project, but also to 
invest some of our money in the CDM project. Here, 
the assumption is that we actually have half of our 
money in the JI  project and half in the CDM project.  
 
We could actually try not just to invest 50%/50% 
but could combine other ratios for the investment. 
We would get the following curve which describes 
the combination of all possible portfolios between 
those two projects. If your are familiar with finance 
this called an efficiency frontier.  All projects with 
are left to the JI project are better than just the JI pro-
ject alone. In all these cases we increase the return 
without increasing the risk. 
 
We could achieve such diversification through in-
vestments in funds which would invest in different 
projects. In return the fund would get the emission 
permits, and the permits could be distributed to the 
individual investors on a pro rata basis. Alternatively 
the fund could direct emission permits into the mar-
ket, get the cash return and distribute the cash return 
to investors. (This is useful only if the fund wants to 
diversify price risks. Otherwise there is no benefit in 
selling permits on the market).  
There are already some Kyoto funds initiatives: 
• WB Prototype Carbon Fund 
• EBRD-Dexia 
• Credit Lyonnais (private sector bank) 
• UBS (Switzerland) 
• etc. 
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Commercial Insurance 
Commercial insurance is another strategy to handle 
risks. We all know an insurance contract is described 
by a an insurance premium. We need to pay and in 
return we get a compensation, if a specific event 
causes a loss. In the context of JI projects we have 
different causes that can generate a loss, e.g. we 
could have technological under-performance, or base-
line adjustments, and so on.  
 
Not all risk are insurable. Insurance companies will 
not be prepared or willing to insure all risks. They 
need to meet certain criteria: 
 
In the context of Kyoto mechanisms projects we 
would envisage to have an extension of some existing 
coverages. There are business interruption insurance 
for consequential loss (e.g. if a machinery breaks 
down, for some months we get a compensation of 
resulting losses because we cannot produce a product, 
products cannot be sold, we cannot produce emission 
credits, emission credits cannot be sold etc...). This is 
an easy extension of existing insurance schemes. We 
have already some technology performance insurance 
that could also be extended in order to cover losses 
associated with the non-production of emission per-
mits. Further fire insurance (for sink projects) or po-
litical risk insurance could also be extended.  Or we 
could have some new kind of risk insurance, e.g. for 
counterparty risk or for liability insurance. Some 
companies are already developing insurance schemes, 
for example Swiss Re, has finalised a feasibility 
study. They consider to go ahead and to develop new 
insurance schemes.  
 
Outlook 
A variety of the questions mentioned in this contribu-
tion as being open questions will be further investi-
gated by an R&D project co-financed by the Euro-
pean Commission under the lead of IWO. Here are ist 
main features: 
• German insurance company; Italian bank; Brit-
ish/US-American emissions broker; IWO (lead). 
• Development of insurance schemes for Kyoto 
Mechanisms: insurability of risks; optimal design 
of insurance contracts; insurance and risk premi-
ums. 
• Development of a Kyoto fund, based on quanti-
tative analysis of efficient risk diversification. 
• Project finance and Kyoto Mechanism. 
• Case studies. 
K 
J 
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Participation of DCs in climate 
change prevention: CDM and 
beyond.12  
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Abstract. An agreement on CDM rules is important both 
for industrialised and developing countries. As a flexibility 
mechanism, it will allow industrialised countries to benefit 
from low cost emission reductions but the CDM, as a main 
goal, should also stimulate a more sustainable economic 
development in DCs.  
The CDM is the sole instrument, with GEF, proposed for 
DCs participation into climate change prevention. This 
situation satisfies a majority of DCs, but CDM may not 
offer sufficient perspectives for some countries with rapid 
industrialisation given the huge economic stakes linked to 
the creation of a carbon credits market between Annex I 
countries. 
The operationality of the CDM is not yet established and 
important questions, as environmental additionality, are 
still unresolved. Here we first examine the rules in order to 
validate project additionality and their possible conse-
quences on the effectiveness and the scope of the mecha-
nism. The different reaction of major DCs groups on the 
structure of the mechanism will then be analysed. This will 
lead us to examine the possibilities to enlarge participation 
of DCs in climate change prevention according to the ap-
parent wish of countries with rapid industrialisation. 
 
Introduction 
The CDM was created as the result of interest con-
flict between industrialised and developing countries. 
The former, bearing historical main responsibility for 
the increase in greenhouse gas concentrations, com-
mitted themselves not only to limit their emissions, 
but also to facilitate the transfer of climate-friendly 
technology and to provide developing countries with 
new and additional financial resources. The latter 
gave priority to their development needs; their in-
volvement in the prevention of climatic risk depends 
principally on the transfers of technology and finance 
from the richest countries. 
At Kyoto, the question of strengthening Annex I 
countries commitments brought the debate on the 
North/South joint implementation back onto the 
agenda. Some Annex I countries only accepted higher 
reduction targets on condition that they could resort 
                                                           
12 A extended version of this paper may be find on IEPE 
internet site :  
http://www.upmf-grenoble.fr/iepe 
13 IEPE-CNRS, BP 47, 38040 Grenoble cedex 9, France  
Tél. : 33 (0) 4 76 51 42 40  Fax : 33 (0) 4 76 51 45 27  
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to flexibility measures, especially the North/South 
flexibility. Joint implementation is not explicitly 
mentioned in the Kyoto Protocol but the concept, 
unchanged, has been implemented among Annex I 
countries (East/West) and less clearly between devel-
oped and developing countries in the CDM. How-
ever, a fundamental new dimension is introduced, as 
the CDM should also assist Parties not included in 
Annex I in achieving sustainable development (PK, 
Art 12-2). 
The CDM is potentially more than just a flexibility 
mechanism and, unlike joint implementation, it has 
awakened real expectations from developing coun-
tries. By favouring investment projects more clearly 
seen as development priorities in host countries, it 
could lead to new investment flows and speed up the 
transfer of technology and know-how. It introduces 
the possibility of effectively integrating developing 
countries into the general climatic risk prevention 
effort, while respecting their need to develop further. 
Nevertheless, it poses basically the same problems as 
those encountered by joint implementation (Dixon, 
1999): without rigorous checks on additionality of 
projects and the actuality of associated reductions, the 
creation of the CDM could undermine the aim of the 
Convention, namely the stabilisation of greenhouse 
gas concentrations. Although eastern countries have 
quantified commitments and developing countries 
have not, the rules and methods to apply would be 
very similar, with the exception of projects being 
implemented bilaterally, directly between the investor 
and the host country, as it has been suggested for 
small projects, in a fast track approach. 
Most of the DCs can find in the CDM a way to sat-
isfy their needs. But other ones wish to play a more 
active role in reducing emissions and also in 
participating in the technology market and 
commercial flows linked to carbon credit market. 
They fear, if the CDM framework is too strict, of 
being excluded from new economic and industrial 
opportunities; and, consequently, they fear for their 
social and economic development. For them it is 
necessary to enlarge the CDM rules, and to examine 
different options for a better participation in overall 
climate-friendly actions and mechanisms. 
A legitimate need for environmental addi-
tionality 
Annex I countries consider North/South flexibility to 
be essential because it allows access to emission re-
ductions at a lower cost. It is however potentially 
dangerous in terms of the Conventions ultimate aim, 
as it introduces the possibility of credits being pro-
duced in countries without any binding quantitative 
commitments. Without the application of control 
checks for quantified emissions targets, there is noth-
ing to prevent the sale of fictitious credits and 
large-scale production of tropical hot air14 in non-
                                                           
14 Tropical hot air is the term usually applied by the ne-
gotiators to describe the production of fictitious emission 
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Annex I countries. It is therefore essential for the 
activities undertaken in the context of the CDM to 
bring about additional emission reductions, that is, 
reductions that would not have occurred had the in-
centive provided by the CDM not been there. 
Two major methodological approaches have been 
proposed in an effort to resolve this question. The 
first consists in analysing the projects on a case by 
case basis, while the second uses a more standardised 
process based on the definition of reference practices 
The project-by-project approach: more rigorous but 
much more expensive 
Measuring the additionality of a CDM activity is 
based on the need to know what would happen if no 
additional income from the sale of credits in the 
CDM was available. Would another project have 
been implemented, or would the environment-
friendly project have been realised in any case? 
The economic analysis allows this question to be 
answered. It can thus be assumed that an economi-
cally profitable project without emission credit valua-
tion would probably be implemented without any 
consideration for global environment. On the other 
hand, if the same project costs the investor more than 
a reference option less favourable to the environment, 
it would only be implemented if the value of the car-
bon credits allows the additional cost to be offset. 
In this kind of additionality approach, for each pro-
ject a specific baseline is defined and the CDM activ-
ity is evaluated in comparison with it. The aim is to 
limit as far as possible the «windfall» effects that 
could result from setting up the CDM. For some, this 
method is the only one that truly allows the environ-
mental additionality of CDM activities to be guaran-
teed and to guard against mass production of ficti-
tious credits in DCs. 
The pilot phase of Activities Implemented Jointly15 
has however shown that constructing baselines has in 
some cases proved particularly difficult (Beuermann 
et alii, 2000; Dixon, 1999). Moreover, this additional-
ity approach, based on economic profitability, is not 
necessarily consistent with the investors real deci-
sion-making processes that include also subjective 
aspects. Projects that appear profitable on paper are 
sometimes not realised, while others, initially less 
attractive, will be implemented without taking ac-
count of carbon credits. In these conditions, it is im-
possible to assess the additionality of a project using 
only its economic profitability as a basis. 
The additionality of an investment must also be as-
sessed in a context of asymmetry of information, 
which leaves investors free to manipulate certain pa-
rameters in their favour. One of the regulatory bodies 
of the pilot phase, the Joint Implementation Registra-
                                                                                       
reductions in developing countries because of the imple-
mentation of non-additional projects.  
15 In the pilot phase, we say Activities Implemented 
Jointly and not joint implementation, in order to indicate 
that the projects thus realised cannot lead to the granting of 
emission credits.  
tion Centre in the Netherlands, acknowledged once 
its task was completed that economic criteria can be 
manipulated quite easily and will always be met by 
creative bookkeeping, and that it was therefore diffi-
cult to answer the question does the investment go 
beyond the investments that would be made other-
wise? (JIRC, 2000). In consequence, this additional-
ity approach has the major inconvenience, from the 
investors viewpoint, of being partly unforeseeable.  
The need for the investor to draw up a specific 
reference situation, and the need for the regulator to 
analyse the relevance and genuineness of information 
supplied for each individual project, make this 
method relatively expensive. The more rigorous and 
precise the checking and validation of the emission 
credits, the higher the cost, and therefore the higher 
the risk of increased transaction costs for each pro-
ject. 
The risk that the size of the CDM will be limited 
through investors being put off by the excessive com-
plexity of the project validation procedures has led to 
other means of monitoring environmental addi-
tionality being introduced.  
Standardised approaches: simplicity versus strict-
ness? 
The use of technology lists is the first means by 
which additionality can be standardised and simpli-
fied (Hargrave et alii, 1998). Additional technologies 
are defined a priori according to the country or the 
socio-economic context. These technology lists could 
be revised periodically to take account of changes 
noted such as dissemination of certain types of tech-
nology or the advent of new options, and could lead 
to the creation of technological matrices with a tem-
poral aspect. 
The practice of benchmarking, an alternative to 
the above approach, is based on the same logic of 
standardisation. Reference or standard figures are 
produced for the environmental efficiency criteria of 
a sector: for example, carbon content per kWh for the 
electricity sector or per tonne of cement for cement 
works16. Every project that produces an emission 
level below the limit must be considered to be addi-
tional, regardless of the technology used. Bench-
marks have an advantage over technological matri-
ces because there is no need to identify all the addi-
tional technologies beforehand. 
In both cases, the main idea is to lay down refer-
ences beforehand for use as pointers in quickly as-
sessing the additionality of proposals submitted to the 
regulator and their impact in terms of emissions. It is 
not necessary any longer to carry out an ex ante in-
depth study of each project. So, the project approval 
procedure will become at once more predictable and 
less expensive, and thus meet the wishes of investors 
for a simpler and more transparent system In addi-
                                                           
16 This type of indicator also poses a reference problem. 
What should be considered: the average for the equipment 
installed, the upper tenth, the most efficient equipment, or 
the most recent installation? 
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tion, these approaches lend themselves to a dynamic 
application based on periodic redefinition of refer-
ence thresholds, taking account of technological pro-
gress. 
Although less accurate than the project-by-project 
additionality analysis, the standardised approach pro-
vides much more of an incentive for potential inves-
tors, and we can suppose that it would be required for 
small projects producing only a limited amount of 
emission credits. 
On the other hand, for large projects, a case-by-
case approach may be justified initially, despite its 
limits, with the expectation that the benefit of experi-
ence will lead to the standardised approach being 
refined and thus effectively limiting non-additional 
projects. 
What will be the environmental efficiency for the 
CDM? 
Behind the debate on CDM project additionality as-
sessment procedures is a broader one on geographical 
flexibility and on the involvement of developing 
countries in global warming prevention. This debate 
opposes supporters of a strict definition for addition-
ality and those in favour of a more dynamic approach 
to the CDM. 
It is in fact essential to be equipped with means of 
assessing additionality in order to prevent the large-
scale production of fictitious emission reductions 
from frustrating the aims of the Convention. There is 
however a risk that laying down excessively complex 
rules in an anxiety to create a legitimate level of 
strictness, will dissuade potential investors from par-
ticipating in the CDM and ultimately limit its size. 
The relevance of the CDM is not confined to more 
flexibility for Annex I countries; it is also aimed at 
favouring and accelerating cleaner and more efficient 
technology adoption in developing countries. 
Some people believe that it would be beneficial to 
accept a limited percentage of non-additional projects 
if the CDM were capable of boosting investment in 
DCs, in a more environment-friendly way. Without 
losing sight of the need to guarantee project 
additionality, the validation procedure should be 
simplified so as to favour the instruments status as 
an incentive; the CDM would benefit from greater 
investment and therefore a net increase in emission 
credits, despite a simultaneous increase in the 
proportion of non-additional projects. In dynamic 
terms, the spillover effect produced by enlarged 
dissemination would also benefit the global 
environment. The proposals aimed at developing the 
sectoral or programme-based approach in the context 
of the CDM point in this direction (cf. infra). 
The CDM would become a means of aiding devel-
opment and allowing benefiting from short term ad-
vantages of flexibility. But the main goal would be-
come thus, from the dynamic viewpoint, to steering 
the DCs towards sustainable development paths by 
facilitating the adoption of cleaner and more efficient 
technologies. 
Different expectations and strategies among 
developing countries 
After COP4, the negotiations around the Buenos 
Aires Plan let know the positions and preferences of 
developing countries, which are a general agreement 
on some points, but also sharply differing expecta-
tions of what the CDM should bring to developing 
countries. 
The first point of agreement is that the CDM cannot 
be limited to North/South joint implementation. Its 
role is more fundamental: while allowing developing 
countries to participate in the overall fight against 
global warming, it must also contribute to the eco-
nomic and social development of these countries. 
DCs also believe that CDM activities should be un-
dertaken with respect for their national sovereignty 
and national development priorities, and that host 
countries should adopt a proactive role with regard to 
project eligibility and monitoring and credit availabil-
ity; 
In other respects, the differences between countries 
are great, especially in matter of equity, eligible ac-
tivities and initiatives taken by national actors. The 
sharp differences expressed in the area of project fi-
nancing and how the CDM should work, reveal very 
different perceptions of the CDM and its potential 
effect on the countries in question. In the negotiations 
on the implementation of CDM, three possible basic 
approaches17 for organising the mechanism have ap-
peared: a bilateral approach, a multilateral one and an 
unilateral one. These different approaches may be 
combined to produce a mixed model, combining the 
advantages inherent in certain models. It has been 
suggested that the bilateral and unilateral approaches 
could be combined so as to profit from both the effi-
ciency of the former and the fairness of the latter. The 
unilateral approach would necessarily be associated 
with one of the two others. 
The preferences expressed for one or another 
method of organising the CDM18 are clearly affected 
by the economic properties of the countries in ques-
tion, but also by their political relationships. It will be 
noticed that these choices and preferences are never 
expressed in absolute terms, but depend on how the 
climate-related negotiations unfold. We present the 
positions of three groups of countries as they seem 
typical of  DCs perceptions and preferences. 
China and India in favour of a strictly bilateral ap-
proach 
For these two countries, CDM projects must work in 
a strict bilateral relation between an Annex I country 
investor and a non-Annex I country, so as to assess 
better the scope and implementation of the projects 
and limit outside influences on national development 
                                                           
17 For a more comprehensive treatment of the approaches, 
see Yamin, 1998; and Baumert, 2000. 
18 This analysis relies on the official contributions (about 
the CDM) from the non-Annex I Parties to the climate-
related negotiations. 
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options. In addition, they wish to restrict the use of 
credits produced in favour of the investor country 
alone. The emission credit should not be transferable 
or exchanged on markets. In a strict bilateral relation 
it is easier to justify such a restriction. 
This position is indicative more of opposition in 
principle to North/South flexibility than of fear of not 
being able to control the resultant investment flows. 
For India and China, a very rigid CDM of limited 
size would not be a problem to them, as their eco-
nomic size and level of development have made them 
very attractive for a number of large-scale projects. 
They are already attracting a significant proportion of 
private investment19 and also receiving the most 
ODA. Their arguments as to the specific role of this 
mechanism are largely rhetorical or political, and 
aimed at other developing countries and the G77 and 
China. 
AOSIS20, the African countries, and some Central 
and South American countries: a multilateral ap-
proach aimed at better allocating the benefits of the 
CDM 
The countries preferring to choose the multilateral 
approach make up a group of territories of modest 
economic and geographical size; most of them are 
vulnerable to climatic change. They consider that  
they are often marginalized by purely market-based 
instruments, being not attractive enough for obtaining 
projects. These fears have been increased by what 
happened during the AIJ pilot phase, during which 
the African countries and small island states were 
granted only a tiny number of projects (Menanteau, 
1997). 
Of these countries, the smallest and poorest do not 
have the means to organise the financing of projects 
or to implement them independently. A centralised 
multilateral finance arrangement would have the ad-
vantage of directing the funds and projects more 
fairly from a geographical point of view, without 
excluding the least developed countries. In addition, 
dissociating supply of and demand for projects would 
have the effect of limiting the dependence on busi-
nesses and on the Northern States. Finally, because of 
their limited power of negotiation, the smaller coun-
tries are hoping to obtain more advantageous certified 
emission reduction prices and a more favourable dis-
tribution of profits. 
Most Central and South American countries, and 
South Korea, for a unilateral approach 
The countries wishing for a unilateral approach to the 
CDM are all semi-industrialised countries of average 
                                                           
19 Within the DCs, China is the commonest destination of 
foreign direct investment, with 30,4% of the total in 1997. 
India is the tenth. China is the main beneficiary of ODA ; 
India is the third. (Baumert et Kete, 2000). 
20 The AOSIS (Alliance of Small Island States) is a coali-
tion of 42 small island countries whose survival is threat-
ened by climate change. It is very much involved in cli-
mate-negotiations. 
economic size, which have their own clean technol-
ogy or are capable of implementing it. Some of them, 
like Costa Rica, Mexico, Brazil, have demonstrated 
yet their capacity to select and implement projects 
and to organise financing. 
Several arguments have been put forward in favour 
of unilateral implementation; most notably, greater 
consistency with national development priorities, a 
willingness to develop domestic greenhouse gas miti-
gation programmes, and South/South co-operation 
initiatives. However, the main argument in favour of 
unilateral approach is that these countries also wish to 
benefit from the income obtained from the sale of 
credits by completing projects in their own territory 
or in other developing countries. In fact, these semi-
industrialised countries do not wish to remain re-
moved from the new industrial and business potential 
opened by the creation of the CDM. They are fearful 
that their industrial development will be hampered if 
the Annex I countries are the only ones to profit from 
the technological push that could be help for by the 
CDM.  
The expectations implicit in these various positions 
suggest that some countries would like to exceed the 
limits laid down by the CDM and play a larger and 
more active part in the prevention of climatic 
changes. In this way the first two groups, namely 
China and India on one hand and the least advanced 
or poorest countries on the other, are strictly within 
the context of the CDM. The first group thinks that it 
will benefit from project flexibility in every way, the 
essence of things being that the industrialised coun-
tries make the greatest domestic effort. The second 
group wishes to benefit from the CDM, and with that 
in mind is making proposals aimed at adjusting the 
markets spontaneous tendencies. With regard to the 
countries in the third group, it seems essential for the 
rules of the CDM to be widened in order for them to 
benefit. They are therefore clearly advocating more 
active participation by the developing countries, 
within the bounds of the mechanism and possibly 
beyond. 
What are the perspectives for developing 
countries beyond CDM? 
Currently, the only way of including developing 
countries in the international global warming preven-
tion strategy is the CDM, which imposes certain lim-
its linked to the project-based flexibility approach. 
The first limit has been mentioned above as an in-
troduction to the debate on project additionality vali-
dation procedures. In the absence of quantified com-
mitments by the host countries, nothing can prevent 
anyone from strategic manipulation of baselines ex-
cept strict validation of additionality procedures.  
The second limit relates to the amount of credits 
likely to arise through project flexibility. Some emis-
sion reduction potentials are in fact difficult to mobi-
lise in the context of projects (energy management in 
households, for example), and require the implemen-
tation of specific programmes, measures and policies.  
ENER Forum 1. Integrating the Kyoto Mechanisms into the National Framework,  
Krakow, Poland, 8-9 February 2001  
30 ENER 23.01 
 
Finally, the opposition of developing countries to 
project-based flexibility can be explained in part by 
the fact that the investments that it produces may be 
conditional in nature. Joint Implementation pilot 
phase showed that a higher level of project integra-
tion into national environment and development pol-
icy would have been desirable (IEPE, 1997). Would 
things be different with CDM projects, as some de-
veloping countries cannot impose their own priorities 
to foreign investors? 
These restrictions have led some people to suggest 
that CDM should leave behind project flexibility in 
favour of a more sectoral approach, which will give 
the developing countries control over the projects, 
limit the risk of tropical hot air, and improve the po-
tential impact of the CDM. 
Enlarging CDM to include sectoral and programme-
based approaches 
Sectoral caps are an illustration of the attempts 
made to exceed the restrictions linked to project 
flexibility. The idea is, within a given country, to 
define reference emission paths for certain economic 
sectors and assess the CDM activities on the basis of 
this sectoral reference pattern. Because of the stakes 
that it offers, the electricity sector, for example, could 
be subjected to a sectoral approach; this would allow 
the potential emission credits to be contained, while 
making easier the implementation and increasing the 
field of action of the CDM. 
This approach was planned in the particular context 
of Joint Implementation between Annex I countries, 
working on the hypothesis that the national govern-
ments of the JI/AIJ host countries would use their 
overall (emission reduction) commitment as a basis 
to calculate commitments from various economic 
sectors or technologies (Jepma et alii, 1999). The 
idea is to distribute the national commitments among 
domestic stakeholders by assigning quantified objec-
tives to the economic sectors and maybe to the key 
economic actors. Instead of monitoring the impact of 
each project closely, it would then be sufficient to 
check that the amount of credits exported is consis-
tent with changes in emission levels for each sector 
on one hand and the accepted sectoral reference on 
the other hand. 
Other proposals aim to regularise the procedures 
for obtaining emission credits with a view to increas-
ing the incentive nature of the CDM, whilst preserv-
ing at the same time a guarantee of a level of project 
additionality21 
These various approaches have the common feature 
of offering a sectoral or programme-based determina-
tion of the volume of credits. Their interest is to make 
their implementation easier and leave it to the host 
countries to specify which programmes or sectors 
will be judged priority. But, they all encounter the 
                                                           
21 See especially the analysis of the potential lever effect 
of the CDM on policies and measures in developing coun-
tries (Mathy et alii, 2000). 
 
same difficulty, namely the definition of sectoral 
emission scenarios. Finally, these sectoral or pro-
gramme-based approaches do not provide a real op-
erational solution to the question of additionality. 
Neither do they offer the adaptability, independence 
nor overall flexibility based on the exchange of emis-
sion permits. 
Quantified commitments: the main restriction in a 
generalised permit exchange scheme  
Negotiable emission permit systems have an advan-
tage over basic instruments for projects such as the 
CDM, in that they produce closed trading systems 
that bring together countries bound by specifically 
quantified restrictive targets. At the opposite, CDM, 
like Joint Implementation, is an open trading sys-
tem that allows to associate all the parties to the Con-
vention, including those who have not taken quanti-
fied commitments. 
Closed trading is an equation that always comes to 
zero; whatever one win, the other loses, as the coun-
try transferring the emission credits to another has its 
objective altered in consequence. Monitoring this 
trading is a simple procedure, but the system can only 
be set up between countries that have undertaken to 
limit their emissions on a restrictive basis. 
Without restrictive undertakings, the CDM remains 
the only means of exchanging credits from develop-
ing countries, but carries the disadvantages men-
tioned above and also does not encourage those coun-
tries to make any real effort to control their green-
house gas emissions. On the contrary, as it is easier to 
reduce emissions in countries that have not made yet 
a specific effort in this area, the less virtuous coun-
tries will be those that most easily attract CDM inves-
tors by offering low cost reduction opportunities. 
The question can then be asked whether general 
application of binding commitments in developing 
countries is not the solution to look for in order to 
allow North/South emission reduction credits ex-
changes. By taking account of these countries devel-
opment needs, the allocation of an emissions budget 
would provide great incentive to implement more 
climate-friendly policies in order to benefit from 
emission rights income. The volume of credits and 
the income arising from them would be very much 
higher than those from the CDM projects alone, and 
also the independence in choosing the emission re-
duction policies to be implemented would be greater 
for host countries. 
Extending binding commitments to developing 
countries is not however on the agenda: no develop-
ing country is prepared to take a quantified commit-
ment to reduce or even mitigate its greenhouse gas 
emissions, primarily because of the restrictive effect 
that such an undertaking would have on its economic 
development22.  
                                                           
22 Developing countries are unwilling to accept restrictive 
commitments as first the Convention and then the Berlin 
Mandate laid down quantitative commitments on Annex I 
countries and not on non-Annex I, because of their com-
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Conclusion 
In the absence of a wholly satisfactory solution, in-
termediate solutions have been proposed in an at-
tempt to benefit from the adaptability and size of a 
global flexibility system, which would overcome the 
stumbling block of negotiating restrictive undertak-
ings with developing countries. 
Voluntary commitments by developing countries as 
suggested during the Kyoto Conference are an exam-
ple of such intermediate solutions23. But none of 
them are wholly satisfactory or indeed applicable to 
all developing countries. 
In future, however, proposals aimed at integrating 
developing countries more closely into the interna-
tional efforts to prevent climatic change should be 
made. Methods for participation in a generalised per-
mit exchange system should, for example, are offered 
to developing countries who want them. Even if it 
raises the difficult question of initial allocation of 
quotas. 
For some developing countries, this question of ex-
tending the scope of emission reduction trade to non-
Annex I countries has already arisen. For them, it is 
not a question of being penalised in the technological 
race with the major industrialised countries because 
the incentive mechanisms created by the Climate 
Convention primarily benefit industries in Northern 
countries. The possibility of these countries complet-
ing MDP projects, either in their own territory or in 
other Southern countries, and creating financial in-
centives to implement environment-friendly policies, 
appears to be unavoidable. 
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Abstract. This section summarises the most important 
issues of the different presentations on emission trading. 
From the EC's point-of-view emission trading is considered 
to be one of the most promising future tools for combating 
Global Warming.  
The major conclusions of the discussion in this session 
are: (i) More co-ordination between different countries is 
required than usually expected; (ii) the implementation of 
emission trading schemes is more complex than expected in 
the early theoretical papers; (iii) Regarding the optimal 
linkage of different systems of ET in various countries 
further research work is necessary; (iv) It is of high rele-
vance to address other sectors  especially transport  ade-
quately. 
Introduction 
This section summarises the most important issues of 
the different presentations on emission trading (ET). 
Paul Koutstaal pointed out that a major feature of 
ET is that they are not project-based, see Figure 1. 
Hence ET is an important tool which could help to set 
the right prices for an efficient climate change policy. 
This is important because many diverse actors with a 
large number of alternative technical options are in-
volved. The most important  question with respect to 
the different mechanisms is to what extent they result 
in setting the right carbon price throughout the econ-
omy. A currently limiting aspect is that ET focuses 
solely on the industry. 
 
Major types of ET 
The most important types of ET are, see also the 
depiction in Figure 1:  
Cap and Trade (C&T) 
An absolute cap on emissions is set. Allowances for 
these total emission amount are traded. The major 
disadvantage of C&T is that it is very unlikely that it 
will be introduced successfully by one single country.  
Rate-based Trading 
A relative baseline is set by an emission rate e.g. X 
tons CO2 per kg steel. Above the rate emission credits 
must be bought, below credits may be sold.  
Baseline & Credit 
An absolute baseline for an emission reduction is set 
throughout the economy. The objective of trade are 
emission reductions by various companies. A major 
disadvantage of this approach are the high transaction 
costs. 
MECHANISMS
Project-based Non project-based
Joint Im-
plementation
Emission
trading
Cap&
trade
Rate-
based
Absolute
baseline
Baseline
 
 
Figure 1. Project-based vs non-project-based ap-
proaches for reducing greenhouse gas emissions 
The ECs view on ET  
From the EC's point-of-view emission trading is con-
sidered to be one of the most promising future tools 
for combating Global Warming. As explained by 
Matthieu Wemaere from the EC's DG Environment 
the expectations and the most important requirements 
of the EC to ET are:  
• Trading will be in addition to and must be com-
patible with existing policies and measures; 
• Most important is the need for non-
discriminatory competition  
• Expected European added value is 2.1 bn per 
year; 
• Institutional set-up by the EC should facilitate an 
early start to a multi-country learning by doing 
trade 
• Start in 2005 with a limited number of sectors 
that contribute significantly to total greenhouse 
gas emissions; 
• Trading has to be co-ordinated to link different 
types of ET systems 
• Some controversial issues will still remain open, 
e.g. if a country wants to sell a credit of technol-
ogy (e.g. nuclear) to a country where this is not 
accepted. 
A comparison of Denmark's and the UK's 
proposed trading scheme 
The most advanced countries with respect to an im-
plementation of trading schemes are currently Den-
mark and the UK. Eva Jensen and Margaret Mogford 
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gave an insight on the currently discussed ET models 
in these countries. 
In Table 1 the major features of the discussed ET 
models of Denmark and the UK are compared.  
 
Table 1. Comparison of the currently discussed ET 
models of Denmark and the UK 
Country 
Feature: 
Denmark UK 
Basic principle: Cap and trade Mixture 
Currency CO2 CO2 
Allocation Grandfathering Grandfathering 
Sectoral Coverage Power sector 
only 
Various indus-
tries 
Participation Mandatory voluntary with 
incentives 
Up-
stream/downstrea
m 
only one sector 
(power indus-
try) 
mixture 
Type of target absolute Relative and 
absolute 
Penalty rather low tax 
penalty 
Loss of incentive 
   
 
Conclusions 
The major conclusions of this summary are: 
• C&T is not attractive without an EU-wide 
application;  
• It is of high relevance to address other sectors  
especially transport  adequately;  
• more co-ordination between different countries is 
required than usually expected; 
• the implementation of emission trading schemes 
is more complex than expected in the early theo-
retical papers; 
• Regarding the optimal linkage of different sys-
tems of ET in various countries further research 
work is necessary. 
JI and Emission Trading: an 
economic evaluation.  
Paul Koutstaal, Inspectorate of the Budget, Dutch 
Ministry of Finance, Netherlands24 
 
Keywords. Emission trading, Joint Implementation, alloca-
tive efficiency 
 
Abstract. Three different trading mechanisms are distin-
guished on the extent to which they internalise the external 
costs and set the right price: cap&trade with an absolute 
cap, trading with a relative cap and baseline&credit pro-
jects. From these three, only the classical cap&trade 
schemes with an absolute cap are allocative efficient. Sub-
sequently, a number of practical issues are considered. It is 
concluded that, because of these practical problems, trading 
with a relative cap and project-based mechanisms will be 
preferred. 
Introduction 
The Kyoto Protocol mentions three flexible instru-
ments: the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM, 
article 6), Joint Implementation (JI, article 12) and 
Emission Trading (ET, article 17). Although the three 
instruments are clearly distinct in a number of ways, 
especially with regard to their institutional setting, 
they have in common that they allow the parties to 
the protocol to trade emissions in one way or the 
other. Since the drafting of the Kyoto-protocol, nu-
merous studies have further developed these instru-
ments, resulting in various (sub)forms of emission 
trading. Generally, two main types of emission trad-
ing are distinguished; the classical cap-and-trade 
(C&T) systems and project-based baseline-and-credit 
trading (B&C), see, for example, Sorrel and Skea 
(1999), p. 11 and Hargrave c.s. 1998. 
In the next section, a distinction is made between 
trading mechanism based on the degree to which they 
internalise externalities and set the right price. Subse-
quently, the main features of the different trading 
mechanism are described. 
Given these characteristics, the advantages and dis-
advantages of the various forms of emission trading 
in both developed countries and accession countries 
are analysed, and an assessment is made of the poten-
tial of the various emission trading forms within the 
EU and the Accession countries. 
Trading mechanisms and internalisation of 
external effects 
Recently, there have been a number of developments 
with respect to both emission trading and to JI which 
tend to blur the differences between the two concepts. 
As regards emission trading, studies on the possible 
design of ET in the U.K. and in the Netherlands have 
introduced the idea of emission trading with a relative 
cap instead of an absolute one. With a relative cap, 
there is not an absolute limit on emissions, instead 
                                                           
24 Tel: +31 70 342 8352, +31 70 342 7925 
Email: p.r.koutstaal@minfin.nl 
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sources have to meet an emission rate expressed in 
terms of emissions per unit of output or input, for 
example energy. Sources which emit less than the 
rate per base unit can sell permits while those who 
emit more have to buy them. The trade unit is the 
same as with an absolute cap, a certain amount of 
emissions, say tons. The main difference with an ab-
solute cap is the uncertainty about future emissions; if 
the growth of the base unit is higher because of, for 
example, a higher growth of the sector or the econ-
omy, emissions will be higher as well. 
For JI as well relative baselines have been pro-
moted, which are basically the same as relative caps. 
In order to get a clearer view of the different trad-
ing mechanisms developed, a look is taken at the 
extent to which these mechanisms internalise exter-
nalities and set the right price. Allocative efficiency 
will only be achieved if a trading mechanism will 
fully internalise externalities and result in the right 
price throughout the whole economy. 
For this analysis, three relevant trading forms are 
distinguished: the two mechanisms mentioned above, 
absolute cap and trade (C&T) and baseline and credit 
(B&C), and a third form, trading with a relative cap 
based on a rate or performance standard (RT). 
The consequences of the different trading mecha-
nisms are presented diagrammatically, depicting the 
equilibrium of a representative competitive firm and 
of the industry (see also Baumol & Oates 1988, p. 
219-221). For simplicity, it is assumed that emissions 
are directly proportional to output. 
Figure 1 presents the effects of introducing a clas-
sical C&T system with an absolute cap on both the 
representative firm and on long-term industry supply 
and demand. Initially, before the introduction of 
C&T, the firm produces quantity YC at price PC, at 
the point where its marginal cost curve MCC inter-
sects its average cost curve ACC (the left-side dia-
gram). The total quantity produced ands consumed is 
QC, the point where the long-run industry supply 
curve SC intersects the demand curve D (right-side 
diagram). 
 
Firm Industry 
AC C 
AC P 
MC C 
MC P 
D 
SC 
S P 
P C 
 PC+PP 
Y C,P Q P Q C Quantity 
Price Price 
Production 
 
Figure 1 Firm production and industry supply, C&T 
Introducing C&T raises the marginal cost curve by 
the price of the permits to MCP (because of the direct 
proportionality of emissions to output). The average 
cost curve also rises with the permit price to ACP. 
Consequently, the final product price now equals PC 
+ PP, the original product price plus the permit price. 
The long-run industry supply curve will shift up-
wards to SP and total quantity produced declines to 
QP. Consumers have to pay the full permit price and 
therefore will reduce their consumption. 
Figure 2 shows the effect of the introduction of 
B&C trading. It is assumed here that there is a fixed 
baseline, however the analysis would not be funda-
mentally different with a relative baseline. Firms can 
sell credits at a price of PP, therefore they will in-
crease marginal costs, including abatement costs, up 
to the point where the costs of reducing emissions 
equal the price paid for the credits on the market. 
This is shown by the shift of the marginal cost curve 
upwards to MCS. Given the same permit price PP as 
in the C&T system presented in Figure 1, MCS in 
Figure 2 equals MCP in Figure 1. However, the aver-
age cost curve will not shift upwards, as in Figure 1, 
but it will shift downwards and to the left to ACS. 
The reason for this is that average costs are reduced 
because the firm sells credits (in a B&C-system, 
firms do not have to buy credits). It is assumed here 
that firms will only be able to generate credits when 
they are actively in business and consequently can 
not create credits if they exit or before entering an 
industry (see also Baumol and Oates 1988, chapter 14 
and Farrow 1995 for the relevance of this condition). 
 
Firm Industry 
AC C
AC S
MC C 
MC S
D 
S C SS
PC 
PS
Y C Q SQ C Quantity
Price Price 
Production 
 PC+PP 
 Figure 2. Firm production and industry supply, B&C 
As a result of the reduction of the average costs, the 
long run final product price, as determined by the 
intersection of MCS and ACS, will be PS instead of PC 
+ PP in the case of C&T. Instead of having to pay a 
higher price, consumers will pay a lower price and 
therefore consume more: the industry supply curve 
will shift to the right and quantity consumed and 
emissions increase (left-side diagram). In general, a 
B&C-system will have the same consequences as a 
subsidy for emission reduction (Baumol & Oates 
1988, chapter 14). One difference is that the price of 
the credits will decrease when more firms enter the 
industry, create credits and sell them on the market, 
while in the standard subsidy case it is assumed that 
the subsidy rate is fixed. The price decrease will re-
duce the incentive to enter the industry and result in a 
less increased level of output. 
RT is presented in Figure 3. Again, MCC and ACC 
represent the average cost curve and the marginal 
cost curve before the introduction of emission trad-
ing. Introducing emission trading with a relative 
raises the marginal costs, but not to the same extent 
as the costs are raised with an absolute cap. For the 
emissions per unit of output below the relative cap, 
ENER Forum 1. Integrating the Kyoto Mechanisms into the National Framework,  
Krakow, Poland, 8-9 February 2001  
ENER 23.01 35 
 
the rate N in terms of allowed emissions per unit of 
output, no emission permits are needed and therefore 
no costs have to be made. Consequently, the marginal 
and the average cost curves rise with the permit price 
PP less the allowed rate N. The final product price 
therefore is PC + PP - N. Consumers pay less than 
they would in the case of an absolute cap and the 
industry supply curve does not shift as much to the 
left as was the case under C&T. Industry output, de-
termined by the intersection of the industry supply 
curve SR and the demand curve D, is QR, less than the 
output without RT, but more than the output with 
C&T. 
Above, it has been assumed that the representative 
firm in the industry was a net buyer of permits. 
Therefore, PP - N > 0 and the product price rises 
when RT is introduced. However, the price might 
also fall when the representative firm is a net seller of 
permits. In that case, industry supply would shift to 
the right and total output and therefore emissions 
from this industry would increase. 
 Firm Industry 
AC C 
AC R 
MC C
MC R
D 
S C
SR 
P C
Y C Q R Q C Quantity 
PricePrice 
Production 
PC + PP 
QP 
PC + PP - N
 
Figure 3 Firm production and industry supply, RT 
It should be noted that the analysis will be modified 
when transaction costs are taken into account. This 
will be especially important with B&C, where trans-
action costs are expected to be significant. The main 
effect is that transaction costs increase costs and 
therefore price PS will be higher than in the case 
without transaction costs. 
The importance of introducing right prices in the 
economy for all producers and consumers should not 
be underestimated, especially in the context of cli-
mate change. The reason for this is that the reduction 
of greenhouse gases depends on system innovations, 
which involve many, diverse actors with a large 
number of alternative technical options. These ad-
justments are complex, have a long time horizon and 
are difficult to implement efficiently with command-
and-control regulation. Economic instruments such as 
tradable emission permits and charges which set the 
right price on emissions provide an incentive at every 
level of the economy and thereby ensure that, not 
withstanding complex relations between producers 
and consumers, emission reduction is achieved in an 
efficient way. 
This can be illustrated by a simple example. Sup-
pose that an agreement is made with car manufactur-
ers to reduce fuel use per kilometre. One of the solu-
tions would be to use less heavy materials in the pro-
duction of the car. However, the production of these 
materials might require more energy than the heavier 
materials used before. Consequently, the energy sav-
ings realised through the use of the lighter materials 
will be more or less offset by the higher energy use in 
the production of these materials. If carbon is priced 
at the right level throughout the whole economy, the 
higher price of the lighter materials will be taken into 
account in the production of the more efficient car, 
which is not the case with the agreement. 
The next section describes the main features of the 
three trading mechanisms distinguished above. 
 
 
 CAP-AND-TRADE 
(C&T) 
RELATIVE CAP TRADING 
(RT) 
BASELINE-AND-CREDIT 
(B&C) 
Tradable object Emissions Emissions Emission reductions 
Absolute cap on 
emissions 
Yes Yes, if the rate is regularly 
adjusted in order to realise the 
intended emission limit 
No 
  No, if the rate is not adjusted 
regularly 
 
Simplicity of 
grandfathering 
permits 
Simple to complicated Simple, assuming that 
performance standards are already 
in use 
Not relevant 
Revenue raising  Yes, in case of an auction 
No, with grandfathering 
No No 
Verification and 
monitoring 
Simple and at relative modest 
costs 
Simple and at relative modest 
costs 
Depending on the baseline, from 
simple and modest costs to 
complicated en expensive 
Entry barriers Possible No No 
Implementation Should be introduced instead of 
existing regulation 
Can be introduced in addition to 
existing regulation 
Can be introduced in addition to 
existing regulation 
 
The table above presents the most important characteristics of the three main trading mechanisms presented above. 
These characteristics include the main design issues and institutional elements. 
ENER Forum 1. Integrating the Kyoto Mechanisms into the National Framework,  
Krakow, Poland, 8-9 February 2001  
36 ENER 23.01 
 
Characteristics of trading mechanisms 
The tradable object is in principle the same for all 
three mechanisms: a certain amount of reduced emis-
sions. For example, a ton of CO2. The difference is 
that the amount of emission permits which can be 
brought onto the market is determined in different 
ways. Under a C&T system, a source can bring all of 
its emissions onto the market, as long as he does not 
emit more than the number of permits he retains. 
With RT, a source can sell permits with the restric-
tion that emissions, less the emission permits it has 
sold, are equal to or less than the rate. This rate can 
be expressed in emissions per unit of output or emis-
sions per unit of energy used. Wit B&C, emission 
reductions can be brought on the market if a source 
emits less than the allotted baseline.  
Only with C&T is there an absolute cap. With both 
RT and B&C the resulting level of emissions depends 
on the level of activities; the higher the level of activ-
ity, the more  emissions. One could adjust the rate 
when the level of production is higher than expected, 
but this might be politically difficult. 
The grandfathering of permits can be complex in 
the case of C&T. It has to be decided how to divide 
the permits among the participants, which may need 
extensive negotiations. Furthermore, it has to be 
avoided that those who have not reduced emissions in 
the past are rewarded by a large amount of permits, 
which would be the case if permits are distributed 
strictly on the basis of historic emissions. A relative 
cap can be easier, especially when the rate can be 
based on existing performance standards. However, if 
such a rate does not exist, it might be more compli-
cated. 
Auctioned permits raise revenue which can be used 
to reduce non-optimal taxation. With RT, B&C and 
grandfathering in C&T, sources acquire their permits 
for free and no revenue is raised. Consequently, 
abatement costs will be considerably higher (Pezzey 
1998). 
In contrast to C&T and RT, it is necessary for each 
B&C project to determine the specific baseline. Con-
sequently, the costs of verification and monitoring 
will be high, which will reduce trade. 
It has been argued that C&T might provide a bar-
rier against entrants, especially when the established 
firms receive their permits for free. Grandfathering 
permits however does not necessarily raise entry bar-
riers, because the use of grandfathered permits entails 
opportunity costs. Entry barriers might be raised if 
capital markets do not work perfect and therefore 
entrants have to pay higher capital costs than the es-
tablished firms. However, the extent to which this 
would raise entry barriers in the case of CO2 appears 
to be limited (see Koutstaal 1997, ch. 4). 
With RT and B&C, entrants have to meet either the 
same relative cap (RT) or they can be allotted a base-
line on the same terms (B&C) as the established 
firms. Therefore there is no entry barrier, instead 
there is an incentive for new firms to enter the mar-
ket, which is one of the reasons for the inefficiency of 
these schemes which has been described above. 
RT and B&C can be combined with existing in-
struments such as directives and voluntary agree-
ments, especially if these include rates which can be 
used as relative caps or baselines. It is difficult to 
combine C&T with existing regulation, because this 
could hinder trade and therefore reduce efficiency. 
Consequences for the practical choice of trad-
ing mechanisms 
From the point of view of economic efficiency, C&T 
is to be preferred above the other two variants. Only 
with C&T will the prices be set at the optimum level 
and will all producers and consumers have the right 
incentive to reduce their emissions and use of CO2-
intensive products. Moreover, only a C&T system 
will guarantee that the emissions will remain below 
the limit. Last, C&T allows for the possibility to auc-
tion permits and raise revenue, making it possible to 
lower distortionary taxes, which considerably reduces 
the costs of controlling CO2 emissions. 
However, implementing C&T takes considerably 
more than the implementation of the other two trad-
ing mechanisms. C&T is difficult to introduce in ad-
dition to existing regulation, moreover it is hardly 
possible to experiment with C&T. Such a system has 
to be introduced at a sufficient large scale for the de-
velopment of a well-functioning market, the choice 
for C&T is a go/no-go decision, not something in 
between. The other two mechanisms can be intro-
duced on top of existing regulation, which makes it 
possible to introduce trading in a more gradual way.  
C&T and RT tend to be less acceptable to firms 
than B&C because targets are mandatory instead of 
voluntary participation in trading. C&T, in addition, 
has the disadvantage from the point of view of firms 
that emissions are bound to an absolute ceiling, 
which means that an increase of the firms activities 
entails higher costs, while within RT production can 
be expanded without increasing costs. 
Not only are C&T systems of limited acceptability 
for firms, authorities are also reluctant to introduce 
such systems. Not only because this would mean a 
major break with the existing regulatory system, but 
also because it would put the national industry at a 
competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis competitors in 
other countries who face different, less costly, poli-
cies. It might be argued that all Annex I countries 
have accepted emission reduction targets under the 
Kyoto-protocol and therefore firms in all countries 
will have to be confronted with policy measures and 
therefore higher costs. However, marginal abatement 
costs differ considerably between countries, as a 
number of studies have shown (see, for example, 
Capros & Mantzos 2000, or Shared Analysis Project 
1999). Consequently, firms will not face a level play-
ing field. 
The fear for loss of competitiveness has influenced 
the design of a number of trading systems in various 
MS of the EU. The Danish trading scheme levies a 
modest fine see the paper by E. Jensen) when the 
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participants do not have sufficient permits to cover 
their emissions, which effectively means that the par-
ticipating firms can limit their costs by choosing the 
fine instead of compliance. In the proposal for a UK 
trading scheme, participants can take part in an abso-
lute sector (C&T), a unit sector (RT) or a project sec-
tor (B&C). Caps in the absolute sector are negotiated 
between the government and the firms in question, 
the costs of achieving these limits will probably be 
limited. In the Netherlands, a commission established 
by the government is making a distinction between 
those firms who are exposed to competition from 
other countries (the so-called exposed sector) and 
those who are not exposed (the sheltered sector). For 
the exposed sector, the commission is considering 
RT, for the sheltered sector a C&T system. 
Given this reluctance of national governments to 
introduce (effective) C&T systems in isolation, the 
introduction of a comprehensive, effective C&T sys-
tem will have to be co-ordinated at the international 
level. The proposal of the European Commission for 
an EU C&T-system for the energy-intensive sectors 
within the EU (European Commission 2000) is an 
example of such an international co-ordinated trading 
system. 
Given the various arguments presented above, what 
would be the options for Accession countries? Im-
plementing an effective C&T-system in isolation 
would not appear to be an attractive option, for the 
same reasons which restrain the current Member 
States from introducing C&T in an effective way. A 
difference however is that Accession countries can 
achieve their targets at a lower price, which might 
make it less of a problem to introduce a C&T-system, 
because the economic consequences for the sectors 
involved would be less, given the lower costs.  How-
ever, the costs and regulatory requirements of the 
introduction of C&T might be prohibitive for the 
Accession countries. In case the EU would introduce 
C&T at the EU-level, it would be logical to assume 
that the Accession countries would join in as well. 
If C&T is not an option for one reason or another, 
the practical choice for Accession countries is limited 
to RT and JI. RT with mandatory targets, or in other 
words, fast track JI, has a number of advantages over 
B&C. Transaction costs will be lower than in B&C, 
which will lower costs and increase the possibilities 
for foreign investors who are willing to buy emission 
reductions. In addition, it is more likely that a well-
functioning market will develop. Externalities are 
internalised to a stronger extent, which will provide a 
stronger incentive to consumers and increase the effi-
ciency of emission abatement within the economy. In 
addition, mandatory emission rates provide the au-
thorities with an instrument which can be used to 
achieve the emission reduction targets agreed in 
Kyoto, especially when the rates are adjusted on a 
regular basis when necessary to achieve emission 
limits. Regulatory requirements will be more exten-
sive than in project-based B&C trading, however 
monitoring and verification of the baselines will be 
less complicated than with other baseline methodolo-
gies in B&C trading. One does not necessarily have 
to chose between RT or B&C, both mechanisms can 
exist side-by-side (as is proposed in the British 
study). However, transaction costs of non rate-based 
JI will be higher than those of RT, therefore JI might 
be prised out of the market. 
Conclusions 
Recent developments have obscured the differences 
between cap&trade tradable emission schemes and 
baseline&credit projects. In this paper, trading 
schemes are distinguished on the bases of the eco-
nomic efficiency of the different trading mechanisms. 
It has been shown that only C&T fully internalises 
the external costs. 
However, it will be more difficult to implement 
C&T than RT and B&C for a number of reasons: 
1. In order to be successful, a sufficient large C&T-
scheme has to be implemented, experimenting on 
a small scale or gradual phasing in is not possi-
ble; 
2. Environmental effective C&T has to be imple-
mented at the international level (at least at the 
lebvel of the EU), otherwise fear of loss of com-
petitiveness will limit the effectiveness of 
schemes which will be implemented; 
3. RT and B&C can be implemented on top of ex-
isting regulation. 
This is reflected by the fact that some of the trading 
schemes which are currently being designed in a 
number of countries focus to a smaller or greater ex-
tent on the less efficient trading mechanisms such as 
RT and B&C. The extent to which the reduced effi-
ciency will be a real problem depends on the magni-
tude of this efficiency loss, which has to be deter-
mined by further empiric research. 
References 
Baumol, W. and W. Oates (1988), The Theory of Environ-
mental Policy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Capros, P. and L. Mantzos (2000), The Economic Effects of 
EU-Wide Industry-Level Emission Trading to Reduce 
Greenhouse Gases, Report prepared for the European 
Commission, Results from PRIMES Energy Systems 
Model. 
European Commission (2000), Green Paper on greenhouse 
gas emissions trading within the European Union, COM 
(2000)87. 
Hargrave, T. , N. Helme and I. Puhl (1998), Options for 
Simplifying baseline Setting for Joint Implementation, 
Center for Clean Air Policy, http://www.ccap.org 
Koutstaal, P.R. (1997), Economic Policy and Climate 
Change: Tradable Permits for reducing Carbon Emis-
sions, Cheltenham, UK and Brookfield, US: Edward El-
gar. 
Pezzey, J.C.V. (1998), Reflections on the Double Dividend 
Debate, in: Environmental and Resource Economics, 
11(3/4): 539-555. 
Shared Analysis Project (1999), Economic Foundations for 
Energy Policy ISBN 92-828-7529-6, Vol. 1, Vol. 2, 
Vol. 5 ,. www.shared-analysis.fhg.de, 
Sorrell, S. and J. Skea (1999), Pollution for Sale: emissions 
trading and joint implementation, Cheltenham, UK and 
Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar. 
ENER Forum 1. Integrating the Kyoto Mechanisms into the National Framework,  
Krakow, Poland, 8-9 February 2001  
38 ENER 23.01 
 
The Green Paper of the Euro-
pean Commission: A framework 
for emission trading at European 
level? On-going research activi-
ties.25  
Matthieu Wemaere DG Environment, EC, Brus-
sels, Belgium. 
 
Keywords. Emission trading, flexibility instruments, Kyoto 
Protocol, European Union, climate change 
 
Abstract. The paper presents the position of the European 
Commission on the specific role of the Commission in 
linking national emission trading systems. It discusses point 
by point the areas where the European Commission might 
see the need for co-ordination (currency, direct / indirect 
emissions, upstream / downstream trading, monitoring 
standards, reporting & verification, compliance, nature of 
targets, project mechanisms and emission trading, regis-
tries) or where the Commission role might be less clearly 
defined (allocation methodology, stringency of targets, 
sectoral coverage). In fact, it appears that with EU emission 
trading schemes more needs to be co-ordinated than first 
thought and certainly it is the context of the implications of 
national emissions trading schemes in the internal market 
which is at the heart of the possible Community interven-
tion. 
Introduction 
The Commission published in March 2000 a Green 
Paper on emission trading. This paper is not a politi-
cal document, it is rather a conceptual document. The 
idea was to first provoke a debate within the Com-
munity on the instrument of emission trading and also 
to try to improve the understanding on what trading is 
about while involving the stakeholders. There was a 
sort of consultation organised through the publication 
of the Green Paper. A lot of questions were raised on 
a number of outstanding issues in relation to trading 
but certainly the Green Paper at least states very 
clearly that emission trading is a very important in-
strument for the EU to fulfil its commitment agree-
ment to Kyoto of -8%. Nevertheless, the paper also 
pointed out that, in accordance with the EU position 
on the flexible mechanism, trading would and cer-
tainly should stay supplemental to political domestic 
measures  supplementarity is very well highlighted 
in the Green Paper  but also that trading, if this is to 
be established at either national or community level, 
should be compatible with existing political measures 
which is still, to the Commission's point of view, the 
main means to combat climate change. Existing poli-
cies and measures are certainly the regulatory ap-
proach, which is the traditional approach, but also 
other economic instruments like taxation or negoti-
ated agreements. It was important to remind that trad-
ing is before all not the panacea but a means to re-
duce emissions at lower costs.  
                                                           
25 Transcription of the oral presentation by M. Wemaere. 
European added value 
The Commission conducted a study to see what 
would be the economic value of having a large trad-
ing system within the Community and one outcome 
was that at least 2.1 billion Euro per year could be 
saved if the sectors identified in the Green paper 
would be covered by a Community scheme on emis-
sions trading. To be clear on one point: The Green 
Paper does not say that we should have a Commu-
nity-wide scheme on trading but actually it asks the 
question should we have a community-wide scheme 
or should we co-ordinate national Member States 
schemes or should we not? Is there an interest, in 
particular in the industry to have something either co-
ordinated or harmonised or not? It will appear later 
on whether we are going in one way or another. But 
anyway we just came to the conclusion that the wider 
the scale of such a trading scheme the lower the cost. 
If we have a system at Community level covering 
those sectors that are identified in the Green Paper we 
could save those amounts of compliance costs per 
year and the sectors we are referring to now are the 
electricity and heat sectors, aluminium production, 
chemicals, refineries, paper production and iron/steel 
production. That would cover more or less 45% of 
CO2 emissions within the Community. 
It is clear that emission trading systems have to be 
compatible with the rules that already exists within 
the Community to protect and preserve the smooth 
functioning of the internal market, which argues the 
case to organise or at least co-ordinate to a certain 
degree at Community level, but again the Green Pa-
per raised the issue and does not give the answer and 
we will see later on as well where we are on this is-
sue. 
We all recognise that trading is a new instrument 
and I can just say that it was a little cultural revolu-
tion even within the European Commission when we 
published the Green Paper because most of the peo-
ple who are working in the Commission DG Envi-
ronment are more familiar with the regulatory ap-
proach, which is the traditional recommended control 
approach, and we had to face a lot of reluctance even 
from our colleagues on this issue and it was very dif-
ficult to convince of the added value of emissions 
trading to combat climate change, but I think we suc-
ceeded to do that. We also have to recognise that the 
concept of permits is something that already existed 
in the EU environment policy (particularly in the 
Kyoto Protocol, but also in fishery and agricultural 
policies), and we thought if this already exists we 
should try also to use this instrument for combating 
climate change. 
The Green Paper also explained that there should 
be a reflection about having the Community organis-
ing a system on trading. This is because the Green 
Paper has been published in the perspective of a fu-
ture implementation of the Kyoto Protocol, i.e in a 
multilateral context where parties exchange allow-
ances or part of a signed amount. It was thought that 
the institutional set-up that already exists at Commu-
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nity level would serve as a good basis to see how 
parties, i.e. Member States, can exchange one to the 
other, even though we know that the exchange will 
take place at a legal entity level, but it was thought 
that the institutional set-up was a very good frame-
work to start at an early stage to prepare for the im-
plementation of the Kyoto Protocol. 
It is worth reminding that trading takes place in a 
context where the Community is in a specific situa-
tion. The Community has its own objective under the 
Kyoto Protocol of -8%, but also the Council of Min-
isters have decided to redistribute this target of -8% 
among the Member States the so-called Burden Shar-
ing Agreement and we believe that emissions trading, 
if it would take place one day within the Community, 
will be on top of the Burden Sharing Agreement. This 
Agreement certainly does not require the use of trad-
ing but at least it will have many consequences on 
how trading will be implemented either at national 
level but also at Community level. 
Advantages of emissions trading 
The Green Paper tries to explain what are the advan-
tages of emissions trading. The most important point 
is certainly that it secures a predetermined environ-
mental outcome and this is very important. It was a 
very good argument when we discussed with our 
colleagues within DG Environment who were more 
in favour of a regulatory approach because we could 
explain to them that the regulatory approach with 
legislative action would not prevent new emissions or 
additional emissions generated through new installa-
tions that would take place in the future and this idea 
of securing this predetermined environmental out-
come was certainly our best argument at home. In 
addition, companies certainly know their costs, so 
they are best placed to see opportunities  so let com-
panies trade 
Allocation 
The Green Paper insists very much on the need to 
ensure non-discrimination for competition and this is 
again the impact of internal market rules and compe-
tition rules and also to ensure equal access for new 
entrance in a scheme at whatever level, national or 
community level. The Green Paper apparently prefers 
auctioning  at least some people have that feeling. It 
is true that it was seen as preferable from the Com-
missions point of view: first of all it implements the 
polluter-must-pay principle, it is transparent and 
helps to ensure non-discrimination of competition 
among the actors of the trading scheme. So we were 
quite enthusiastic about auctioning and also the recy-
cling of revenues that could be generated through 
auctioning. Auctioning was thought to be very useful 
even though the Community would never say some-
thing on how to recycle those revenues. We are aware 
that the industry does not like very much auctioning, 
first of all because they have to pay for something 
that they had for free before, and also because they 
are sure that the recycling of revenues would never 
be as neutral as they would like and certainly the 
Community would never be in a position to say to the 
Member States well, you should recycle in this way 
or that one.  
Grandfathering is more politically expedient. It re-
quires from each government to decide on which 
sector would be covered but we certainly think that 
there might be a risk for governments to try to sup-
port some sectors and so we are very concerned that 
this grandfathering method would lead to disguised 
state aid. We do not say that grandfathering will lead 
to state aid, this is not the point, but on a case-by case 
basis it could be the case. Right now our position is 
that we accept  that auctioning and grandfathering 
could be combined. We think that the allocation 
method is not that important in fact in terms of envi-
ronmental integrity, because it does not have a strict 
impact on the environmental integrity of the scheme. 
But we are concerned about the internal market rules 
and respecting the internal market rules. This is why, 
even if those two methods are combined either pro-
gressively or distributed in a certain way, govern-
ments should be very aware not to go for disguised 
state-aids. 
Getting started gradually 
The basic idea of the Green Paper is to ask stake 
holders whether they would like to have a scheme at 
Community level, starting prior to the first commit-
ment period around 2005, because we think it is a 
learning-by-doing exercise and it would be very use-
ful for the Community to prepare itself for future 
trading under the Kyoto Protocol. In that perspective 
we also thought that it would be more easy to start 
with a limited number of sectors still under this per-
spective of learning-by-doing. We proposed to cover 
mainly the energy sector but also the other activities 
covered by the IPPC Directive and the Large Com-
bustion Plant Directive. They could provide a good 
basis to define the scope of obligation of a Commu-
nity scheme on trading. Such a scheme would cer-
tainly concentrate at first on carbon dioxide. The in-
tention is not to exclude the other gases, but again in 
the spirit of learning first, it would be preferable to 
start with CO2. 
Consultation phase 
The Commission has received many submissions 
from both governments and the industry on the Green 
Paper. The European Parliament has also been con-
sulted. These submissions on DG Environments 
website. 
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Consultation phase
!95 submissions
!700 pages
!11 governments (incl. Norway)
!42 Business Associations
!24 Companies
!Euro Parliament, Committee of Regions,
Economic & Social Committee ...
 
The European Climate Change Programme 
(ECCP) - Working Group 1 
Definitely the Green Paper was the first step and it 
was set up with the intention to launch consultation 
among stakeholders. Simultaneously, the Commis-
sion launched a large programme, European Climate 
Change Programme. The overall objective of this 
programme is to identify the essential limits for the 
future strategy of the European Union for the imple-
mentation of the Kyoto Protocol. It basically ad-
dresses policies and measures in all sectors. It func-
tions on the basis of what we did in the AutoOil Pro-
gramme: it is a multi-stakeholder consultation proc-
ess which means there are NGOs, industry represen-
tatives, Member States and also the general public. 
This ECCP operates with six working groups that are 
chaired by different persons from different sectors of 
the Commission. It is also an integration exercise to 
help people from other DGs to understand and take 
interest in emissions trading and in climate change in 
general. There is one working group on energy sup-
ply, one on energy conservation, one on transport, 
research, on agriculture, and one on the flexible 
mechanisms which is mainly focussed on emissions 
trading. There was just one discussion on the interac-
tions between emissions trading and the project-based 
mechanism under Kyoto. This working group has met 
quite a number of times and they have addressed a 
number of important issues like absolute vs. relative 
targets, but also the allocation methods and the impli-
cations of the allocation method with regard to inter-
nal market rules and competition rules, impact on 
competitiveness, and relationship with the project-
based mechanisms. Within the group, certainly be-
cause it comprises representatives of Member States 
which have already initiated emission trading at na-
tional level, there was a specific request to address 
the linking of schemes. Should we go ahead with 
various national schemes which could operate in a 
complete disaggregated manner without any co-
ordination, or whether it would be necessary to link 
those schemes at least with respect to the rules for the 
internal market and competition.  
Why co-ordinate trading? 
So why co-ordinate trading? This is where we are 
now. Certainly cost savings increase with number 
participants. But, the more participants we want, the 
more we have to co-ordinate, or, at least we have to 
think about this co-ordination issue. Two questions in 
that respect are what elements would need to be 
compatible from one scheme to another and what are 
the minimum building blocks of an EU approach? 
Why are any rules needed? 
Let us start with the rules that may be needed. To 
achieve environmental policy objectives, we think 
that there is a need to co-ordinate and to fix a rule for 
such a co-ordination because one lax scheme in one 
Member State could contaminate the others. Linking 
separate schemes makes prevailing the lowest com-
mon denominator if a minimum set of rules is not 
specified, which, from an environmental point of 
view, would be very good.  
Preserving and enhancing the internal market is the 
other main objective to follow. We think, and so does 
the industry, that a co-ordinated scheme would be 
preferable because it takes place in a framework at 
Community level with its existing rules on competi-
tion and the internal market. Co-ordination would 
preserve the internal market with that respect. It 
would also help the Commission to manage in-
fringement procedures and would further limit the 
case of infringement procedures for non-respect of 
competition rules. This is also a way to manage fu-
ture implementation of emission trading schemes in a 
given context, which is very particular because it is 
the EU context with its specific rules.  
And lastly we think that rules are also needed be-
cause we think SHOULD DO will not be enough. 
When you look at the draft decision text on the Arti-
cle 17, it is clear that we talk about the overall pur-
pose, about eligibility criteria to fulfil basically the 
Article 5 and 7 requirements. Then there is the liabil-
ity provision. Beyond that there is not much. In order 
to have a system operational, we need to have more 
rules. More rules does not mean more bureaucracy 
and more legislation, this is not what I am talking 
about, it is just to make it operational in a more effi-
cient way.  
I would like to give two examples which rules are 
needed. We know the Kyoto level and we know the 
UN rule or in addition to the UN rule. For example, 
in one scheme are we going to have an upstream or a 
downstream approach to define the sectoral coverage 
of the scheme? This is not set by Kyoto. Certainly 
not. This might raise some concerns in terms of com-
petitiveness, also some concerns in terms of envi-
ronmental outcome. Also, are we going to count di-
rect or indirect emissions? We will certainly say 
something about that. We have the feeling that if we 
have different national schemes counting, in one of 
these, only direct emissions, while another counts 
indirect emissions as well, there might be some prob-
lems in terms of double counting. We have a good 
example with the Danish scheme which counts only 
direct emissions, whereas the UK scheme will count 
indirect emissions. We do not think that it is worth 
imposing something at Community level which says 
it must be only direct or indirect, but we try to co-
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ordinate it and try to limit the problems which arise 
later on. 
What must & what may? 
What musts and what mays are in? It is a first attempt 
to see what should be requiring a co-ordinated re-
sponse at Community level (part 1). Part 2 will ad-
dress further issues for which it could be desirable to 
have a Community response. It takes into considera-
tion the rules for the smooth functioning of the inter-
nal market.  
Part 1: Part 2:
! Currency
! Direct / Indirect
! Upstream / downstream
! Monitoring standards
! Reporting & verification
! Compliance
! Nature of targets
! Project Mechanisms
! Registries
! Allocation methodology
! Stringency of targets
! Sectoral coverage
 
So first of all we need to know what we are going 
to talk about, so what is going to be exchanged, what 
exactly would be the denomination of what we are 
going to exchange? There is not an absolute need to 
translate everything into CO2 equivalent, though the 
Kyoto Protocol is based on equivalent emissions. But 
at least we need to agree on conversion rates and on 
reference denominations, to be sure that, in the end, 
when we will count in every Member State, what 
every Member State has done to fulfil its commit-
ment under the Burden Sharing Agreement, we all 
talk the same language. 
The second point is about direct and indirect emis-
sions. Direct emissions as those which occur in a 
production facility directly, while indirect emissions 
are those which do not directly occur on-site; they are 
avoided emissions bought by the facility as a produc-
tion factor. We are afraid that, if one Member State 
counts both direct and indirect emissions, there might 
be a phenomenon of double counting. The energy 
supply sector is going to switch fuels to reduce its 
emissions and is then going to count the emissions it 
has generated directly, but the final user may also 
consider to count the emissions in the electricity he 
had to bought. It seems therefore necessary to be very 
clear on what to do with direct and indirect emis-
sions.  
We have not yet a complete view on how to ad-
dress this at Community level, but we should cer-
tainly assume that the Member State which decides to 
count indirect emissions should assume the responsi-
bility that what it imports as emissions from another 
Member State (because this is also sort of indirect 
emission counting), will be counted as emission free, 
while what it exports should be counted for the ful-
filment of its own target. It is rather in the context of 
trading between one Member State and the other that 
this direct and indirect counting measurement might 
create a problem. In a context, which is now modified 
through the liberalisation of the energy and the gas 
market, there might be implications of counting indi-
rect emissions. It is the question of assuming the re-
sponsibility of counting the imports of emissions 
completely free, in the system that could be co-
ordinated at Community level.  
Upstream vs. downstream approach: we have the 
feeling there could also be a problem of double 
counting because, if there is an upstream approach, it 
is the producer of the fossil fuel that is going to be 
participating in the scheme and if, in another Member 
State, its a downstream approach, then it is going to 
be the end user of the electricity or energy which is 
going to be counted, so there might be also a problem 
in that respect. We should find ways to avoid that 
somebody will pay twice for the emission reduction, 
because the price of the permits will be passing on, 
let's say, from the one who already paid the cost at 
the upstream level to the one who is going to use the 
energy in the end.  
On monitoring standards: we think it is very impor-
tant to define common standards on how to measure 
emissions and emission reductions. We have the feel-
ing that if there is no common standard on monitor-
ing, there would be the possibility that one Member 
State may be very lax in how to count its emissions at 
plant level. Then one plant, or one person participat-
ing in the scheme, could sell all its permits and un-
derstate its level of emissions. If there is no strict 
monitoring standard, we feel there would be some 
problem with the final environmental outcome.  
There are different possibilities to standardise 
monitoring requirements at Community level. It is 
not necessarily through a legislative approach. One 
could think about asking the European Centre of 
Standardisation to work on that and Member States as 
well as industries should be involved in the elabora-
tion of the standards. This could be a part of the task 
to be done at Community level. 
Recording and verification is also very important to 
our mind. Verification is a complicated issue because 
it might involve a controlling authority. It might be 
quite difficult to harmonise this at Community level, 
but at least we could say that verification could be 
done on a periodical basis and those permits that have 
been used in the past should be retired. We could 
think about those elements that would not put a big 
constraint on Member States, but while entering the 
overall system, would operate the different national 
systems in a very co-ordinated manner at a Commu-
nity level.  
Compliance is also a very important issue for us. 
We think that those Member States which would not 
adopt a strong and robust compliance provisions, 
there will be an attempt from those companies that 
operate in more strict Member State to sell in the first 
ones. It would again be a lower denominator that 
would win in that case. For example, we take the 
Danish scheme which has a penalty rate of 40 Danish 
crowns per tonne of CO2 for each exceeding tonne of 
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CO2 equivalent. If there is a Member State with 41 or 
45 Danish crowns, there is a risk of permits flowing 
from Denmark to the other state. This would certainly 
create a lot of problems for Denmark to achieve its 
target under the Kyoto Protocol, bearing in mind that 
Denmark has a hard target under the Burden Sharing 
agreement.  
On the nature of targets, we do not have strong 
feelings actually. We do not think it is necessary to 
take a position on absolute vs. relative targets. We 
could imagine that the Member States use relative 
targets. But which has to be co-ordinated at least is, 
that in the national scheme, there should be an overall 
cap on all companies that face only a relative target. 
And in case the relative targets are below the overall 
cap, it is up to the Member State to adopt additional 
policy measures, or, if it does not have the time, be-
cause this might be at the very last moment, to buy 
more allowances in other Member States. In this case 
the responsibility rests on the Member State and not 
on companies and that is why we tend to agree in the 
Commission on absolute targets, also because the 
Kyoto Protocol is expressed in absolute and not in 
relative targets. Again, to be sure we are talking in 
the same language, to be sure we are working on the 
same basis, we would favour absolute targets, but this 
is not to be fixed or to be imposed at Community 
level, this is just to be co-ordinated as explained be-
fore.  
Project mechanisms: If, in one Member state, legal 
entities participating in an emissions trading scheme 
can also get access to credits generated by JI projects, 
and this is not the case in another member state, may 
create a problem in the sense that it will make it eas-
ier for those who can get access to new credits to 
achieve their own targets. This is, however, not the 
biggest problem. The biggest problem is, if we have 
Member States which have lax requirements for pro-
ject-based mechanisms or which accept credits from 
controversial projects (lets say nuclear, large hydro, 
not very clean coal which are refused in another 
Member State because of the political question of 
excluding nuclear in the CDM or JI), there might be a 
problem in terms of equal access to credits generated 
by those project-based mechanisms. In these cases, 
we think that it would be necessary to co-ordinate as 
well.  
Registry: we think - and also the members of the 
Working Group 1 of the ECCP agreed on this very 
clearly - that it would be necessary to co-ordinate or 
at least harmonise the minimum of information on 
how many permits are sold and how is it represented. 
It is also very important with regard to the monitoring 
of greenhouse gases throughout Europe and the links 
that could be made with the monitoring decision 
which is a Council decision of 1993 amended in 
1999, whereby the Member States report to the 
Commission the monitoring of their emissions.  
Part 2 is what is not necessarily to be co-ordinated, 
but what might be desirable to co-ordinate. As you 
see these are the three most controversial issues. We 
do not think that this will have a very strong impact 
on the environmental outcome we expect from trad-
ing. We have some strong feelings about how alloca-
tion could have impacts on the internal market and, 
more importantly, what state aids could be disguised 
through the allocation method used by the Member 
States, but we have rules at community level on com-
petition and, if there is a problem, we expect that 
some of the Member States or some companies will 
draw the attention of the Commission to whatever 
problem could be caused by one allocation method-
ology in one Member State. Therefore we do not 
think it absolutely necessary to co-ordinate allocation 
methods between the Member States.  
On the stringency of targets: as I said before, this is 
not something for the Community to look at, this is a 
question for the Member States to decide how many 
permits to give to their legal entities and what should 
be done in terms of political measures and how those 
two things should be complementary. So there is not 
a very involvement necessary from our side.  
Sectoral coverage: it is something we are still 
thinking about. In the Green Paper we propose a very 
strange system of opt-in opt-out because we under-
stood very clearly that we would not go with a full 
coverage at Community level, for very clear reasons. 
We think it could be left to the Member States to de-
cide what sector to cover or not, but we will be also 
very cautious on what sectors are going to be covered 
and more importantly on what sector will not be cov-
ered. For example, one entity might participate in a 
national emission trading scheme, where permits are 
auctioned, for which it has to pay. If there is another 
sector, which is in competition with him and is not 
covered by any other measure, the legal entity par-
ticipating in the emission trading scheme would not 
be in the position to ask for compensation, according 
to Community law, to its government for reverse dis-
crimination, and in the absence of any Community 
instrument co-ordinating at least basic elements of 
emissions trading, it would be very difficult for him 
to seek a solution at Community level.  
Preliminary conclusions 
Conclusions can only be preliminary so far. But in 
fact more needs to be co-ordinated than we first 
thought and certainly it is the context of all the impli-
cations of national emissions trading schemes in the 
internal market which is at the heart of the Commu-
nity intervention.  
Work in progress in WG1
!The records are on the website
!The GP submissions are on website
!No agreement at UN level would be a set
back to emissions trading in EU
"in terms of timing
"in terms of company involvement (given
arguments on competitiveness)
"as a driver to meet targets cost-effectively
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On June 26/27, there will be a large conference in 
Brussels with many participants to present the results 
of the ECCP. On the basis of this final report and the 
debate taking place in Brussels in June, at this con-
ference, the Commission will present a communica-
tion in Autumn 2001 and in this communication, the 
Commission will say more explicitly what are its 
intentions with respect to emissions trading at com-
munity level. * 
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 Addition by the editor given recent devel-
opments at the EU level 
The College of Commissioners the EU has adopted 
on 23 October 2001 a ratification package that will 
now be passed on to Parliament and the Council. 
Download documents from the following links: 
Ratification proposal 
europa.eu.int/comm/environment/climat/docs.htm 
PAMs package (scroll down!) 
europa.eu.int/comm/environment/climat/eccp.htm 
Emission Trading Directive 
europa.eu.int/comm/environment/climat/ 
emission.htm 
Follow the flashing NEW logos :-) 
EU press release 
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi/guesten.ksh?p_ 
action.gettxt=gt&doc=IP/01/1465|0|RAPID&lg=EN 
Commission proposes ratification of Kyoto Protocol 
and emissions trading system (IP/01/1465), Brussels, 
23 October 2001 
Today the European Commission adopted a major 
package of initiatives to combat climate change. It 
comprises a proposal for the EC to ratify the Kyoto 
Protocol; a draft Directive on greenhouse gas emis-
sions trading within the EU; and a Communication 
setting out further measures for reducing greenhouse 
gas emissions. The Commission thereby reaffirmed 
the EU's commitment to bring the Kyoto Protocol 
into force before the World Summit on Sustainable 
Development (Rio+10) in Johannesburg in Sep-
tember 2002 and meet its Kyoto target. Environment 
Commissioner Margot Wallström said: With these 
proposals, we pursue the EU's ambition to provide 
leadership in addressing climate change. By present-
ing proposals for an emissions trading system and 
other emission reduction measures in parallel to the 
ratification instrument we wish to demonstrate that 
we are serious about delivering on the commitments 
we have signed up to. I hope that other Parties to the 
Kyoto Protocol will also move quickly towards its 
ratification and implementation. We have no time to 
lose in combating climate change. She added: The 
emissions trading system will be an important corner-
stone in our strategy to reduce emissions in the most 
cost-effective way. 
Council Decision on the ratification of the Kyoto 
Protocol: 
Both the European Community and the Member 
States have to ratify the Kyoto Protocol to make it 
binding for the EU, including the objective for the 
EU to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions by 8% 
between 1990 and 2008-2012. The Commission has 
therefore presented a proposal for a Council Decision 
concerning the conclusion of the Protocol on behalf 
of the European Community. Once adopted by the 
Council, the Decision will also make legally binding 
the contributions to be made by each Member State 
to the Kyoto -8% target. This so-called burden-
sharing was already agreed by the Environment 
Council on 16 June 1998. It allows some Member 
States to increase their emissions while others reduce 
them, so that the EU jointly achieves its target. The 
Council Decision would also require Member States 
to prepare their ratification by 14 June 2002, so that 
the European Community and its Member States can 
jointly deposit their ratification instruments with the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations before the 
World Summit on Sustainable Development in Sep-
tember 2002. 
Communication on the implementation of the Euro-
pean Climate Change Programme: 
The EU is committed not only to the ratification and 
early entry-into-force of the Kyoto Protocol but also 
to meeting its 8% emission target. The Commission 
has therefore today announced a series of 10 actions 
to further reduce greenhouse gas emissions in the EU. 
These actions have been identified as particularly 
cost-effective and feasible in the short term under the 
European Climate Change Programme (ECCP). 
Some of these actions are already contained in the 
Commission's Green Paper on the Security of Energy 
Supply [1] and the recent White Paper on the Com-
mon Transport Policy [2]. The Commission intends 
to make specific proposals to implement these actions 
over the next two years. They include for example 
legislation on combined heat and power, energy-
efficiency requirements for end-use equipment and 
energy-demand management, as well as initiatives to 
promote energy efficiency in public procurement and 
for shifting traffic from road transport to other trans-
port modes. 
In addition, the Commission will present proposals 
for bringing the Community's greenhouse gas moni-
toring mechanism in line with the requirements of the 
Kyoto Protocol, and on the use of emission credits 
from the Clean Development Mechanism and Joint 
Implementation under the Kyoto Protocol in the new 
EU emissions trading system (see below). 
These actions are included on the list of about 40 
measures identified under the Commission's Euro-
pean Climate Change Programme (ECCP). The 
ECCP was launched by the Commission in March 
2000 [3] and has involved a broad range of stake-
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holders and experts in identifying and making rec-
ommendations on cost-effective ways to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions. Its first results were pre-
sented in a report in June 2001 and presented at a 
conference in July [4]. The 40 possible measures are 
estimated to have a combined emission reduction 
potential of roughly the double of what is likely to be 
needed for the EU to reach its Kyoto target. The 10 
measures announced in the Communication alone 
should be sufficient to fill close to half of the gap 
between the EU's forecasted emissions in 2010 and 
its Kyoto target (340 Mt CO2 eq.). All of this poten-
tial can be realised at a low cost to the economy (be-
low an estimated 20 per tonne of CO2 eq.). 
The European Climate Change Programme will 
continue, and other emission reduction measures al-
ready identified in the first phase will be examined 
more closely. 
Directive on greenhouse gas emissions trading: 
An internal EU system for greenhouse gas emissions 
trading is an important cornerstone in the Commis-
sion's strategy for reaching the Kyoto target in the 
most cost-effective way. Emissions trading will re-
duce the cost of emission reductions by ensuring that 
these reductions are made where they are least costly. 
At the same time, emissions trading is environmen-
tally effective by achieving a pre-determined emis-
sion reduction from the activities covered. The 
Commission launched a broad consultation on emis-
sions trading by publishing a Green Paper in March 
2000, and further details of the system envisaged 
have been discussed with stakeholders under the 
European Climate Change Programme. The proposed 
Directive aims at establishing an EU framework for 
emissions trading and an EU-wide market for emis-
sions. It thereby ensures the proper functioning of the 
internal market and prevents distortions of competi-
tion that might arise from separate national emission 
trading schemes. 
The Commission proposes that emissions trading in 
the EU should start in 2005, and in a first phase cover 
CO2 emissions from large industrial and energy ac-
tivities. 
These are estimated to account for about 46% of 
the EU's total CO2 emissions in 2010, and about 4,000 
to 5,000 installations across the EU will be affected. 
In 2004 the Commission will consider an extension 
of the Directive to other sectors and greenhouse 
gases. 
Each installation covered by the Directive will have 
to apply to the competent authority in its Member 
State for a permit allowing it to emit greenhouse 
gases. This permitting procedure shall be fully co-
ordinated with the procedure under Directive 
96/61/EC on Integrated Pollution Prevention and 
Control (IPPC) in order to avoid unnecessary bu-
reaucracy. On the basis of the permits, Member 
States shall allocate emission allowances to each in-
stallation every year. They will gradually reduce the 
number of these allowances over time to ensure that 
emissions are reduced. It is these allowances that can 
be traded, although no operator of an installation will 
be forced to trade. By 31 March each year, the opera-
tor will have to surrender a number of allowances 
equal to the emissions of its installation in the preced-
ing calendar year. The Directive would set harmo-
nised penalties to be paid by operators for not surren-
dering a sufficient number of allowances. In the pe-
riod 2005-2007, the Member States shall allocate 
allowances free of charge according to a national 
allocation plan to be approved by the Commission 
and respecting certain criteria so as to avoid state aids 
and distortions of competition between sectors in 
different Member States. For the 2008-2012 period, 
the Commission shall specify a harmonised method 
of allocation at a later stage. 
Member States will set up national registries to en-
sure the accurate accounting of the holding and trans-
fer of allowances, and the Commission will designate 
a Central Administrator at Community level to keep 
an independent record of allowances. The Member 
States shall report to the Commission every year on 
the implementation of the Directive. The Directive 
will also set principles for the monitoring and report-
ing of emissions from installations, on the basis of 
which the Commission intends to adopt more detailed 
guidelines at a later stage, as well as criteria for the 
verification of the operators' reports. 
Acknowledging the considerable interest in emis-
sions trading, Commissioner Wallström emphasised: 
The Proposal on emissions trading represents a 
major innovation for environmental policy in Europe. 
We are de facto creating a big new market, and we 
are determined to use market forces to achieve our 
climate objectives in the most cost-conscious way. 
For the market to operate properly and deliver envi-
ronmental benefits we must create the necessary 
structures. 
She added: Emissions trading will play an increas-
ingly important role over coming decades when we 
will extend it to other sectors and greenhouse gases. 
Our system will also be fully compatible with the 
emerging international emissions trading system. But, 
as a first step we must establish confidence in a sys-
tem that is shown to work, with adequate controls. 
Mrs Wallström concluded: I am very satisfied to 
see this package of measures on climate change 
adopted by the Commission today. The ratification 
proposal will bring us closer to entry into force of the 
Kyoto Protocol by 2002. The emissions trading pro-
posal shows how we intend to fulfil our commitments 
by using new instruments. The Communication is 
important in emphasising that the EC does not intend 
to meet its Kyoto commitments by concentrating on 
any one measure or sector, but to take action simulta-
neously on a broad range of fronts. I now expect the 
Council to adopt our proposals rapidly time is run-
ning. 
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Background: 
The Commission has presented its proposals for 
ratifying and implementing the Kyoto Protocol just 
two weeks before the 7th Conference of the Parties to 
the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(COP7) will be held in Marrakech from 29 October 
to 9 November 2001. The objective of this confer-
ence is to translate the political agreement on the 
main outstanding issues concerning the implementa-
tion of the Kyoto Protocol that was reached at the 
resumed 6th Conference of the Parties in Bonn last 
July into legal text. The EU is confident that this aim 
can be achieved if all Parties stick to the Bonn 
agreement. Following the United States' withdrawal 
from the Kyoto Protocol announced by President 
Bush in March, the entry-into-force of the Kyoto Pro-
tocol requires its ratification by a broad range of 
other industrialised and developing countries, includ-
ing the Candidate Countries, Russia and Japan. By 
presenting its proposal for an early ratification of the 
Protocol, the Commission hopes to convince other 
Parties to follow suit rapidly. 
Combating climate change is also a priority under 
the Community's 6th Environmental Action Pro-
gramme and the EU's sustainable development strat-
egy endorsed by the European Council in Göteborg in 
June 2001. The EU's heads of state and government 
at the time re-iterated the EU's determination to meet 
its commitments under the Kyoto Protocol and to 
ratify the Protocol so as to allow it to enter into force 
by 2002. 
In the meantime, the EU has reduced its green-
house gas emissions by 4% between 1990 and 1999 
and is thereby on track to meet its commitment under 
the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change 
to stabilise its emissions at 1990 levels. 
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The Danish Emissions Trading 
Scheme.26  
Eva Jensen, Danish Energy Agency, Copenha-
gen, Denmark 
 
Keywords. Emission trading, flexibility instruments, Kyoto 
Protocol, climate change 
 
Abstract. This paper presents the Danish emission trading 
scheme and how it functions. First of all, some background 
is given to the emission trading scheme, especially con-
cerning the Danish commitments for climate protection. 
The trading scheme is described in detail, including its 
implications for other energy policy. The EU notification of 
the trading scheme is then described, how it has started and 
what Denmark expects later from the scheme, in particular 
in an international perspective.  
Danish commitments 
Danish GHG targets 
Denmark has the following three targets for the 
protection of climate change: 
• UNs Climate Convention and EU: -5% CO2 
emissions in year 2000 compared to 1990 (the 
EU as a whole has a stabilisation target) 
• National Target: -20% CO2 in 2005 compared to 
1988 
• Kyoto and EU bubble: -21% GHGs in 2008-12 
compared to 1990 (which is considered a fairly 
hard target for Denmark) 
Background for commitments 
What is the background for starting a trading 
scheme?  
•  First of all, there is a high environmental re-
sponsibility of the Danish society due to: 
- Large reduction potential 
- High per capita emissions 
- High per capita income 
• Second, there is a high degree of security of sup-
ply (or negatively spoken: of overcapacity): 
- 160-180% power production capacity (older coal 
plants for which Denmark wanted to make sure 
that they are not used for exports when electric-
ity prices go up on the market) 
- Denmark is a net exporter of oil and gas 
• Third, there are also industrial interests 
- Denmark is a First mover on wind power and 
biomass and wants to push these technologies 
further on. 
Results of past efforts 
Denmark has made considerable efforts for climate 
protection in the past. Achievements to be mentioned 
by are that 
                                                           
26 Transcription of the oral presentation by E. Jensen. 
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• 50% of heat consumption is covered by district 
heating 
• 75% of district heating is covered by CHP 
• 50% reduction in heat consumption pr. square 
meter (since 1972) 
• 50% increase in consumption of renewables 
 (since 1990) 
• Denmark covers half the world market in wind 
turbines 
Danish CO2 emissions and export of electricity 
As already mentioned, one motivation for introducing 
a trading scheme was to prevent the export of elec-
tricity from coal-fired power plants. Figure 1 shows 
the Danish CO2 emissions (green line). It appears 
clearly that the emissions follow the blue columns of 
electricity exports. To fulfil it targets, Denmark has to 
be sure that there will not be too much export of elec-
tricity. 
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Figure 1. Danish CO2 emissions and export of 
electricity 
Danish CO2 cap and trade scheme 
How does the Danish cap-and-trade system work? 
• First there is a limit on the CO2 emissions for 
each year 
• The scheme was designed to preserve the possi-
bility of participation in the Nordic market for 
electricity (but by excluding too much of coal-
based electricity exports) 
• It should give incentives to produce electricity by 
more environmentally friendly technologies 
• It should prepare the energy sector for the use of 
the Kyoto mechanisms 
• The period envisged are the years 2000-2003 
To start with the cap: allowed emissions by the power 
sector are for the different years: 
• [Year 2000: 23 Mtonnes CO2] 
• Year 2001: 22 Mtonnes CO2 
• Year 2002: 21 Mtonnes CO2 
• Year 2003: 20 Mtonnes CO2 
The figures for 2000 are in brackets because the sys-
tem was delayed due to the approval procedure of the 
EU, and the system could not start in time. The sys-
tem started only in January of 2001.   
One could ask whether this is a stringent target. 
This question might be answered by looking at the 
average emissions from the power sector which for 
the period 1994-1998 were on average 30.3 Mtonnes 
CO2 (though this figure includes the large electricity 
exports in that period). Covered by the scheme are 
power companies with emissions of more than 100 
ktonnes CO2/year (see also next section), or 
• 90% of emissions by the power sector 
• 85% of power production 
The allocation principle is Grandfathering to com-
panies already producing power (+ Vattenfall), based 
on average historical emissions in 1994-1998. There 
are two reasons for this choice. First of all, the pro-
ducers who invested in capacity did not know that the 
scheme was going to come.  The second reason was 
that the companies have to compete with other coun-
tries, and in this case the Grandfathering is politically 
more acceptable than the auctioning out, which in 
theory is more attractive.  
The last part of the scheme is a penalty/tax: 40 
DKr/tonne (~ US$ 5). This is fairly low. The reason 
for this was again to prevent that Danish companies 
would be disadvantaged compared to companies in 
surrounding countries which do not have a cap.  Even 
if the penalty is low it was calculated to ensure com-
pliance. 
Emissions trading players 
Currently, the emission trading players are 8 compa-
nies, of which the first two are the largest ones: 
• Elsam (Western Denmark) 
• E2 (Eastern Denmark) 
• PreussenElektra / EON 
• Vattenfall 
• Østkraft, Randers Kommunale Værker 
• Shell 
• Christiansø, Anholt 
Anticipated implications 
What will be the implications of the scheme?  
• The Nordic reserve capacity will be limited 
- Marginal production costs will rise significantly 
(by 30%) 
- Clean technologies will become more competi-
tive 
• The fulfilment of Danish commitments will be 
supported 
• Only few traders and trades initially 
- BUT the scheme is prepared for international 
participation!!! 
It should be added that there is not only a cap but also 
a banking cap.  
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Further, it should be mentioned that the scheme is 
also prepared for participation in CDM and JI. It 
makes provisions for these flexibility instruments so 
that the ministry can issue guidelines on participation 
in CDM and JI without going through the whole leg-
islative process again. However, this could only be 
done when international guidelines become available 
and Denmark has to wait until then. The position of 
Denmark is that these projects should be based on the 
polluter pays principle, i.e. the industries should 
provide the funds for these projects.  
EU notification 
The trading scheme has been notified according to 
the directive on state aid. There were three key ques-
tions to which answers had to be provided before 
notification was given: 
1.Equal access Set aside (declaration) 
This was considered a problem in particular for new 
entrants into the market though this is very unlikely 
in the next years: first new entrants have to build up 
new capacity which takes years and second, the price 
is so low currently that nobody invests in production 
capacity in Denmark. So the compromise was that the 
Commission in is approval proposed that if any new 
entrant will come in, he would be provided with re-
duction units. Denmark promised to do so. 
2.Element of subsidy Stringent targets 
Then there was the element of subsidation which 
arises due to the choice of the grandfathering. The 
question was whether this was state aid, as no auc-
tioning was carried out. However, the answer was 
very clear: as Denmark was the only country with 
targets, it is not considered as state aid. As long as 
other countries have no such schemes, this is not 
problem. However, in the future, when other schemes 
will arise, we will have to come back to this question. 
3. CHP-protection Supports environmental  
 aim of the scheme 
This was a minor item, which will not be further dis-
cussed here. 
 
How is the scheme working in practice? So far, there 
is still little experience as the scheme started late. 
There have not been any trades yet. For the moment 
only simulations of the trade are available up to 2006. 
By the end of this year, the Danish government 
would have to decide on the quotas further on up to 
2006 so that the companies would have a firm ground 
for their decisions.  Another crucial element in the 
simulations is the price of electricity which starts 
quite low (around 12 Danish Ore) to end up to rise to 
about a Dollar at the end of the period. At the begin-
ning there will be little electricity production (due to 
the low electricity price) and companies will bank. In 
2003/2004 the emissions will be higher than the cap, 
and the companies will empty the bank and at the end 
the emissions are higher than the quota and nothing 
will be left on the bank . Companies will then start 
paying for the emissions. 
In summary from international perspectives and 
considerations the following elements are important 
with the trading scheme: 
Cost effectiveness % Trading needed 
Trade implications% Auctioning preferable 
Political reality      %  Only Grandfathering  
  acceptable 
Risk         %  Trading and GHG reduc 
 tions never a reality 
Further Developments 
The following developments in the near future might 
occur with the trading system: 
• The period after 2003 will have to be figured out 
(will there be a cap and if yes, how low?) 
• How to enter more sectors/more players (energy-
intensive industries) 
• Adjustments of tax/penalty as others follow (for 
example in the frame of a general Nordic trading 
scheme, though this is not very concrete yet) 
• Development of the market place (currently a 
formal platform for such a trading scheme which 
is Internet based, is elaborated by international 
consultants). 
• Distribution of emission permits (especially 
when new producers enter the market, will there 
still be Grandfathering?, although new entrants 
are not expected before some time. Then there 
will be the EU trading scheme to be considered.) 
• Developments of JI and CDM: as soon as inter-
national rules are available, the Danish scheme 
will be opened to this. Electricity industry is cur-
rently pushing much into that direction. 
• Green certificate market (2003): 20% of the mar-
ket should be covered by green electricity. Com-
patibility with the trading system needs to be as-
sured. 
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The Proposed UK Emissions 
Trading Scheme.  
Margaret Mogford, UK Emissions Trading Group 
Secretariat 
 
Abstract. The purpose of this paper is to develop general 
thoughts about carbon trading and the Emissions Trading 
Group (ETG) process and provide an overview of the pro-
posals for a greenhouse gas trading scheme and the pros-
pects for successful implementation. 
Why emissions trading? 
The arguments for emissions trading are well under-
stood.  When accompanied by a robust compliance 
and reporting regime, trading delivers assured 
environmental results as reliably as regulation but it 
does so in a way that works with business instincts 
rather than against them.  A market acts as its own 
check on compliance.  It is unlikely that a firm will 
cry foul if a competitor appears to be getting an easy 
ride from an inspector but you can be sure that there 
will be complaints if there is suspicion of market 
advantage from weak verification of emissions. 
Having said that we must be clear, trading itself 
does nothing for the environment.  It is merely a de-
livery mechanism, that directs investment and 
changes of operating practices, which are the means 
of improving environmental performance, to where 
they can be most effective.    
Businesses become fully engaged when trading is 
allowed to meet an environmental target, from the 
plant manager to the commercial analyst.  It achieves 
what environmental managers have been attempting 
for years, bringing environmental concerns to the 
centre of business decision making. The collaborative 
effort of the ETG where some 100 companies and 
other organisations came together to work with gov-
ernment to design the system, demonstrates the busi-
ness interest in trading as an environmental tool. This 
compares with development of Integrated Pollution 
Prevention Control (IPPC) and even the Climate 
Change Levy (CCL) negotiated agreements where 
business did not feel engaged in the fundamental de-
sign. 
Why Carbon Trading? 
Emissions trading works where the impact of the 
pollution is not specific or localised. The wider 
spread the impact the larger the potential market, and 
the larger the market the more efficient it will be in 
discovering least cost abatement opportunities. 
Greenhouse effects are the ultimate non localised 
pollution impacts. The effect on the atmosphere is 
independent of the source of the emission. This 
makes greenhouse gases ideal emission trading pol-
lutants for their greenhouse warming potential, it 
does not over ride the local air quality impacts of the 
non CO2 gases which remain controlled under IPPC. 
Greenhouse gases are recognised internationally as 
a threat and, notwithstanding the outcomes at the 
Hague, the building blocks are in place for world 
wide trading with all the economic efficiencies that 
that will bring. It is also clear that Kyoto is only the 
beginning. As the demands on business get tougher it 
becomes all the more important that economically 
efficient solutions are found.    
Meeting the demands of stabilising 550 ppmv CO2 
in the atmosphere will, according to the Royal Com-
mission on Environmental Pollution, require a 60% 
cut in UK carbon emissions by 2050. This will not be 
achieved without a transformation of the UK econ-
omy.  History shows that economic transformation 
occurs in response to market signals rather govern-
ment direction. Emissions trading will play a critical 
role in signalling and encouraging the necessary 
changes in the economy, whether by generating extra 
revenue streams for low carbon technology or by 
pricing high emissions sources out of the market. The 
value of the carbon emissions associated with in-
vestments will be factored into those investment de-
cisions. In economic terms former free externalities 
will be internalised.  With the right market signals the 
transformation should be made with less dislocation 
than would occur under other approaches. 
What is the Emissions Trading Group? 
The ETG is a collaboration of companies, trade asso-
ciations, service providers and critically government 
departments that came together because they believed 
the arguments on the value of emissions trading as an 
effective tool to deliver carbon emissions reductions 
from UK business. 
There are multiple motivations for being involved 
in the ETG but the common belief is that climate 
change is a real problem and that businesses will 
have to play a part in delivering the solution.  We in 
the ETG do not compare the business impact of emis-
sions trading with past business as usual without cli-
mate change policies, it is self evident that such poli-
cies are here already and will get tougher; the CCL is 
the best example.  We are working to show that busi-
ness is willing to collaborate with government to de-
sign policy tools which allow business to contribute 
with less deleterious effects on competitiveness.   
The ETG was formed in June 1999 under the aus-
pices of the CBI and the Advisory Committee on 
Business and the Environment by some 30 major 
companies and other organisations.  All companies 
are represented in the ETG Council by board level 
individuals, signalling high level engagement in the 
process, to stop staff like myself getting involved for 
intellectual interest without evident support of the 
company.  The work is done by technical level repre-
sentatives of the companies in work and advisory 
groups.  Critically our government colleagues have 
been represented at all meetings of these groups so 
that ideas are worked out with government.  When 
our papers are delivered to government, they hold no 
surprises indeed they have been instrumental in their 
writing.  
The numbers have now grown to 100, with new 
companies coming on board all the time.   We have 
full participation of big five consultancies, banks, 
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City law firms as well as brokers, verifiers and other 
service providers all of which bring expertise neces-
sary to a workable design. 
An important element of the process is the external 
outreach, both to firms that do not have the resources 
to be actively involved, via a series of workshops in 
London and the regions, and to other stakeholders.  
The CBI organised introductory workshops in Spring 
2000 in 10 locations attended by over 400.  These 
were followed up by another series in the New Year 
with a similar attendance. 
Equally important has been the NGO liaison Group 
that has met regularly for over a year to test the ideas 
we are developing against an NGO review.  These 
meetings have been good economic tutorials on the 
principles and practicalities of the scheme.   As a 
result the scheme design is strengthened and we have 
gained the support of NGOs to the principle of trad-
ing so long as  
• it delivers real environmental improvement,  
• is subject to robust monitoring and verification 
and  
• is transparent;  
principles that underpin the work of the ETG.  As 
they point out and we would agree, the issue of the 
setting of targets may not meet such a consensus. 
Why has the ETG worked as a process? 
The ETG has worked for the same reasons as an 
emissions market will work.  It works with the grain 
of business and government needs.  There is remark-
able alignment between the government wish to be 
assured of emission reductions and the business view 
that how and where to find those reductions should 
be left with them.   
The ETG as a process has worked for several rea-
sons among them: 
• Participant companies have nominated very sen-
ior people to the Council from which the Steer-
ing Committee has been drawn.  The Steering 
Committee has main board members of some ten 
companies and CEOs of some, under the chair-
manship of Rodney Chase, deputy CEO of BP.  
Such high level engagement of the companies 
demonstrates commitment and allows those 
working on the scheme to devote considerable 
time. 
• The hard work of those that have actively par-
ticipated.  Some have given days of work per 
week since the ETG was established.  The think-
ing and solutions have emerged from work-
groups and advisory groups chaired by represen-
tatives from different ETG members.  The chairs 
look for volunteers to work on papers individu-
ally and in small groups, and that work has al-
ways come through.  The quality is high and of-
ten on particular subjects, for example the meas-
urement of baselines for projects, we have as-
sembled UK expertise and by pulling such a 
broad group together we take the topic forward.  
In other areas we have developed new ideas and 
even vocabulary, for example in relation to ac-
counting for emissions from electricity, we have 
distinguished between double counting and dis-
crepancy, a technical but very important step to 
clarifying thinking on a difficult subject. 
• The true collaborative nature of the process is 
exemplified by the Secretariat, which is staffed 
by secondees from BG, a gas exploration and 
distribution company, from the DTI and from BP 
and is housed at Blue Circle, the cement com-
pany.  This demonstrates the range of interests 
within the ETG. 
• The achievement has not just been from hard 
work but because of the commitment and enthu-
siasm that being involved in an innovative policy 
development process and working with new 
ideas brings.  There are business reasons for us 
all to be involved but the narrow business inter-
ests are often left at the door in the search for 
workable solutions. 
• Finally, critical to the process has been the full 
engagement of government.  The openness and 
co-operative approach of officials from DETR, 
DTI and Treasury has greatly improved the qual-
ity of our proposals but also enhanced their ac-
ceptability to government. 
What has the ETG achieved? 
So what has all the hard work and enthusiasm for the 
project achieved?  In a sense nothing yet, we still 
await an operational trading scheme in the UK.  On 
another level, the achievement has been extraordi-
nary.  We have developed a blueprint for a trading 
scheme that will fit with existing climate change 
policies and measures in the UK.  We have influ-
enced the debate on company emission trading 
throughout the world, even adding new words to the 
lexicon, such as gateway.  We get enquiries from as 
far away as Japan and Australia and the proposals 
were presented in The Hague to a packed side bar 
meeting. 
We have offered the solutions to problems that will 
beset introduction of emissions trading in many other 
countries, such as whether a voluntary approach can 
work, how to handle energy efficiency targets and 
whether a scheme can encompass electricity users 
and producers.  Our ideas on these and other issues 
will not necessarily be adopted but they will influ-
ence thinking.  It is for this reason that many interna-
tional firms that will service international emissions 
trading are so closely involved in our group.  There 
are risks with being in front of the game and the in-
fluence being a front runner brings also carries re-
sponsibilities to do our best to find the right solu-
tions.  Having said that, we are prepared to say the 
trading system will be an exercise in learning by do-
ing, we cannot expect to get it right from the first. 
The actual outputs that we can point to are the Out-
line Proposals published in March 2000 and the re-
ports of the advisory groups that have been meeting 
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since then.  All these are on the ETG website which 
now has over 500 regular users.27 Following the clear 
instructions from our steering committee these do not 
dwell on theory or concepts but tackle the practical 
issues of designing the scheme.  
A critical success without which the scheme would 
not proceed and which has attracted much interest 
overseas, is the case we made to government for a 
financial incentive for firms that take on and deliver a 
binding and demanding emission reduction target.  
We were able to win the argument on efficiency 
grounds that are fundamental to the case for trading, 
that is that the market will find the least cost abate-
ment options. It therefore follows that incentives to 
firms with the opportunity to trade to meet their tar-
gets will deliver very good value emission reductions.  
The ideas proposed by the ETG were well received 
by government, both in letters to the Steering 
Committee chairman and in statements in budget and 
pre-budget reports but the first full commentary on 
the proposals came in November 2000 with the 
publication of the DETR consultation document on 
the trading scheme28.  Most of the document is very 
familiar to those that have been working in the ETG.  
It does depart from ETG proposals in one or two 
places, for example in the preference for a three year 
average to set the grandfather baseline but it is a very 
fair reflection of the work that has been done and it 
asks good questions about the design.  
Is a successful ETS assured? 
The short answer is no.  There is still a great deal to 
do on the technical infrastructure for the scheme,  
• Designing and building a registry to track and 
hold allowances 
• Accrediting verifiers 
• Agreeing reporting protocols 
• Writing the detailed rules and the designing and 
operating incentive scheme 
Much of this activity lies with government but with 
the political will that has been shown to date, we 
must assume that sufficient resources will be directed 
to these tasks and that they will be in place in time. 
More of a risk lies on the company side.  It is pos-
sible that there will be too few volunteers for the 
scheme, because of  
& lack of awareness,  
& inability to prepare, by understanding company 
abatement costs and future emission profiles 
& undue complexity of the scheme 
& finally a new risk since The Hague, that senior 
managers in UK firms take the message from the 
failure to reach agreement that the rest of the 
world is not moving forward so that voluntary 
action here would be unnecessary and pointless. 
                                                           
27 http://www.uketg.com 
28 A Greenhouse gas trading Scheme for the United King-
dom, November 2000, DETR, London 
It is important, if we are not to waste the work that 
we have put in that these risks are overcome, by ex-
tensive marketing of the scheme, full engagement of 
the service providers in raising awareness but most 
important continued full and widely expressed sup-
port from government. 
It will remain however something of a leap of faith 
for firms to commit to the scheme.  They will be vol-
untarily taking on a binding limit on their emissions 
for the period of the scheme.  Despite the incentive, 
this decision may not be primarily a financial deci-
sion, it will be about 
• corporate reputation,  
• demonstrating faith in a policy tool that we be-
lieve to be better than regulation or tax 
• gaining early experience in a carbon market 
which will come and which will be significant 
and word wide 
• benefiting from the discipline that a market 
brings to understanding carbon costs and abate-
ment opportunities. 
So what should we expect 
I think that we can confidently see a greenhouse gas 
market in the UK with a few brave early trades from 
April 2001 but with firms with caps in place from 
January 2002.  They will be pioneers and they will 
not be many but there is enough momentum behind 
the scheme that there will be sufficient for a market 
to be established.  There will also be a large potential 
market for permits in the negotiated agreement sec-
tor, which numbers some 5000 firms. 
Assuming that there is real progress on the interna-
tional front and that the UK market in year one func-
tions effectively, in the following years there will be 
a rush to participate. It takes much less courage to 
join a market, where prices are beginning to emerge 
than to create one from scratch.  The attractions will 
be evident to a much wider range of firms. 
For business as a whole the prize is significant.  It 
is in business interests to demonstrate a  better way 
of delivering emission reductions than the alterna-
tives and a better, collaborative approach to develop-
ing new policies in relation to business. 
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tem: some policy issues identified 
with the POLES-ASPEN model.  
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Abstract. This paper provides some insight on the issues 
raised by the Greenhouse Gas Tradable Emission Permit 
System (TEPS) proposed in a Green Paper of the European 
Commission in 2000. It is based on the results of the 
POLES model for the simulation of the Marginal Abate-
ment Cost curves of the EU countries and on the ASPEN 
software for the assessment of the corresponding structure 
of the permit market. The first section identifies the issue of 
the national sectoral entitlements, in the context of the 
European burden sharing agreement, and then derives a 
simple scheme for the CO2 entitlement of energy intensive 
industries and electricity sector; this system is based on the 
hypothesis of entitlements allowing for the equalisation of 
the marginal abatement costs (MACs) across the different 
sectors of each country. The second section presents and 
discusses the key outcomes of the simulation for the energy 
intensive industries and electricity sector TEPS in 2010. 
The third section discusses the consequences for industries 
of different environmental regulation schemes, while com-
paring the grandfathered and auctioned permit system with 
the tax or technical standard (Policies and Measures). It 
also identifies some key issues that will have to be further 
analysed and discussed in the process of designing the EU 
emission permit market.  
Introduction 
In 2000 the European Commission prepared a Green 
Paper on the creation of a European Greenhouse Gas 
Tradable Emission Permit System to be implemented 
from 2005 on, in a perspective of early action for the 
compliance to the Kyoto Protocol. This proposal was 
issued in order to allow for reactions of industry, 
stakeholders and academic researchers, before further 
elaboration by the EU services. The exercise per-
formed with the POLES model and the ASPEN soft-
ware shows that such a TEPS for large energy con-
sumers in Europe would bring large economic bene-
fits, compared with the no-trade situation. It also 
shows however that this type of tradable permit sys-
tem supposes first that the thorny issue of sectoral 
entitlements is solved in a satisfactory way both in-
side each country and across member countries. 
The European Commission Green Paper on emission 
trading 
The Green Paper presents the main lines of a future 
European emission trading system for the electricity 
                                                           
29 CNRS  Université Pierre Mendès-France, 150 rue de la 
Chimie, Domaine Universitaire, 38040  Grenoble.e-mail: 
patrick.criqui@upmf-grenoble.fr 
sector and the energy intensive industries, i.e. the 
industries identified the Large Combustion Plants and 
Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control Direc-
tives. The proposed scheme would start in 2005 and 
thus be incorporated in an early action scheme for the 
compliance to the Kyoto Protocol. But it is also pro-
posed that the market may be progressively extended 
to other industries and economic actors and thus con-
stitute the core of a future EU-wide tradable emission 
permit system. It is thus important, in view of these 
possible developments, to identify the key issues 
raised by the definition and implementation of such a 
scheme. The key issues of course relate basically to 
questions of economic effectiveness on one hand, and 
equity and competitiveness on the other hand. 
The POLES model for the simulation of MAC curves 
The POLES model is a partial equilibrium, energy 
sector model for the world up to 2030. Its geographi-
cal and sectoral disaggregation (30 countries or re-
gions in the version used for this exercise, about 12 
sectors of activity and 24 power generation and re-
newable technologies) is however sufficient to pro-
vide insights on the potential impacts of energy and 
environment policies at a country or regional level 
and, in the case of this study, for Europe. 
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Figure 1. The POLES model dynamic simulation 
process 
Basically the POLES model simulates energy and 
environment policies through the introduction of a 
shadow tax for the considered emissions. In the case 
of CO2 emission reduction policies, the shadow car-
bon tax is introduced in every module where fossil 
fuels are burnt, proportionally to the carbon content 
of the fuel. This shadow carbon tax can indeed repre-
sent either a carbon tax, the price of an emission 
permit or also the dual cost of a technical standard or 
Policy and Measure (P&M). We thus denominate it 
with a generic term: the Carbon Value, which repre-
sents the value given by society to the reduction of 1 
tC of emissions. 
By performing a series of simulations of the model 
with stepwise increases in the Carbon Value, it is 
possible to simulate the corresponding reductions in 
emissions and to associate a price/cost with a quanti-
tative reduction target: this allows to build the Mar-
ginal Abatement Cost curves for CO2, which can be 
identified at the sectoral or national level. 
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The ASPEN software for the analysis of tradable per-
mit systems and emission reduction policies 
The ASPEN software then uses the MAC curves pro-
duced by POLES as inputs for the simulation − on 
simple but robust micro-economic grounds  of Trad-
able Emission Permit Systems. The principle used is 
the one of cost-minimisation through trading: if a set 
of economic actors  be they world regions, countries 
or sectors, each characterised by its own MAC curve 
and emission constraint − participates in an emission 
permit market, then the price of the permit will 
equalise, through the process of exchanges, the 
Marginal Abatement Costs for each participant. 
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Figure 2. Example of a permit market simulation with 
the ASPEN software 
The ASPEN software allows to calculate the mar-
ginal and total abatement costs with and without 
permit system and also to evaluate the gains from 
trade for different extensions and structure of the 
market. This process can be applied either for the 
assessment of international emission reduction 
agreements or for the analysis of national policies 
involving different sectors with different MAC 
curves. 
A starting point: national emission reduction 
policies and sectoral CO2 entitlements 
The design of CO2 emission reduction policies can be 
based on different policy instruments such as Carbon 
taxes, Policies and Measures or tradable emission 
permit systems. Very probably the implementation of 
actual policies will rely on a mix of these different 
instruments, according to the characteristics of the 
different sectors considered (number of economic 
agents, respective sensitivity of these agents to price 
signals ). 
One key issue in the definition of national policies 
is the inter-sectoral equity vs overall economic ef-
fectiveness trade-off. Each type of instrument − 
P&M, tax or tradable permit − will allow for emis-
sion reductions, be it with or without an explicit 
quantitative target, but it will also involve additional 
sectoral costs. Thus the policy mix considered in a 
national policy also corresponds to an explicit or im-
plicit carbon entitlement and to a burden-sharing of 
the national target among the different sectors. 
This question is rarely addressed as such and it 
raises difficult policy issues, similar to those of the 
identification of acceptable quantitative emission 
reduction objectives in an international agreement. 
Two extreme approaches can be adopted in the de-
sign of a national emission reduction policy and in 
the identification of the corresponding sectoral tar-
gets: 
• In the case of the adoption of a general carbon 
tax (GCT) system, the  emission control is ob-
tained by a price signal. In principle, the same 
tax introduced in every sector will induce the 
implementation of all abatement options that 
present a cost inferior or equal to the tax level. 
As a consequence, marginal abatement costs are 
equalised across the sectors. The global target is 
met with full economic-effectiveness, provided 
that the level of the GCT has been conveniently 
determined.. The sectoral targets, total sectoral 
costs and share of the burden are not identified 
ex-ante but can only be studied ex-post, after the 
MAC equalisation process. To some extent, the 
sectoral equity or fairness of the policy do not 
even have to be considered in the first stage of 
the policy process. 
• But a different approach may also be adopted 
through a uniform reduction objective system. 
This is done by considering a uniform limitation 
or reduction rate relatively to the base year that is 
equal to the national objective; i.e. if a country 
has to reduce its emissions of x% relatively to 
1990, then this objective is applied in each sec-
tor. Of course the corresponding sectoral targets 
allow to meet the national goal and the advan-
tage of this system is that it apparently provides 
a fair burden-sharing among sectors. This may 
however not be the case if, as maybe expected, 
the trends in emissions in the no-climate policy 
scenario and the MAC curves are very different 
across sectors.  
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Figure 3: Sectoral targets for France, equalisation of 
MACs with a carbon tax vs. uniform reduction objec-
tive (0% increase between 1990 and 2010) 
The potential consequences of such a uniform 
reduction objective can be analysed and compared 
with a general carbon tax system while considering, 
as a simple example, the set of sectoral MACs 
produced for France with the POLES model and 
illustrated in Figure 3. 
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This case clearly shows the differences in marginal 
and total costs, incurred by the sectors in the general 
carbon tax versus the uniform reduction objective 
policy: in the former case the MACs are equalised, 
but some sectors (industry) reduce their emissions 
more than others (transport), in absolute and in rela-
tive terms. In the latter case, all sectors stabilise their 
emissions, but the MAC is null in industry as this 
sector already reduces its emissions in the No-Policy 
Case, while it would be rocketing in the transport 
sector, which presents both a high Reference and a 
low price-elasticity to the Carbon Value. The case of 
other European countries may be less easily illustra-
tive, but this only for technical reasons (reduction 
targets should be differentiated in a Figure 3.-type 
representation), while the essence of the problem 
remains unchanged. 
A third type of policy may reconcile the two ap-
proaches by entitling the different sectors according 
to the uniform reduction objective and then install a 
nation-wide trading scheme, allowing for the equali-
sation of sectoral MACs. The distributive conse-
quences of such a scheme would of course be very 
important, with some sectors being sellers and the 
other buyers of permits. As mentioned above, actual 
policies will probably use a mix of instruments and 
thus follow a hybrid sectoral entitlement scheme. 
As no explicit and general rule has up to now be 
identified either at a country or EU level, one diffi-
culty for economic modelling exercises is to build 
reasonable hypotheses on sectoral entitlements. In 
most cases the hypothesis is that of entitlements ac-
cording to the equalisation of sectoral MACs: it in-
deed allows to suppose that the cost-effectiveness 
criteria is respected in the design of national policies 
and this is its main advantage. But, as underlined 
above, this hypothesis is not the only one possible 
and, to some extent, it may even be considered as a 
modelling artefact. 
A EU trading scheme for industry, under the 
equal MAC entitlement hypothesis 
For exploratory purposes, the EU trading scheme for 
energy intensive industries and the electricity sector 
has been explored with POLES and ASPEN under 
the hypothesis of  European burden sharing agree-
ment and equal MAC national entitlement in each 
EU country or region. Furthermore, it has to be un-
derlined that this hypothesis corresponds to a certain 
degree of grand- fathering as the entitled emissions 
are given for free. 
The no-trade and EU-wide trading cases as bench-
marks for analysis 
The Kyoto compliance hypothesis is first studied for 
the EU in 6 regions (Germany, France, Great-Britain, 
Italy, Rest of EU-North, Rest of EU-South). The re-
sults in Table 1. show that under the European burden 
sharing agreement with no-trade hypothesis, the na-
tional MACs measured by the POLES model lie in a 
very wide range, from 16 99/t CO2 (52 $90/tC in Ger-
many) to 118 99/t CO2 (in Rest of EU-North). The 
The total cost for the EU is of 17 b99, i.e. approxi-
mately 0.17% of EUs 2010 GDP. The theoretical 
hypothesis of a full perfect market at EU level 
changes the scene quite drastically, with a permit 
price of 42 99/t CO2 and a total cost of 11 b99. This 
case is however highly hypothetical, as it supposes 
the possibility of a market to be established among 
very different sectors, some of them made of a multi-
plicity of economic agents. 
Table 1. The Kyoto Protocol in the EU, costs in the 
EU-wide Trade and No-Trade cases 
Emissions (MtC) Trade : Permit Price 134,5 $/tC No Trade
KYOTO 2010 2010 2010 Trade Trade Dom. Total  % of MAC Cost  % of
2010 Ref Kyoto Trade Value Cost Cost GDP No Tr GDP
(Mt) (Mt) (Mt) (Mt) (M$) (M$) (M$) ($/tC) (M$)
FRA 121 104 108 -3.5 468 796 1 265 0.08 185 1 350 0.09
RFA 236 210 182 28.0 -3 760 3 167 -593 -0.03 52 643 0.03
ITA 123 103 111 -8.6 1 151 715 1 866 0.13 279 2 454 0.18
GBR 168 141 137 4.4 -585 1 800 1 215 0.09 108 1 274 0.09
REUn 206 146 174 -28.5 3 828 1 835 5 664 0.40 381 8 763 0.62
REUs 131 112 104 8.2 -1 102 1 563 462 0.04 83 680 0.07
Total Bubble 983 816 816 (40,5) (5447) 9 877 9 877 0.11 - 15 164 0.17  
The energy intensive and electricity sector market 
The EU Green Paper on emission trading introduces 
some realism in the scenarios for emission permit 
trading in Europe and this is already a major achieve-
ment. It is indeed supposed that the market may be 
progressively introduced, first in sectors built from 
large energy consuming entities, i.e. the energy 
intensive industries (EII in Table 2.) and the electric-
ity sector (ELEC). 
The simulation of such a market with POLES and 
ASPEN, supposing that each sectors entitlement 
correspond to the equalisation of the MACs at the 
national level shows that this initial market would 
indeed capture quite a large part of the gains that 
would be obtained in the much less realistic case of a 
full EU-wide trading scheme. 
Table 2. The EU industry and electricity sector mar-
ket, costs in the Trade and No-Trade cases 
Emissions (MtC) Permit Price 123 $/tC No Trade
EU Buble 2010 2010 2010 Trade Trade Dom. Total MAC Cost
2010 Ref Kyoto Trade Value Cost Cost No Tr
(Mt) (Mt) (Mt) (Mt) (M$) (M$) (M$) ($/tC) (M$)
FRA-ELEC 9 8 8 0.3 -39 28 -12 (37) 11
FRA-EII 9 8 9 -0.4 53 47 100 185 113
RFA-ELEC 63 50 38 12.0 -1 479 1 345 -134 52 325
RFA-EII 14 13 13 0.9 -108 94 -14 52 17
ITA-ELEC 31 23 27 -3.4 422 235 657 279 911
ITA-EII 9 7 8 -1.2 142 58 200 279 287
GBR-ELEC 46 31 30 1.2 -143 801 658 108 666
GBR-EII 10 9 8 0.1 -18 81 63 108 64
REUn-ELEC 46 24 34 -10.1 1 247 642 1 888 380 2 987
REUn-EII 18 12 16 -3.7 459 127 586 380 1 031
REUs-ELEC 39 28 25 3.9 -474 795 322 83 401
REUs-EII 9 8 7 0.5 -61 113 52 83 63
Total Bubble 304 221 221 (18,9) (2322) 4 364 4 364 - 6 877  
The key results in Table 2. indeed show the follow-
ing: 
• The intensive industries and electricity producers 
market covers approximately 30 % of the Un-
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ions emissions (given the POLES model sec-
toral disaggregation). 
• The gains that may be expected from the trade 
among these sectors amount to 2.85 b99, i.e. 
about one half of the total gains from trade (in 
the full EU-wide vs. no-trade cases). 
• The price of the permit is of 38 99/t CO2, slightly 
inferior to the hypothetical EU-wide Carbon 
Value. 
With the national entitlement system considered 
here (equal sectoral MAC in each country) the trade 
flows in the European energy intensive industries and 
electricity sector market principally consist in: 
• Purchases from the electricity sector and energy 
intensive industries in EU-North (respectively 10  
and 4 MtC) and in Italy (3 and 1 MtC). 
• Sales from the electricity sectors in Germany 
(12MtC), Great Britain (1MtC), EU-South 
(4MtC). 
All participating units benefit from the emission 
permit market. In the four importing units identified 
above, the gains come from a permit price that is in-
ferior to the national carbon value. For the three ex-
porting units the permit price is higher than the na-
tional carbon value, but further reductions are more 
than compensated by the permit sales revenues. 
A particular situation occurs in France, where the 
electricity sector presents a backward bending MAC 
curve for intermediate carbon values. This is ex-
plained in the models results by the following phe-
nomenon: when the carbon value is low, the electric-
ity sectors emissions are reduced; when it increases 
further, electricity − which presents in France a very 
low carbon intensity because of the nuclear share in 
power generation − replaces more carbon intensive 
fuels in final consumption, but as a consequence, the 
emissions of the power sector increase; then for high 
carbon values the effect is again a net reduction in the 
electricity sector. This type of situation should clearly 
deserve more analysis in terms of the complex indi-
rect effects of a carbon value on the fuel mix and 
sectoral emissions. 
The total cost for industry and the issue of the 
entitled vs. auctioned permits 
It has been supposed in the above analysis that the 
permits have been initially entitled to the different 
sectors according to the MAC equalisation rules. In 
that case the total cost for the sector is the one indi-
cated in Table 2. It corresponds solely to the cost of 
the abatement inside the sector plus or minus respec-
tively the buying or sale of permits for the difference 
between the entitlement and the effective emission.  
Policy instruments and total cost for industry 
Figure 4. illustrates in a generic way the possible 
elements of the total cost for a sector, in a buyer case 
(i.e. when the marginal abatement cost in the no-trade 
situation is higher than the permit price in the trade 
situation) and for four types of policy instruments: 
• In a no-trade + Policy and Measure (or emission 
standard) the total cost is only the sector abate-
ment cost (A+B1+B2). 
• In a no-trade + carbon tax system the total cost is 
the sum of the sector abatement cost (A+B1+B2) 
plus the tax paid on remaining emissions 
(C1+C2). 
• In a trading case + entitled or grandfathered 
permits, the total cost is limited to the sector 
abatement cost (A) − which is of course lower 
than in the no-trade situation as the permit mar-
ket allows to lower the required MAC − plus the 
permit purchase (B1). 
• In a trading case + auctioned permits, the sector 
cost is the sum of the abatement cost (A), plus 
the costs of the permit corresponding to the total 
emissions (B1+C1). 
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Figure 4. Total cost for a sector for 4 types of policy 
instruments (buyer case) 
This type of analysis allows to identify the similari-
ties in terms of cost structure between the P&M sys-
tem and the entitled (or grandfathered) permit market 
on the one hand, and the carbon tax and auctioned 
permit on the other hand. It also provides an insight 
on the possible preferences of industrialists as regard 
the choice of the policy instrument. In the case of a 
buyer, examined here, the carbon tax is systemati-
cally the highest cost solution and the entitled permit 
the lowest one. The comparison between the Policy 
and Measure and the auctioned permit systems de-
pends in the industrys perspective on the relative 
surface of  B1 and C1, i.e. of the Reference, the per-
mit price and the MAC curve shape. 
For concisions sake a similar analysis for the seller 
case is not provided here. It would show slightly 
more complex results in the comparison of instru-
ments, but the entitled permit market would still be 
the lowest cost option. 
Distributive impacts, competition and uncertainties 
These analyses of the cost consequences for industry, 
remind us that the equal MAC national entitlement 
hypothesis used in Section 2. is only but one of the 
possible cases. As illustrated above an auctioned 
permit system would of course introduce strong dis-
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tributive consequences, but it would also raise several 
difficult questions such as: 
• What institution would receive the probably 
large funds resulting from the auction and for 
what uses?  
• What should be the total amount of permits auc-
tioned at EU level for the subset of energy inten-
sive industries and power producers? 
• How would the emission profile of each sector 
participating in the auction permits, be made 
compatible with the sectoral targets of national 
policies? 
Comparatively, the entitled permit system seems to 
present in its definition and implementation less 
uncertainties and consistency problems. Besides the 
fact that it would probably be preferred by 
industrialists (as involving less transfers from their 
part) it would also respect the consistency of national 
abatement policies. 
One key remaining issue is however that it may 
raise problems of competition between similar indus-
tries in the EU. Indeed while every participant would 
gain from trade, some of them may gain much more 
than others, as illustrated in Table 2. These may 
probably claim that the situation results in an unfair 
competition inside the EU. More important than the 
particular results obtained in this preliminary simula-
tion is the fact that this type of situation may exist, 
depending on the national targets, structural condi-
tions and sectoral entitlement policies. This latter 
issue is probably the one that should deserve the 
more attention in the process of launching a European 
permit trading scheme. 
Conclusion 
This exploratory study aimed at identifying some key 
issues related to the implementation of a European 
CO2 emission permit trading system for energy inten-
sive industries and power generators. The quantita-
tive results of the simulation − performed for entitle-
ments with equal sectoral marginal costs at the na-
tional level − show that the gains to be expected from 
this type of system are large. It may indeed capture 
half of the total gain of a hypothetical full-EU trading 
system, relatively to a no-trade situation. As it was to 
be expected, all sectors participating in this market 
may gain from trade, but the simulation also shows 
that some sectors in some countries gain much more 
than others.  
The study thus indicates that several key issues 
should deserve, in the process of designing the EU 
tradable emission permit system, more in-depth 
analyses. In the case of an auctioned permit system 
the key issues relate to the status of the authority in 
charge of emitting the permits and receiving the cor-
responding funds, as well as to the necessary consis-
tency between the EU market and the national poli-
cies. In the case of national sectoral entitlements, it 
remains to be studied how entitlement schemes dif-
ferent from the one considered in the study would 
allow to combine economic effectiveness in the im-
plementation of national emission reduction policies 
and fair competition conditions among the different 
European industrial sectors. 
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Session 3: Perspective for EU enlargement 
Rapporteurs Summary  by Peter Helby, Lund University, Environmental and Energy Systems Studies, Sweden. 
 
Introduction 
The presentations of session 3 were too divergent in 
content to give any holistic picture of the relations 
between Kyoto mechanisms and enlargement of the 
European Union. However, taking into account state-
ments also from the previous sessions, a few positive 
observations are possible, and several open questions 
and potential problems can be brought to the attention 
of the audience before departure from the forum. 
Positive observations 
• Enlargement will bring into the Union a signifi-
cant amount of un-used emissions rights, i.e. a 
contribution more likely to be welcomed by the 
present member states than the agricultural sur-
pluses and extra labour resources that enlarge-
ment will also bring into the Union. Possibly, the 
emission rights can even have a certain value for 
the accession countries as bargaining chips. 
• Some accession countries are doing a serious and 
probably successful job of preparing the institu-
tional framework for sharing emission rights 
with other member states under either fast track 
joint implementation or emission trading rules.  
Open questions 
• Are the positive observations above valid for 
other countries than Poland and the Czech Re-
public? 
• Will the accession countries become part of the 
EU bubble and will they be integrated in a spe-
cific EU regime, that goes beyond the general 
Kyoto regime? 
• Does the foreseen abundance of emission rights 
constitute only a short-term phenomenon, likely 
to be a source of turbulence in the enlarged Un-
ion? Or are accession countries already going 
through the process of decoupling of CO2-
emissions from economic growth, so that they 
may become a long-term source of emission 
rights, permanently influencing the dynamics of 
CO2-reduction in the Union.  
Potential problems 
• Accession countries seem often to be waiting for 
initiatives from Brussels, rather than going for-
ward with institution building based on their own 
judgement. Unlike so many other areas, where 
accession countries are required to implement 
l'acquis communautaire created by others, the 
area discussed at this conference is one, where 
l'acquis does not yet exist, but is in the process of 
creation. In such cases, initiative and experimen-
tation by member states is usually an important 
part of the policy process in the Union. As the 
accession countries have much greater scope 
than present member states for being host to joint 
implementation projects or exporter of emission 
rights, they here have a chance to take the initia-
tive, to be prime movers, rather than simply re-
acting to initiatives from Brussels. This would be 
to their own advantage, but is also important for 
the Union, which only works well when member 
states join the policy process in an active way 
and with a sense of responsibility.  
• The presentations and discussions relating to EU 
enlargement tended to be more about distribu-
tional consequences of different modes of im-
plementing the Kyoto mechanisms, than about 
maximising their effectiveness as tools for sus-
tainable development. As the purpose of the 
cash-flows being created by the protocol is to 
serve as incentives for sustainable development, 
rather than as a source of redistribution or en-
richment, it is somewhat worrying that distribu-
tional aspects get so much attention compared to 
the more relevant subject of incentive effective-
ness. Potentially, such tendencies could cast 
doubt on the legitimacy of the cash-flows. 
• A certain conflict was evident between market 
based and state monopoly approaches to joint 
implementation and emission trading. While a 
strong regulatory role of the state is certainly 
needed in this area, it is less clear why state or-
ganisations should monopolise the trade in emis-
sion rights or joint implementation credits, as 
suggested by some participants. State monopoly 
could easily create a conflict between the institu-
tionalisation of Kyoto mechanisms and the goals 
of the enlargement process, unless clear and 
strong environmental arguments are put forward 
in favour of state monopoly. But the arguments 
heard in the discussions seemed to be more about 
national interests, the entrenchment of which is 
neither the purpose of the enlargement process 
nor of the Kyoto Protocol.  
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Status of the implementation of 
the Acquis Communautaires 30  
Ewa Anzorge , UN Department, Polish Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, Warsaw, Poland 
 
Keywords. Acquis Communautaires, candidate countries, 
Poland, emission trading, flexibility instruments, Kyoto 
Protocol, climate change 
 
Abstract. This paper presents the state of the Acquis 
Communautaires in Poland, i.e. the degree to which EU law 
has been implemented in Poland in view of its accession to 
EU membership. After a general view on all chapters of the 
implementation process, the paper focuses in particular on 
the Environment Chapter and the Energy Chapter. Poland, 
in the past years has carried out considerable efforts, and 
has invested substantial financial means (both from the 
state and the private sector) in order to comply with Euro-
pean Union law on the environment, although this chapter 
is not yet fully closed, and transitional arrangements have 
been requested by Poland in several fields. With respect to 
the flexibility instruments, in particular international emis-
sions trading, it would accelerate the national implementa-
tion process, which has already started in some respects, if 
these instruments would become part of the EU Acquis 
Communautaires given the current strong focus of policy 
makers on the integration process with the EU. 
Introduction 
The government of Poland has adopted December 31, 
2002 as the date on which Poland will have finished 
the process of harmonisation of its laws with Com-
munity Laws and will be prepared for accession to 
the European Union. In the first stage, Acquis Com-
munautaires is being transposed to the Polish law and 
the next stage covers implementation. Acquis Com-
munautaires was divided into 29 areas, in which Po-
land presented its position and in which negotiations 
are going on. Poland has already closed negotiations 
in 13 areas. These areas are Science & Research 
(Chapter 17), Telecommunication and Information 
Technologies (Chapter 19), Education, Training and 
Youth (Chapter 18), Culture and Audiovisual Policy 
(Chapter 20), Industrial Policy (Chapter 15), Small 
and Medium Sized Enterprises (Chapter 16), Com-
mon Foreign and Security Policy (Chapter 27), Con-
sumers and Health Protection (Chapter 23), Statistics 
(Chapter 12), External Relations (Chapter 26), Eco-
nomic and Monetary Union (Chapter 11), Freedom to 
Provide Services (Chapter 3), and Financial Control 
(Chapter 28).  
Environment Chapter 
Environment is one of the most difficult subjects 
from the remaining areas (the second is Agriculture). 
Under three programmes (PHARE, ISPA and SA-
PARD), the European Union provides assistance for 
investments and institution building necessary for 
integration. Very often, assistance in institutional 
strengthening takes the form of twinning arrange-
ments where officials or experts from member coun-
                                                           
30 Transcription of the oral presentation by E. Anzorge. 
tries are seconded to work with the Polish counter-
parts on the implementation of Acquis Communau-
taires in a given area.  
In 2000 three such projects were implemented in 
the area of Environment. They concerned strengthen-
ing of environmental impact assessment, air quality 
assessment systems and pollution prevention, and 
control at internal level. Also in 2000 eight projects 
were approved under ISPRA: five concerned water 
and waste water management, three were related to 
waste.  
Poland fully endorses the objectives of the Euro-
pean Union Policy with regard to Environmental Pro-
tection and shall seek to implement the Union stan-
dards in force. Since 1991 we have consistently im-
plemented a state environment policy, which is based 
on principles of sustainable development. We have 
managed to achieve considerable improvement of the 
state of environment and increased public awareness 
on the subject. Poland already adopted a part of the 
EU legislation in the environment field and is prepar-
ing for the implementation of the other parts.  
However, the cost of implementation would largely 
exceed the possibilities of the state budget and of 
Polish enterprises. It will therefore be necessary to 
work in some areas on transitional arrangements. 
Over the ten last years, Poland implemented a large 
number of projects which brought substantial im-
provement in the state of environment. Emissions to 
air and water were reduced, legally protected areas 
were expanded and Poland ratified a number of inter-
national conventions on the environment. The im-
provement in the state of the environment was possi-
ble due to an effective system for financing of envi-
ronmental protection. The basic sources of financing 
environmental investments are environmental funds 
and investors' own funds. Environmental funds man-
age financial means related to the economic use of 
the environment and penalties for the violation of 
pollution emission limits. In Poland, there are also 
fees for the emission of carbon dioxide, although they 
are not very high. Over the past years about 2 billion 
Euros were spent every year on environmental pro-
tection in Poland. In 1997 it was 8.1% of the value of 
all investment expenditures. Despite this large effort 
there is still a certain gap between the present state of 
environment in Poland and the state that would be in 
compliance with the legal acts on environment in the 
European Union. The costs estimated to be fully in 
compliance is estimated at 30 billion Euros. For this 
reason, Poland has asked for transitional arrange-
ments in the implementation of 13 directives in the 
field of environmental protection.  At present there 
are some new acts in the legislative process that will 
transpose most of the EU directives. These acts are: 
act of environmental protection, water law, act on 
waste, act on packaging and packaging waste, act on 
toxic and polluting substances.  
Concerning the transitional arrangements for 13 di-
rectives, five concern waste, four water, one volatile 
organic compounds, one ozone depleting substances, 
IPPC and radiation protection.  
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Implementation of the Climate Convention 
There is one directive which concerns directly the 
implementation of the Climate Convention (Council 
Decision of 21 June 1993 for a Monitoring Mecha-
nism for CO2 and other greenhouse gas emissions 
(GHG). Poland is a party to the Convention since 
1994 and as a party is fulfilling its obligations under 
the Convention. The obligation to stabilise GHG 
emissions by the year 2000 was fulfilled and, in fact, 
Polish emissions  are far below this level in the year 
2000 (though official data are not yet available) but 
in 1998 the emissions of GHGs amounted to 72% of 
the base year (1988) emissions.   
Poland fulfils also obligations concerning report-
ing. Some inventories were submitted with delay but 
we asked for some flexibility for countries in transi-
tion. First, we submitted inventories every two years,  
but now, the lacking inventories are also prepared. 
The ministry of environment established in 2000 the 
national centre for emission inventories. The centre 
will prepare emission inventories for various conven-
tions, e.g. for the Geneva Convention, for European 
Union Environmental Agency and also for the Cli-
mate Convention and the Kyoto Protocol. This centre 
will maintain national registries of Assigned 
Amounts for the purpose of international emission 
trading or transfers under Joint Implementation. In 
this way, Poland is able to fulfil eligibility criteria for 
the participation in Kyoto Mechanisms, as the ones 
currently under discussion.  
Also, the ministry of environment is preparing a 
strategy of climate protection and is investigating 
what should be prepared in our laws to allow for 
emission trading, because at present Polish law does 
not cover trading of emissions. Poland is waiting for 
concrete COP decisions, precising terms and condi-
tions of trading and transfers under Joint Implementa-
tion, but any step from the European Union would be 
helpful for Poland. For our decision makers the prior-
ity currently is for the integration into the European 
Union, they mainly work on this area and the laws 
that are in relationship with the European Union. 
Therefore, if there are provisions for emission trading 
in the Acquis Communautaires, they will be trans-
ferred to national laws. Even the new act on envi-
ronmental protection that is currently in parliament 
does not create the conditions for the transfer of 
emission units. This act is transposing the IPPC di-
rective and is linking permits for emissions to a com-
plete installation. It seems therefore difficult to trans-
fer permits that are constructed in such a way.  Intro-
duction of emission trading will require changes in 
this new act.  
The Energy Chapter 
Let me say also some words about energy. In this 
area our energy law and the geological and the min-
ing law are consistent with the Acquis Communau-
taires. Poland will, of course, implement all Acquis 
Communautaires in this field by 2002 with the excep-
tion of two points:  
Directive 98/30 relating to common rules for the 
Internal Market for natural gas and of Directive 
68/414 relating to obligations of member states to 
maintain minimum stocks of crude oil and petroleum 
products. In relation to this last obligation Poland 
asked for a transitional period for eight years until the 
end of December 2010. We asked for a limitation of 
the range of stocks by excluding fuel oil from the 
mandatory stocks and by increasing the share of 
crude oil in the mandatory stocks up to 80%.  
In relation to the gas directive Poland requested a 
three years transition period until the end of 2005.  
This is because the Polish gas market currently is not 
prepared for competition on the liberalised EU gas 
market and during the transitional period we will 
carry out restructuring and privatisation of the gas 
industry. New entities working in the field of explo-
ration, transport, storage, distribution and sales of gas 
should be established. This period will also enable 
the entities to operate at least one year on domestic 
competitive markets with free prices before the im-
plementation of the EU directive. Further, the imple-
mentation of the directive requires additional ex-
penses of the order of 200 million Zloties for the 
connection to the EU transmission grid and another 
200 million Zloties for upgrading measurement sys-
tems in pressure reduction stations.  
Outlook 
The implementation of the Acquis Communautaires 
requires great efforts from the administration and also 
a lot of expenditure for the necessary investments 
from the state budget and the private sector. Poland 
has undertaken these tasks on a voluntary basis in 
order to become a member of the European Union 
and strives to finish all chapters before the deadline at 
the end of 2002. With regards the Convention and the 
Kyoto Protocol it would be very useful for Poland to 
participate in the preparation of the European Union 
legislation. Poland would then be able to prepare its 
own legislation in this field because international 
trading of emissions should have the same rules so 
that all countries would trade the same permits on an 
equal basis.  
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Emissions Trading in Poland.  
Jochen Hauff, Atkearney, Berlin, Germany and 
Fanny Missfeldt, 31 Risø National Laboratory, 
Roskilde, Denmark. 
 
Keywords. Emissions trading, climate change, Po-
land, energy sector. 
 
Abstract. This paper discusses where and whether a 
domestic greenhouse gas trading system in Poland 
could be implemented. It argues that emission trends 
suggest that a domestic trading regime would be not 
necessary to meet the Polish Kyoto target. However, 
if Poland wants to participate in an emerging trading 
system in Europe or if it wants to become a major 
seller of emissions permits in an international permit 
trading market, it would be useful for Poland to in-
troduce a domestic trading regime. 
Introduction  
Poland was one of the first countries in Europe that 
has considered the introduction of emissions trading 
as a policy instrument. But following initial enthusi-
asm regarding this new policy instrument in the early 
nineties, it has yet to be implemented. Under the 
Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) of 1997, 
Poland has now the possibility to participate in inter-
national greenhouse gas trading. So the question 
arises whether and how Poland should implement 
domestic greenhouse gas trading in order to facilitate 
its participation in international trading. 
After discussing Polish energy and emission trends, 
the status of Polish climate policy is considered. Fol-
lowing this, the issue of where a domestic trading 
regime could be implemented is analysed. Conclu-
sions are finally drawn against a background of do-
mestic, regional and international politics. This paper 
draws heavily on Hauff (2000) and Hauff and Miss-
feldt (2001). 
Trends of Energy Use and Emissions in Po-
land 
Like in other Economies in Transition, Poland's eco-
nomic growth plummeted along with the transition to 
a market economy in the early nineties. 
The current greenhouse gas emissions are still 
dominated by emissions from the energy sector. The 
shares of total CO2 emissions in 1997 in various sec-
tors were as follows: 
• Energy and transformation industries 53% 
• Industry and construction  19% 
• Transport     7% 
• Other sectors    17% 
The reason for the high share of emissions from the 
energy sector is the continuously high share of the 
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use of coal in the energy supply mix, as data from 
1997 reveals: 
• Steam, Coking and brown coal  70% 
• Natural gas      9% 
• Crude oil    15% 
• Hydro, wind, biomass     5%. 
But the coal sector reform, which was brought on 
its way with the help of the World Bank in 1998 will 
contribute to reducing emissions from this sector 
among others through the closure of unprofitable 
mines.  
Poland and Climate Change 
Poland ratified the Convention on Climate Change in 
1994, and signed the Kyoto Protocol as early as 1998. 
Under the Protocol, Poland is committed to 6% re-
duction of the main six greenhouse gases compared 
with 1988 (KP, 1997). Polish base year emissions, 
excluding emissions uptake from the land-use, land-
use change and forestry sector, were 561,021Gg, with 
476,625Gg from CO2 alone. This makes Poland the 
third largest emitter in the region following Ukraine 
and Russia. 
As a result of the shift in economic regime, future 
trends in emissions are similar to other economies in 
transition subject to high uncertainties. Reflecting the 
large uncertainties of emissions, projections for 2010 
range from +23 to -11% compared to 1988 (National 
Communication 1, National Communication 2). Re-
cent projections, however, confirm a steep down-
wards trend for 2010 with around -15% below 1988 
emissions (FEWE, 1999). 
This projection points to a large potential of Polish 
emission sales in an international greenhouse gas 
market. In addition, further 20% reductions can be 
reached at a cost of less than 20 USD, as a 'with 
measures' scenario shows (FEWE, 1999). 
Polish environmental law is based on its Water 
Law from 1974, which was complemented by the 
Environmental Protection Act of 1980. Since 1994, 
Poland has an office for Joint Implementation, and in 
1999 an office for the implementation of the 
UNFCCC (1999) was added. 
Polish environmental expenditure at 1.1% of GDP 
is well within the range of other OECD countries, and 
well above that of Germany with 0.5% of GDP. Po-
land levies emission fees and standards. For example 
a nominal CO2 and CH4 fee exists at 82.7 USD/ton, 
and a much higher SO2 fee is levied at 82.7 USD/ton. 
While before transition enforcing such levies was 
difficult, and to some extent meaningless (soft budget 
constraint), following transition enforcement has im-
proved. 
Since passing the Decree of the Council of Minister 
from August 5, 1998, reporting on emissions by in-
dustry, including from greenhouse gases is a strict 
requirement (Hauff, 2000, p.19). The software most 
commonly used for such reporting is called 'SOZAT'. 
Although there is no requirement to use this software, 
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it is most widely spread, and facilitates raising stan-
dardised data. 
Poland is one of the few countries in Europe with 
existing experiences in emissions trading. Two trials 
for emissions trading have been conducted, one in 
Chorzów in 1991, and a computer simulation in 
Opole in 1994. The example in Chorzów with one 
representative trade illustrates well the type of cost 
savings and emissions reductions that may be gener-
ated through emissions trading. In Chorzów there is a 
steel mill which exhibits comparatively low abate-
ment costs, while a neighbouring power plant has 
higher costs. The deal of Chorzów meant that the 
steel plant with lower costs would adopt a stricter 
emissions reductions target for which it would be 
subsidised. The power plant in turn would reduce 
less, but pay a higher fee. While this arrangement 
was cheaper for both plants, in the period from 1991-
92 joint reductions of 51% of particulate emissions, 
93% of CO and 31% of SO2 were realised. However, 
the experiment has not been repeated, because there 
is no legislation in Poland, which would allow for 
such transfers among plants. 
Possible domestic trading systems in Poland 
Using an upstream-downstream analysis, Hauff 
(2000) identifies where a trading regime could be 
located in the Polish economy. Hauff's analysis is 
limited to CO2 emissions from energy and industry. 
An upstream-downstream analysis aims at finding the 
ideal point of incidence for emissions trading in the 
energy system. Downstream is thereby the location of 
where energy is converted into CO2 emissions. Hauff 
examines a core downstream system as suggested 
by Festa (1998). Such a system suggests that trading 
is implemented in the heat and power sector as well 
as for energy intensive industry. An upstream system 
focuses on the location of where energy sources enter 
the Polish market. Commonly it is assumed that the 
flexibility to react to a downstream system is greater, 
because real options for switching to alternative en-
ergy sources and technology options exist. An up-
stream system, while achieving a better coverage of 
emissions at commonly lower transaction costs, 
leaves little options to industry except for reducing 
production and/or import of energy sources. 
Table 1: Survey Statistics 
Questionnaires Sector 
Sent Returned Percentage 
returned 
Power, CHP32 80 40 50 
Industry 150 33 22 
Coal mines 46 1 2 
Total 276 75 27 
 
Hauff's (2000) analysis was based on a sector 
analysis, which was supported with a survey among 
industry. Table 1 summarises the return rate of the 
                                                           
32 Combined Heat and Power 
survey. 276 questionnaires were sent in total with a 
return rate of 27%. 
A downstream system in the power and heat sector in 
Poland could comprise few large entities that would 
ensure good trading coverage in the power sector. 
This would include:  
• the 20 biggest professional plants, which would 
cover 91% from professional power, i.e. those 
bigger than 300 MW(e); 
• the 46 plant (>50MW), which cover 100% of 
professional power; 
• the 110 industrial power plant and CHP > 
5MW(e), at 93% of such CO2 emissions. 
The survey results indicated that the power industry 
shows high levels of awareness on emissions trading, 
probably as a result of a discussion in the early nine-
ties to introduce SO2 trading in the sector. They also 
appear to share a generally positive attitude with re-
spect to introducing emissions trading. The inclusion 
of the heat sector, however, is more difficult. 
When considering the inclusion of energy intensive 
industries in a downstream system the problem of 
lack of data availability in the sector is apparent. 
Hauff (2000) uses an indirect method to deduce the 
importance of industry contributions to greenhouse 
gas emissions in this sector. 
Hauff (2000) suggests that the five largest indus-
tries could be included in a trading regime: coke and 
refining, chemical, metallurgical, mineral and food 
and beverages industries could be included. This 
would amount to coverage of about 1,400 enterprises. 
Table 2 summarises the elements of a downstream 
system. 
Table 2: A downstream system 
Sector Participants Entities with 
monitoring re-
quirements 
Power and heat 
generation 
46 professional 
power and CHP 
companies plus 160-
180 industrial CHP 
producers. 
120 professional 
power and CHP 
plants. All 160-
180 industrial 
CHP plants. 
Energy intensive 
industries 
1,400 large enter-
prises in five energy 
intensive sectors 
Minimum of 
1,400 
Total About 1620 entities 1,700 or more 
 
An upstream system could comprise the coal, the 
gas and the oil sector. To be comprehensive, it should 
also cover net exports of electricity. In the coal sector 
the 9 domestic coal companies, which run 64 coal 
preparation plants, could be potential partners. Also 
an unspecified number of coal importers should be 
included. A serious problem with targeting the coal 
sector is that hefty resistance may be expected from 
the coal lobby, as the sector is subject to severe re-
structuring. What is more, the restructuring activities 
will lead to decreasing output levels, which could 
question the need for explicit reduction targets from 
this sector. 
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For the gas sector a suitable point of incidence 
could be a combination of permits for the net imports 
with domestically produced gas at the point where the 
gas is introduced in the distribution system. An ex-
emption for non-energy users is required. A compli-
cation arises in the context of methane emissions 
from coal-beds and landfill sites, where currently fees 
are required. If those fees remained low, then under a 
pure CO2 trading regime there could be an incentive 
to continue ventilating methane. 
Table 3: An upstream system 
Sector Participants Where carbon 
would be moni-
tored 
Coal 9 producers; 
uncertain number of 
(small) importers 
64 coal preparation 
plants and/or 54 coal 
mines, all importers 
Gas  One producer and 
importer 
About 60 gas fields, 
some direct deliver-
ies from well, one 
importer 
Oil Four independent 
refineries, 160 im-
porters 
Seven refineries, 
160 licensed im-
porters 
Electricity import Approximately 200 
entities of which 20-
25 major companies 
One importer 
Total Approximately 200 
entities of which 
20-25 major com-
panies 
Approximately 
270-350, of which 
around 185 major 
installations. 
 
In the oil sector the regulation at the exit of refinery 
could be most feasible, as less than 200 entities 
would be required to report data. The oil sector is the 
least complicated sector to include in an upstream 
system, as it is the sector with most internal competi-
tion. But the number of mitigation options is limited 
at the refinery level. Table 3 gives an overview of a 
possible upstream system. 
What trading system is feasible? 
The scenarios in Hauff (2000) are not easily trans-
lated in the share of total greenhouse gas emissions 
that the suggested upstream or downstream systems 
would cover. However, the share of CO2 emissions 
from energy industries can be used as a proxy for an 
upstream system, while the CO2 emissions from fuel 
combustion could be used as a proxy for a down-
stream system. At 236,582 Gg of CO2 from energy 
industries in 1990, an upstream system would cover 
around 62% of the Polish CO2, and 42% of the total 
Polish greenhouse gas emissions.33 At 371,433 Gg of 
CO2 from fuel combustion in 1990, a downstream 
system would cover 98% of CO2, and 66% of total 
greenhouse gas emissions. Coverage is thus better 
under a downstream regime. Greater coverage of 
gases implicitly warrants a greater environmental 
integrity of the system. 
                                                           
33 The uptake of emissions though sinks is hereby not ac-
counted for. 
But transactions costs are likely to be higher under 
a downstream regime as the upstream regime would 
require regulation of only 12% of the number of enti-
ties that require regulation under the suggested down-
stream regime. In addition, the data availability 
among energy intensive industry is very low. 
Oligopolistic market power would be a higher 
threat under an upstream regime, where trading is 
likely to be dominated by the 20-25 bigger plants. 
Such market power is also important before a trading 
system starts up, as plants could more readily bargain 
for more lenient targets. 
While the upstream system would be politically 
feasible both in the gas and the oil sector, it seems 
politically infeasible in the coal sector as a result of 
the restructuring of this sector. As the coal sector 
generates 70% of CO2 emissions, this almost ex-
cludes an upstream system in Poland. 
When considering the compatibility of a domestic 
regime both at the regional and the international 
level, the European Commission's draft directive on 
emissions trading (EC, 2001) has to be taken into 
account. The Directive envisages a downstream sys-
tem to be implemented in the EU.  
From a technical point of view Poland does not 
need a domestic emissions trading regime in order to 
participate in international greenhouse gas trading. 
The Joint Implementation (JI) Office in Warsaw, for 
example, envisages a credit-trading regime. The JI 
office would thereby act as an intermediate broker, 
which sells emission reductions permits on the basis 
of a set of projects conducted in Poland. It would 
thereby act in a comparable way as the World Bank's 
Prototype Carbon Fund. 
Poland as Accession Country: Conclusions 
From a domestic viewpoint there is no urgent case for 
CO2 trading in Poland in early 2001. Arguments in 
favour  come through the possibility to more effec-
tively participate in an international regime, where a 
domestic regime could enable the gaining of experi-
ence. The sector where domestic emissions trading 
appears to be more feasible is the power and heat 
sector as part of a downstream trading regime. 
Poland along with other accession countries should 
be taken on board early, before an EU trading scheme 
is designed. 
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Abstract. Poland, which aspires to join the countries that 
are members of the European Union faces the challenge of 
having to answer the question: if, when and under what 
conditions it should take part in the implementation of 
flexible mechanisms. At present, Poland participates in the 
AIJ pilot phase as the host country. In general, Poland is 
interested in the implementation of a specific number of JI 
projects in Poland, approving the transfer of agreed carbon 
credits generated by the implementation of a given project 
to the investor in 2008-2012. now and in the first commit-
ment period under the Kyoto Protocol (2008-2012). Poland 
 like other countries in Central and Eastern Europe  emits 
less greenhouse gas emissions compared with the require-
ment to reduce its emissions by 6% with respect to the base 
year as adopted for Poland. Poland is therefore interested in 
taking part in international emission reduction trading as 
soon as possible. Poland is preparing to implement its 
emission reduction trading system in two stages, primarily 
for carbon dioxide, by working on the adjustment of the 
Polish law to such trading and on the system for dividing 
emission caps between sectors and companies. Under Arti-
cle 4.4 of the Kyoto Protocol, in the first commitment pe-
riod, the Member States of the European Union must meet 
their commitments on their own within the bubble 
scheme and an alteration in the composition of the Union 
cannot affect these commitments. This means that in this 
period the Candidate Countries can meet their commit-
ments outside of the bubble, i.e. their emission reduction 
trading cannot be limited to the Member States only, but 
can also be conducted with all the Annex-I countries. Po-
land intends to trade primarily with the Member States of 
the European Union, but its choice of partners will depend 
on the market rules. In the second commitment period Po-
land is likely to join the bubble of the European Union. 
Permanent working contacts between the Candidate Coun-
tries and the European Union are therefore necessary in 
order to develop a joint basis for trading in practice. This 
will facilitate efficient and smooth integration of national 
systems with that of the European Union. 
Introduction 
Articles 6 and 17 of the Kyoto Protocol allow the 
Parties to fulfil their greenhouse gas emission reduc-
tion commitments outside of their territories, by, 
among other things, using the economic mechanisms 
called emissions trading and Joint Implementation. 
Despite the fact the Kyoto Protocol has not been 
ratified to date by any European country, even now 
there is a large interest in international pilot transac-
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tions and some European countries have advanced 
very much their work on the implementation of their 
national emission reduction trading systems. In the 
world, several hundred Joint Implementation pilot 
projects have been implemented or are in the course 
of implementation. 
Poland, which aspires to join the countries that are 
members of the European Union, has also faced the 
challenge of having to answer the question: if, when 
and under what conditions it should take part in emis-
sion reduction trading. 
How can Joint Implementation Projects be imple-
mented now, when foreign investors are interested 
only in such projects where credit sharing is provided 
for and when the pilot phase of this mechanism, 
which does not provide for such sharing, is still car-
ried out. 
Flexibility instruments in Poland 
At present, Poland participates in the AIJ pilot phase 
as the host country. Polish-Norwegian and Polish-
Dutch projects are under way. In the framework of 
the Norwegian project, coal to gas conversion is im-
plemented in about 30 local boiler-houses and energy 
efficiency is improved in housing (heat insulation and 
energy saving equipment). In the framework of the 
co-operation with the Netherlands, projects are car-
ried out to reduce air pollution by modernising the 
heating system and to supply heat and electricity as a 
result of coal to gas conversion. These projects in-
clude no provisions on the proposed carbon credit 
sharing. 
The first JI project (providing for carbon credit 
sharing) was implemented in Jelenia Góra by the 
installation of a Dutch bio-mass fired boiler (firing 
wood chips) for the municipal greenery unit. 
The Polish-Canadian JI project is under way to 
build a hydropower plant with the power of 900 kW 
on the Bóbr River, at Leszno Górne in Lubuskie 
Voivodship. 
Work is very advanced on the launching of the im-
plementation of a large project to build a wind farm 
(60 MW) on the Polish coast, mainly financed by a 
Dutch investor, which is very likely to be co-financed 
by the Dutch Government, in the framework of the 
ERU-PT Programme. The implementation of this 
project is very important for Poland in the light of the 
strategy for increasing the share of renewable energy 
sources in Poland (by 7.5% until 2010), which the 
Polish Government adopted a few months ago. 
In the framework of international co-operation, in 
the JOINT project established by the European 
Commission, we are trying to create conditions for 
the implementation of the Finnish-Polish project to 
modernise the heating company PEC Elbląg to allow 
its combined heat and electricity production. 
Certain logistic problems hampering the 
implementation of JI investment projects should be 
stressed. The European countries which express their 
interest in co-operation in the JI area do not want to 
take part in AIJ projects. The condition for the co-
operation is to include provisions for sharing of 
carbon credits generated by the project 
generated by the project implementation. It is often 
requested that the foreign investor should acquire 
carbon credits for a period longer than 2008-2012, 
i.e., the first commitment period. In accordance with 
the provisions of the Kyoto Protocol, Poland does not 
prefer such solutions, although they are quite small in 
the pilot implementations in Poland. 
In general, Poland is interested in the implementa-
tion of a specific number of JI projects in Poland, 
approving the transfer of agreed carbon credits gen-
erated by the implementation of a given project to the 
investor in 2008-2012. 
Types of emissions trading 
Emission reduction trading requires the definition of 
the object of trading between the parties. In this case, 
the object will be emission reduction units, which 
will be equivalent by weight to the reduced quantity 
of greenhouse gas emissions. 
Under such a definition, emission reduction trading 
cannot be recognised as typical trading, subject to 
taxes and custom duties. The product traded does not 
move from its place, therefore, it is not subject to 
custom duties in effect for the import of goods. 
In general, today one can speak of several types of 
possible trading: 
• International emission reduction trading at the 
governmental level or conducted between the 
government and a company. 
An intergovernmental agreement regulates a 
trade transaction between two countries (or be-
tween a country and a company), setting out the 
number of emission reduction units which one 
country sells to another at a contractual price. In 
the case of an intergovernmental agreement, by 
taking the responsibility for meeting the national 
commitment under the Kyoto Protocol, the sell-
ing government gives essential credibility to this 
transaction. 
• International emission reduction trading between 
companies 
A commercial contract between two companies 
sets out the conditions under which a specific 
number of emission reduction units is sold. The 
selling company should obtain approval of this 
transaction by the government of its country, as 
the government is responsible for meeting the 
national commitments in this area (just as in the 
case of Joint Implementation projects). 
• National emission reduction trading 
A national emission reduction trading system is 
introduced in the territory of a given country. By 
an administrative procedure, in the economic 
sectors where such a system is to operate, emis-
sion caps are established for individual compa-
nies which can trade in emission reduction units, 
in the case of sales, when as a result of their ac-
tions to reduce their emission levels they have 
surpluses, i.e. they emit less than allowed under 
the caps. 
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Poland's economic and political position on 
the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol  
In my opinion, Poland should be viably interested in 
taking part in international emission reduction trading 
as soon as possible and this type of emission reduc-
tion trading is our countrys priority. 
This opinion is supported by the fact that now and 
in the first commitment period under the Kyoto Pro-
tocol (2008-2012) Poland has a surplus of reduced 
greenhouse gas emissions compared with the re-
quirement to reduce its emissions by 6% with respect 
to the base year as adopted for Poland. 
The situation of the other countries in Central and 
Eastern Europe is just as good, as they also have sur-
pluses of emission reductions with regard to their 
commitments. 
Table 1:  Potential GHG emission surpluses in the 
EIT (Economies in Transition) Parties during the first 
commitment period 
 
The clear support voiced here for Polands partici-
pation in international emission reduction trading is 
based on economic argument. We have a documented 
surplus of emission reductions in respect to our 
commitments and we can sell it without any greater 
risk. 
From the political point of view, the issue of Po-
lands participation in emission reduction trading 
under the Kyoto Protocol is an open one. It was with 
misgiving that Poland took the position of the Euro-
pean Union as presented by France at the Conference 
of the Parties in The Hague expressing its approval of 
an additional tax burden on such trading in favour of 
the developing countries. This is in contradiction with 
the provisions of the Protocol and against the position 
of the Candidate Countries, indicating that the Union 
is ready to meet the demands of the developing coun-
tries at the expense of the Candidate Countries. Fol-
lowing the adoption of such additional burdens on the 
Candidate Countries, the possibility of Polands par-
ticipation in international emission reduction trading 
becomes uncertain  and it will certainly diminish the 
interest of potential participants in emissions trading. 
A similar situation can be seen in the case of Joint 
Implementation projects on which the European Un-
ion also wants to impose taxes. 
Two stages of Polands participation in emis-
sions trading  
Nevertheless, irrespective of the final political solu-
tions, Poland is preparing to implement its emission 
reduction trading system, primarily for carbon diox-
ide, by working on the adjustment of the Polish law 
to such trading and on the system for dividing emis-
sion caps between sectors and companies. At the 
same time, we take part in simulations of such trading 
carried out by IEA, UNIPEDE and other international 
institutions. 
The concept of participation in such trading envis-
ages that it would be divided into two stages: 
1. Participation in international emission reduction 
trading at the governmental level (or conducted 
between the government and a company). In 
such a case the trading would be conducted by an 
institution authorised by the government. Every 
year, the institution would receive a limit of 
emission reduction units to sell, established on 
the basis of an inventory for the previous year 
(the real emission reductions generated by spe-
cific investment projects). The revenues would 
be allocated to investments aimed at further re-
ductions, with preference given to those sectors 
and companies that have made the greatest con-
tribution to such reductions or where such reduc-
tions can be achieved most effectively. It is a 
system which is relatively cheap and makes it 
possible to begin trading soon. 
2. Authorisation for international and national 
emission reduction trading granted to companies 
which have emission caps and can demonstrate 
real and sustainable reductions. This means that 
the right to participate in trading would be given 
primarily to large companies from selected sec-
tors (e.g. power generation, metallurgy, refiner-
ies, chemical and mineral industries). At a later 
date, companies would be authorised to partici-
pate in international trading. Control of such 
trading would be exercised by an institution or 
institutions designated by the government. The 
institution or institutions would be empowered to 
impose caps and monitor and certify reductions. 
The trading itself would take the form of pur-
chases of shares allowed for trading on the inter-
national market. However, for the purposes of 
this stage, it would be necessary to develop an 
operational system for granting caps, monitoring 
and certification, which will take more time. 
In both cases, it will be necessary to launch a pilot 
phase in order to gain experience in actual emissions 
trading. 
Poland and the European bubble  
By a decision of the Minister of the Environment 
taken in 2000, the National Fund for Environmental 
Protection and Water Management was designated as 
the institution to conduct work to develop the basis 
for greenhouse gas emission reduction trading. In 
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carrying out studies on this problem, we certainly 
draw on experiences of other countries, including the 
Green Paper. However, from our point of view, the 
practical experiences are most interesting, but in this 
scope we can follow mainly the Danish and Ameri-
can experiences. For this reason we have entered into 
contacts with the relevant institutions in both of the 
aforementioned countries in order to use their experi-
ences in the field in question. We also draw on the 
experiences of Slovakia with regard to the legislative 
aspects of such trading. 
Under Article 4.4 of the Kyoto Protocol, in the first 
commitment period, the Member States of the Euro-
pean Union must meet their commitments on their 
own within the bubble scheme and an alteration in 
the composition of the Union cannot affect these 
commitments. 
This means that in this period the Candidate Coun-
tries can meet their commitments outside of the bub-
ble, i.e. their emission reduction trading cannot be 
limited to the Member States only, but can also be 
conducted with all the Annex-I countries. Certainly, 
Poland intends to trade primarily with the Member 
States of the European Union, but its choice of part-
ners will depend on the market rules. 
Envisaging that in the perspective of the second 
commitment period Poland is likely to join the bub-
ble of the European Union, we believe that it would 
be useful even now to establish permanent working 
contacts between the Candidate Countries and the 
European Union in order to develop a joint basis for 
trading in practice. This will facilitate efficient and 
smooth integration of national systems with that of 
the European Union. As a first task, we believe that is 
necessary to develop another version of the Green 
Paper taking into account the specificity of the Can-
didate Countries and concerned to a greater extent 
with the practical aspects (legislation, organisation, 
institutions, trading rules). 
Conclusion  
In conclusion, Poland is viably interested in the quick 
implementation of the Kyoto Protocol mechanisms, 
particularly in the Joint Implementation area (projects 
in the range of alternative energy sources and energy 
saving) and in setting in operation international emis-
sions trading, as a result of which we would be able 
to sell part of our surplus of reduced emissions. 
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Abstract. The paper presents a brief review of the outputs 
of the study Estimate of the Economic Costs for Reduc-
tion of Greenhouse Gas Emissions. The study deals 
mainly with the following tasks: 
1. Development of GHG emission scenarios for the 
Czech Republic till 2012; 
2. Estimation of marginal abatement costs (MACs) in 
selected sectors and on the national level; and 
3. Estimate of the reduction potential of AIJ/JI and inter-
national/domestic emission trading. 
Introduction 
The Czech Republic (CR) signed the Kyoto Protocol 
in November 1998 and therefore committed itself to 
achieve 8% reduction of its aggregated GHG emis-
sions during the first commitment period (2008-2012) 
of the Kyoto Protocol as compared to 1990 emission 
level. At present, the country's emissions are about 
25% below 1990 level. However, the various emis-
sion projections elaborated previously indicate emis-
sion growth after 2000. A set of policies and meas-
ures to prevent a next growth of GHG emissions and 
resulting non-commitment with country's Kyoto 
emission ceiling has been presented by the Czech 
Government as Strategy to Mitigate Climate Change 
in the Czech Republic  Resolution of the Czech 
Government No. 480/1999 Coll. (thereinafter also 
Strategy).  
In 1997 just before COP-3, National Strategy for 
JI in the Czech Republic (thereinafter also NSS) has 
been prepared by an international team co-ordinated 
by the World Bank experts and financed by the Swiss 
Government36. In the NSS, the emission projections, 
scenarios and abatement costs were calculated for the 
Czech Republic for the first time using the MARKAL 
model. 
In 2000 a follow up study of the NSS was carried 
out within a PHARE Project No. CZ9705-05-01-02 
Estimate of the Economic Costs for Reduction of 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions (thereinafter also the 
Phare study)). The Phare study was carried out by 
Carl Bro International a/s (Contractor) and DHV CR, 
                                                           
34 SRC International CS, Pocernicka 96, 108 03 Praha 10, 
Czech Republic, e-mail: maly@srci.cz 
35 DHV CR, Taboritska 3, 130 00 Praha 3, Czech Republic, 
e-mail: lubomir.nondek@dhv.cz 
36 National Strategy for Joint Implementation in the Czech 
Republic, MoE, World Bank, Swiss Office for AIJ, Prague, 
1997. 
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Ltd. and SRC International CS, Ltd. (Sub-Contrac-
tors). The Project has been launched in January 2000 
and its duration was 6 months. The major beneficiar-
ies of the study are the Ministry of the Environment 
of the Czech Republic and Inter-ministerial Commit-
tee on Climate Change. 
The study deals mainly with the following tasks: 
1. Development of GHG emission scenarios; 
2. Estimation of marginal abatement costs (MACs); 
and 
3. Estimate of the reduction potential of AIJ/JI and 
international/domestic emission trading. 
The paper gives a brief review of the study outputs.  
Development of GHG emission scenarios 
National GHG emissions 
The annual national inventory of GHGs carried out 
since 1990 shows that CO2 presents about 85% of the 
total GHG emissions. The major part of CO2 is emit-
ted by combustion processes (approx. 97% of all CO2 
emissions in the Czech Republic). The Project has 
been therefore focused on projections of CO2 emis-
sions. Another 4% of GHG emissions (a part of N2O 
and CH4 emissions) also originate from fuel combus-
tion. Methane emissions from coal mining and natu-
ral gas industry contribute by 5% of GHG emissions. 
The remaining 5% of the total GHG emissions con-
sist of emissions from agricultural processes and 
waste disposal.  
GHG emission scenarios 
Review of existing scenarios and their basic assump-
tions (input data) such as economic indicators, energy 
prices and their possible future deregulation, opening 
energy markets, etc. was taken as a first step in the 
GHG emission scenario development. New economic 
scenarios have been formulated and GHGs emissions 
related to them re-estimated using the MARKAL 
model. Two realistic macroeconomic scenarios were 
developed - moderate and a high growth rate scenario 
- taking into account the EU accession process and 
further development of the EU policies and measures. 
The time horizon of the scenarios is given by the end 
of the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol 
(2008 - 2012). 
Two business as usual GHG emission scenarios 
(thereinafter also BAU) which are a description of a 
plausible future in which no specific policy actions 
are taken to encourage actions that reduce GHG 
emissions or enhance carbon sinks. Only replacement 
of existing technologies after depletion of their life-
time is allowed by technologies available on the mar-
ket. These scenarios differ by the general macroeco-
nomic performance of the national economy. One 
scenario assumes the high economic growth rate 
(4.2% of annual GDP growth rate) while the other 
one assumes only moderate economic growth rate 
(2.5%). These two scenarios present the realistic 
range of possible economic development in the 
Czech Republic.  
Three mitigation scenarios tight to individual two 
BAU scenarios (High and Moderate economic growth 
rate scenarios). The mitigation scenarios describe the 
future which is essentially similar to that one in the 
each baseline scenario with respect to overall eco-
nomic and social trends, except that they assume 
policies or programmes are implemented that encour-
age adoption of measures that will reduce GHG emis-
sions or enhance carbon sinks. The mitigation scenar-
ios reflect different degrees of emission reductions 
relative to the base year to which reduction of GHG 
emissions is calculated in international treaties 
(1990). These mitigation scenarios are distinguished 
by reduction of GHG emissions as compared to BAU 
scenario in 2012 as follows:  
• Weak mitigation scenario in which only a small 
reduction of GHG emissions by 5% is assumed. 
• Medium mitigation scenario in which reduction 
of GHG emissions by 10% is assumed. 
• Strong mitigation scenario in which reduction of 
GHG emissions by 15% is assumed. 
Since in the Czech Republic the GHG emission 
scenarios are critically dependent upon expected op-
eration of the Temelin Nuclear Power Plant (NPP), 
the BAU scenarios are elaborated in two alternatives 
 with the Temelin NPP and without the Temelin  
NPP. 
Sensitivity Analysis 
The above BAU scenarios have been subjected to 
sensitivity analysis examining effects of major factors 
such as macroeconomic growth, energy prices, pene-
tration of new technologies, use of nuclear energy 
and implementation of environmental and other poli-
cies declared by the Czech Government.  
It has been found that CO2 emissions are strongly 
dependent upon GDP annual growth. The higher eco-
nomic growth the higher CO2 emissions. CO2 emis-
sions in the High BAU scenario are by 16% higher 
than in the Moderate BAU scenario and by 23.5% 
higher than in the Low BAU scenario. 
The probable impact of energy prices on CO2 emis-
sions has been studied in case of the Moderate BAU 
scenario, when a substantial difference in crude oil 
and natural gas prices in 2012 (34%) but limited 
changes of coal prices (7%) are assumed. The analy-
sis shows a rather limited sensitivity of CO2 emis-
sions to world energy prices due to the impact of two 
antagonistic trends  gas-to-coal switching and en-
ergy savings. The difference between both cases is 
therefore only about 1%. 
Nuclear energy plays an important role in the 
Czech power sector. Currently approx. 1/5 of power 
is produced in the Dukovany NPP. Another NPP at 
Temelin (South Bohemia) is in the final stage of con-
struction. If both NPPs are operated on full capacity, 
they will provide approx. 50% of total inland power 
production. Both BAU scenarios are based on two 
following assumptions: 
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• The Dukovany NPP will be operated in full 
capacity up to 2012; and 
• The Temelin NPP will start the operation in 2001 
(first unit) and 2002 (second unit). 
The impact of the Temelin NPP operation on the 
CO2 emission level is quite significant. If this instal-
lation is not operated, the GHG emissions will be 
higher by 4.7% in 2004 as compared to the case with 
the Temelin NPP in operation and export of power 
surplus. If the power export is restricted and thus 
power production in coal fired plants is reduced, the 
estimated difference is even 6.5%.  
The sensitivity of CO2 emission reduction to im-
plementation of the energy tax was also analysed. An 
implementation of the minimal energy tax rate pro-
posed by the Commission of EU37 on the level of 
1.1 EUR/GJ for motor fuels and 0.7 EUR/GJ for 
other energy use is assumed. The resulting CO2 emis-
sion reduction is about 0.6%. To increase the impact 
of the energy tax on CO2 emission reduction even 
higher tax rate is recommended to be implemented in 
the Czech Republic. 
Kyoto compliance  
Emission projections obtained for BAU scenarios are 
compared (Figure 1) with previous ones published in 
the Second National Communication (2NC-
BAU,1997) and in the NSS (NSS-High, 1997).  
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Figure 1: Emission projections for BAU (High, Mod-
erate and Low) with previous projections 
It is evident that the differences between compared 
projections are caused by a slowdown in economic 
performance (1997-1999) not predicted earlier. The 
GHG emission growth expected in the High BAU 
published in the Phare study is delayed in compari-
son with comparable projections published in the 
Second National Communication (1997). Improving 
energy efficiency of national economy indicates par-
tial decoupling of GHGs emissions and GDP growth. 
Under conditions of a stable and substantial eco-
nomic growth (4-5% GDP growth annually), an 
approx. 2% annual growth rate of CO2 emissions is 
expected to take place. The scenarios describing 
BAU (no specific policies and measures) therefore 
indicate need for more targeted approaches to be 
taken in the case of strong economic growth.  
                                                           
37 Communication on Environmental Taxes and Charges in the 
Single Market, COM(97)9 final of 26.03.1997. 
Marginal abatement costs (MACs) 
The core issue of the project is the assessment of 
overall cost estimates of GHG emission reduction in 
the Czech Republic broken into relevant sectors and 
priority areas (policies and measures).  
The focus of the work in the Phare study was in a 
large extent on priorities identified in the Strategy as 
follow: 
• Production and distribution of heat and electric 
energy; 
• Utilisation of renewable forms of energy; 
• Support of railway combined modes of cargo 
transport; 
• Municipal forms of urban transport; 
• Energy savings in residential and government 
sector; 
• Energy saving measures in SMEs; 
• Collection and energy use of landfill methane, 
use of selected classes of waste as energy re-
source. 
MACs for these areas as well as overall cross sec-
tor MACs that describes the abatement costs for 
GHG reduction in the CR has been calculated using 
the MARKAL model.  
The MACs were calculated for the High BAU sce-
nario (with the Temelin NPP) and the two following 
cases: with power export; and without power export.. 
Table 1 gives a review of the CO2 emission reduc-
tion potential and MACs by the individually analysed 
sector as well as national data for the year 2012. The 
results show large differences in the CO2 reduction 
potential among individual analysed sectors as well 
as a very wide range of MACs per unit of CO2 emis-
sion reduction. The largest CO2 emission reduction 
potential can be found in the sector Production and 
distribution of power and heat.  
This sector shows also a large potential in the cate-
gory of CO2 emission reduction with MACs up to 30 
USD/t  9.6 Mt/yr. The largest CO2 emission poten-
tial in the category of MACs up to 30 USD/t was 
found in the residential sector - 16.6 Mt per year with 
the total reduction potential in this sector of 23 Mt 
per year38. Rather limited but low cost potential of 
GHG emission reduction can be found for energy use 
of landfill gas. Also switching from passenger car 
transport to public municipal transport is a very 
promising mitigation measure with MACs of 25 
USD/t of CO2. 
The reduction potential of Czech forests will in-
crease as generally poor health of forests improves; 
this may be enhanced by investment into proper man-
agement activities, e.g. liming, reforestation etc. Us-
ing forests as a reservoir for biomass would enhance 
use of forests as an energy resource. Potential of 
                                                           
38 It is necessary to notice that manufacturing industry was not 
analysed in detail as a separate sector. Its reduction potential is 
expected to be substantial - probably larger than in the residential 
sector. 
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other renewables is either exhausted (large hydro-
power) or limited (solar, wind etc.). A relatively lim-
ited potential has been identified in the public sector 
(government buildings, hospitals, schools etc.) and in 
the waste sector because their GHG emission level is 
also limited. Nevertheless, abatement costs are quite 
attractive in these sectors for potential investors. 
Abatement policies and measures in the transport 
sector are generally limited and relatively expensive. 
Table 1: CO2 emission reduction potential and MACs 
by analysed sector and national data 
Sector Total CO2 
emission 
reduction 
potential 
MACs CO2 emission 
reduction 
potential  
MACs up to 
30 USD/t 
 Mt/yr USD/t Mt/yr 
Sectoral data 
Power and heat - with 
electricity export 
 
27.7 
 
316 
 
9.6 
Utilisation of renewables 8.6 518 7.1 
Energy efficient transport 2.5 8,500 0.35 
Promotion of public 
transport 
0.45 750 0.35 
Promotion of combined 
transport 
0.1 4,022 0 
Savings in residential 
sector 
 
23 
 
766 
 
16.6 
Savings in public services 2.35 568 1.5 
Use of landfill gas 1.2 24 1.2 
Waste-to-energy use 0.5 200 0 
National data*) 
High BAU scenario with 
electricity export 
 
65.2 
 
3,105 
 
26.6 
High BAU scenario 
without electricity export 
 
62.3 
 
3,105 
 
22.4 
Moderate BAU scenario 58.4 70,650 9.6 
Reduction potential of AIJ/JI and interna-
tional/domestic emission trading 
The so called national trading potential (JI or emis-
sion trading) has been estimated on the basis of emis-
sion projections and ongoing international debate on 
Kyoto Protocol flexible mechanisms. We discuss 
our results taking into account the Strategy, so called 
additionality and other requirements for the AIJ/JI 
projects (emission baselines). Recommendations on 
the use of the Kyoto flexible mechanism potential 
have been discussed and options worked out. 
It has been assumed that a national scheme of emis-
sion permit trading should be established for a 
number of industries in accordance with  Green Pa-
per on greenhouse gas emission trading within the 
European Union presented by the European Com-
mission in March, 2000 and its background studies 
(CCAP and FIELD).  
Perspectives for ET and JI in the Czech Republic 
There is a potential for JI and/or ET since the GHG 
emissions of the Czech Republic is expected to re-
main well below the Kyoto target. Thus, future JI 
investors will face a limited risk of non-compliance 
of the Czech Republics Kyoto obligations. In respect 
to ET the theoretical potential for trading the units 
between the actual GHG emissions and the Kyoto 
target is in the range of 5 - 30 mil. tonnes of CO2eq. In 
any case, to tap this potential would need establishing 
a National system for the Kyoto Protocol (see below) 
as required by Art. 5, KP.  
The utilisation of the JI potential depends upon the 
ability of the Czech Republic to create an efficient 
system to administer JI projects. The present JI po-
tential is also limited by the additionality require-
ment, e.g. expected implementation of IPPC Direc-
tive 96/61/EC eliminates large industrial installations 
where energy saving is laid down as a general obliga-
tion of the operator. ET is likely to become a more 
relevant mechanism for the EU candidate countries 
since the European Commission urges them to be 
prepared for use of this mechanism.  
JI seems to be more complex and it is currently dif-
ficult to estimate baselines due the lack of consensus 
on baseline methodologies. There is also substantial 
uncertainty on the EU approximation deadlines. It is 
therefore impossible to judge at this moment whether 
JI can be considered relevant after several years. 
Moreover, JI supply will depend closely of the JI 
demand from investor countries and the incentives 
for investors seem limited39. 
Taking into account the reduction potential of 
above sectors assessed, differences of ET and JI as 
well as the effect of the EU accession process on ad-
ditionality of JI projects, an overall applicability of JI 
and ET has been ranked roughly for various sec-
tors/areas (see Table 2). Besides these factors, MACs, 
expected size and number of projects and possible 
complexity of baseline construction have been kept in 
mind. Similar small projects could be aggregated in 
packages using a standard baseline. 
MACs and Market Prices 
Today, no real prices are available concerning ET. 
Estimations published are based e.g. upon an intro-
ducing fictive carbon taxes on use of fossil fuels40. 
All estimates show a large variety of market prices41, 
ranging from 10 to 60 USD/t of CO2eq traded during 
the first commitment period. For the purpose of the 
Phare study, an average price of 10 USD/t of CO2eq 
of ERU is supposed for the first commitment period 
(2008-2012). 
                                                           
39 CarlBro a/s, "JI in the Baltic Region, Economic and Energy 
Political Perspectives", 2000. 
40 Zhang ZhongXiang, Estimating the Size Potential Market for 
the Kyoto Flexibility Mechanisms, University of Groninngen, 
1999. 
41 U.S. DOE, Impacts of the Kyoto Protocol on U.S. Energy Mar-
kets and Economic Activity, Washington, 1998. 
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Table 2: Ranking of JI and ET applicability in various sec-
tors  
Sector JI ET 
Residential Sector ♦  ◊  
Energy Sector ◊  ♦  
Industry42 ◊  ♦  
Forest ◊  ♦  
Renewables ♦  ◊  
Public Sector ♦  ◊  
Waste Management ◊  ♦  
Transport n.a. n.a. 
- 
♦  no restrictions caused by MACs or limited JI 
additionality; 
◊ - Applicability limited due to higher MACs, num-
ber, size, character or additionality of projects; 
n.a. - not applicable due to high MACs. 
National System for the Kyoto Mechanisms 
The term national system appears in KP, Art. 5, 
and refers to an overall system of GHG emission and 
sinks monitoring (national emission registries and 
inventories)43. This system should enable JI and en-
tity participation in ET. National systems will there-
fore have the following functions: 
• Monitor national Kyoto compliance; 
• Establish links to international ET; and 
• Support domestic trading related to entities and 
JI projects. 
At domestic level, these functions may be identical 
with those needed for international trading since 
similar types of information will be required by both 
ET and JI regimes. The national system shall there-
fore act as a boundary for trading on one hand and as 
a safeguard for reaching national compliance on the 
other.  
The ability to monitor GHG emissions with an ac-
curacy required by IPCC standards is a main function 
of KP system of an Annex I Party. The Czech team 
carrying out national emission inventories in accor-
dance with continuously improving IPCC method-
ologies should be the first building block of such a 
system. As in the case of other EU candidates, the 
implementation of the Community monitoring 
mechanism for CO2 and other greenhouse gas emis-
sions is an obligation for the Czech republic.  
Fulfilment of the monitoring requirements of 
Kyoto Protocol for Fast Track 
To be eligible to use the !fast track the Czech 
Republic (CR) have to fulfil a set of requirements. 
The current situation is as follows: 
• CR has in place a monitoring system in accor-
dance with Article 5.1 KP;   
                                                           
42 Without energy transformation processes (power and heat 
generation) 
43 Mullins F., National Systems for the Kyoto Mechanisms, Back-
ground paper, AIXG Workshop on Transition country perspectives 
and the Kyoto Protocol, Bratislava, 2000. 
• The National registry is not yet in place; 
• Have not yet established the initial assigned 
amount; 
• CR have submitted 1st and 2nd annual GHG na-
tional inventory in accordance with provisions of 
Articles 5.2. and 7.1 KP. 
The Czech Republic will fulfil the requirements but 
some very important monitoring requirements has not 
yet been fulfilled. 
Flexible Mechanisms and EU Pre-accession Costs 
The Czech Republic is a candidate for the EU 
membership transposing and implementing Commu-
nity environmental legislation. This will require e.g. 
to grant IPPC permits for new large combustion 
plants based on the BAT and obligation to reduce 
energy intensity (see Article 3, Directive 96/61/EC). 
It must be taken into account that accession costs to 
comply with Acquis are relatively high, e.g. 9.3 bil-
lion of EUR for the Czech Republic44. The most de-
manding directives from the investment point of view 
are those related to industry and the municipal sector, 
including Council Directive 96/61/EC concerning 
integrated pollution prevention and control (IPPC), 
Council Directive 88/609/EEC on limitation of emis-
sion of certain pollutants into the air from large com-
bustion plants (LCP), amended by 94/609/EC, Coun-
cil Directive 94/63/EC on the control of volatile or-
ganic compound (VOC) emissions resulting from the 
storage of petrol and its distribution from terminals to 
service stations, Council Directive 1999/13/EC on the 
limitation of emissions of VOCs due to the use of 
organic solvents in certain activities and installations, 
Council Directive 91/271/EEC concerning urban 
waste water treatment and Council Directive 
1999/31/EC on the landfill of waste. A major part of 
GHG abatement costs is therefore hidden in EU ac-
cession costs. 
It is obvious that the GHG trading potential of 
IPPC category installations have to be used to ease 
the burden related to introduction of BATs. The early 
establishing of a national KP system shall enhance 
interest of operators of IPPC category installations in 
the distribution of GHG emission ceilings over this 
group of ET entities.  
                                                           
44 Source: World Bank and TME (1999)  
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Abstract. Technology transfer from developed countries to 
developing countries and transition economies is a key part 
of the Kyoto Protocol. Under the JI and CDM arrange-
ments, it is envisaged that a range of cleaner low-carbon 
technologies will be acquired by companies in transition 
and developing economies. This paper takes a closer look 
at some international experiences of transferring cleaner 
technologies to China and other major developing countries 
and transition economies. It highlights some of the issues 
raised by these experiences, and draws lessons for govern-
ments and firms in countries wishing to host CDM and JI 
projects, particularly accession States to the European Un-
ion. 
Introduction 
One of the primary aims of the flexibility mecha-
nisms under the Kyoto Protocol is to transfer cleaner 
technologies from developed countries to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions in developing countries. 
According to a recent report published by the In-
tergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 
the area in which the Kyoto Protocol itself may have 
the greatest implications for technology transfer is in 
its establishment of the project based mechanisms, 
Joint Implementation (JI) (Article 6) and the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) (Article 12) (IPCC 
2000). The CDM is seen by the authors of the report 
as a particularly promising route for technology 
transfer to developing countries since it invites An-
nex I countries to work with developing countries to 
further sustainable development (IPCC, 2000). 
Whilst there is an increasing belief within develop-
ing countries and transition economies that the CDM 
and JI will help them acquire cleaner technologies, 
many uncertainties remain. A major uncertainty is 
that the detail of the Kyoto mechanisms are still sub-
ject to negotiation by national governments. Even 
when the detailed rules have been agreed, it is far 
from clear that effective technology transfer will be 
achieved. Past experience has shown that there are 
many common barriers to effective technology trans-
fer from companies and other organisations in indus-
trialised countries to their developing country coun-
terparts. 
The purpose of this paper is to highlight some of 
these barriers. The paper draws on the technology 
transfer literature, with illustrations from some recent 
technology transfer programmes to China and other 
major developing countries. It then draws lessons 
                                                           
45 Research Fellow, Environment and Energy Programme, 
SPRU  Science and Technology Policy Research, Univer-
sity of Sussex, Falmer, East Sussex, BN1 9RF, UK. Email: 
w.j.watson@sussex.ac.uk. 
from these, and discusses some implications for the 
framing of the CDM and JI mechanisms, and the 
needs of accession States to the European Union. 
What Does Technology Transfer Mean ? 
The existing literature on technology transfer is ex-
tremely diverse, taking in various academic perspec-
tives including economics, international relations and 
engineering. As a result, technology transfer has vari-
ous meanings that depend on the context in which it 
is used. In general, technology transfer can be clas-
sified as vertical - from the research laboratory to 
commercial use - or horizontal - from one geographi-
cal area to another (Ping Lan 1996, Bozeman 2000). 
Recent uses of the term, including its application to 
developing and transition economies, have tended to 
fall within the latter category.  
Comprehensive surveys of the technology transfer 
literature with a particular focus on cleaner technolo-
gies and development include those by Ping Lan 
(1996) and Martinot et al (1997). For the purposes of 
this paper, it is important to draw out some of the 
main insights from this literature to illuminate the 
empirical evidence that follows. These insights focus 
particularly on three related aspects of the transfer 
process - the motivations of technology suppliers, the 
influence of the technology transfer mechanism, and 
the capabilities of firms and organisations that ac-
quire technology. 
Many authors have identified the tendency of inter-
national technology transfer efforts to focus on capi-
tal goods and equipment. For example, an analysis by 
Peter Evans (1999a) focuses on international aid to 
the energy industries within China. His data confirms 
that the majority of this aid has funded the construc-
tion of new thermal and hydro-electric power plants. 
In practice, this international emphasis on capital 
goods and equipment only captures one dimension of 
technology transfer. The recent report on technology 
transfer from the IPCC points out that the measure-
ment of the financial aid flows which enable the ex-
port of this equipment provides a poor proxy for 
technology transfer in its broadest sense. As well as 
the export of new equipment, a broader definition 
encompasses ... the process of learning to under-
stand, utilise and replicate the technology including 
the capacity to choose it and adapt it to local condi-
tions and integrate it with indigenous technologies 
(IPCC, 2000). 
A particularly relevant characterisation of broader 
technology transfer is that developed by Martin Bell 
(see Figure 1). He has identified three main types of 
technology flow which pass between technology sup-
pliers in industrialised countries and importers in 
developing countries. The first of these (flow A) 
consists of capital goods, equipment and product de-
signs. In many definitions of technology transfer, this 
type of flow is dominant. However, as Bell has 
pointed out, two additional flows are also extremely 
important. The transfer of knowledge for operations 
and maintenance (flow B) requires the technology 
supplier to impart additional understanding which 
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enables the importer to optimise the operation of the 
facility and to maintain it in the most cost effective 
way. This type of technology transfer is often carried 
out to some extent by technology suppliers, though 
the amount of attention devoted to it varies consid-
erably. 
 
Figure 1. Modes of Technology Transfer 
TECHNOLOGY 
SUPPLIERS 
 TECHNOLOGY 
TRANSFERRED 
 TECHNOLOGY IM-
PORTERS 
     
SUPPLIER FIRMS  
ENGINEERING, 
MANAGERIAL AND 
OTHER 
 
Flow A 
>>>>>> 
 
Capital Goods 
Engineering Services 
Managerial Services 
Product Designs 
 
 
>>>>>> 
CREATION OF NEW 
PRODUCTION CA-
PACITY 
TECHNOLOGICAL     
CAPACITIES 
 
 
Flow B 
>>>>>> 
Skills and Know-How for 
Operation and Mainte-
nance 
 
 
 
>>>>>> 
 
 
     
 
 
 
 
Flow C 
>>>>>> 
 
Knowledge, Expertise 
and Experience for Gen-
erating and Managing 
Technical Change 
 
 
>>>>>> 
 
ACCUMULATION 
OF TECHNOLOGI-
CAL CAPACITY 
 
Source: Bell, M. (1990) Continuing Industrialisation, Climate Change and International Technology Transfer, 
SPRU, University of Sussex, UK. 
 
Perhaps the most important and potentially conten-
tious type of technology transfer is the knowledge and 
expertise necessary for generating and managing tech-
nical change (flow C). It implies the transfer of de-
sign skills and engineering knowledge necessary to 
recreate and optimise a particular item of equipment. 
As a result, this type of transfer can be more demand-
ing on both parties, particularly with respect to human 
resources and skill levels. Whilst this additional trans-
fer of knowledge is essential if firms within developing 
countries are to develop their own technological capa-
bilities, this can directly conflict with the needs of a 
technology supplier to maintain their commercial and 
technological advantage. 
Martin Bells main point is that there is a need to 
transfer the underlying knowledge which lies behind 
the design and operation of a particular piece of hard-
ware as well as the hardware itself. Without this under-
lying knowledge, the recipient firm or institution will 
not be able to operate equipment effectively or make 
the kind of incremental improvements which are com-
mon in developed countries. 
Motivations of Technology Suppliers 
The extent and success of individual technology trans-
fer programmes is heavily influenced by the agendas of 
public and private institutions on the supply side. It has 
often been pointed out that the respective roles of these 
institutions are in conflict with each other. As Mammo 
Muchie observes, the international dialogue ... sug-
gests that as a matter of responsibility and commitment 
to the environment, technology proprietors from coun-
tries with strong systems of innovation can be enjoined 
to transfer [technologies] on favourable terms to de-
veloping countries (Muchie 2000). 
OECD country Governments, which are the source 
of the majority of bilateral and multilateral aid flows to 
developing countries, negotiate environmental and 
technology transfer agreements for a variety of rea-
sons. These include regional security, poverty allevia-
tion and trade as well as environmental protection. 
Whilst there is often an alignment of interests between 
donor Governments and multinational companies, 
these companies will only transfer technology if it is in 
their commercial interest to do so. As a result, the ef-
fectiveness of State-led efforts to transfer cleaner tech-
nologies to developing countries is often limited. 
The Japanese Green Aid Plan 
The challenges of State-led technology transfer are 
clearly illustrated by the experience of the Japanese 
Green Aid Plan. The Green Aid Plan (GAP) is the 
largest environmental technology transfer programme 
to developing countries in Asia. When it designed and 
implemented the programme, the Japanese Govern-
ment was motivated by a number of considerations 
including environmental protection, trade promotion 
and wider bilateral diplomatic relations (Evans 1999b). 
Despite its successes in financing the installation of  
Japanese cleaner technologies in several Asian coun-
tries, the GAP has several drawbacks as a vehicle for 
technology transfer. One of the most important issues 
is dissemination. This is a key concern for both Japan 
and developing countries since there have been no fol-
low-on orders for equipment supplied to the demon-
stration plants. Both sides agree that the main reason 
for this is the cost of the Japanese equipment that has 
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been used at the demonstration plants. It is simply too 
expensive for many companies in developing countries 
to buy on a commercial basis since any economic 
benefits (e.g. reduced energy consumption) are out-
weighed by high investment costs. 
A second issue is more important than the cost of 
Japanese equipment. The GAP has a striking drawback 
as a vehicle for technology transfer. At present, equip-
ment companies from developing countries who could 
build up a capability in the design and manufacture of 
cleaner technologies are almost completely absent 
from the GAP. The focus on technology users such as 
steel mills and cement companies means that equip-
ment manufacturers are generally excluded from tech-
nology transfer activities. Officials within MITI and 
employees of Japanese companies give two very dif-
ferent kinds of response when asked about this exclu-
sion. Either they claim that developing country compa-
nies are incapable of absorbing advanced Japanese 
technology, or they cite worries that Japanese designs 
will be copied by potential low-cost competitors. 
Assistance to the Ukrainian Energy Sector 
Another illustration of the influence of donor govern-
ments and international technology suppliers is pro-
vided by the Ukrainian Chernobyl replacement project. 
Multilateral efforts to help the Ukraine close the 
stricken Chernobyl nuclear power plant have been the 
subject of much controversy over the past few years.  
Attention has focused on the decision of the G7 
countries in 1995 to finance measures in the Ukrainian 
power sector to replace the capacity lost by Cherno-
byls closure. From the outset, the G7s preference has 
been to fund the completion of two part-built VVER 
reactors, Khmelnitsky 2 and Rovno 4 (K2/R4).  
In summer 1996, the European Bank for Reconstruc-
tion and Development (EBRD) commissioned an eco-
nomic assessment of the K2/R4 financing plan. The 
Panel of Experts who carried out the assessment found 
that the plan did not constitute the best use of $1bn of 
EBRD and European Union funds. Instead, the Panel 
argued that the funds should be used for a number of 
initiatives, some of which would foster cleaner tech-
nology transfer to Ukrainian industry. These include 
the purchase of fuel and equipment spares for existing 
fossil-fuel power plants that suffer from poor perform-
ance, safety upgrades at existing nuclear plants and 
demand side assistance to the public and private sec-
tors to help them reduce energy costs.  
Despite considerable evidence that the completion of 
K2/R4 would not be the least cost option for replac-
ing Chernobyl, the EBRD gave the go-ahead for K2/R4 
funding in December 2000 (EBRD 2000). According 
to the leader of the economic assessment Panel (Surrey 
1997), this decision was expected because of the com-
mercial interests of nuclear technology suppliers in the 
USA and Europe. It may also have been driven by the 
desire of NATO to split Ukraine from Russia to aid the 
process of expansion into Central Europe. 
For some, the decision to go-ahead with K2/R4 re-
flects a missed opportunity for the transfer of cleaner 
energy technologies to the Ukraine. Rather than trans-
ferring Western knowledge and skills to help the 
Ukraine modernise its power sector, it can be argued 
that the completion of K2/R4 will do the opposite: it 
will help Western European and US nuclear companies 
acquire new knowledge of Russian reactor designs. 
Furthermore, the project will not facilitate improve-
ments in environmental performance within the 
Ukrainian power sector and other energy-intensive 
industries. However, it remains to be seen what the 
final outcome of the project will be. 
Technology Transfer Mechanisms 
There are a variety of different mechanisms for tech-
nology transfer. A recent report to the IPCC identifies 
nine separate pathways for technology transfer in-
cluding government assistance programmes, direct 
purchases, licensing, foreign direct investment, joint 
ventures, co-operative research agreements and copro-
duction agreements, education and training, and gov-
ernment direct investment (IPCC 2000). Each of these 
has strengths and weaknesses for both parties to the 
transaction, and the choice of the appropriate mecha-
nism is heavily influenced by the motivations of these 
parties as well as the technology being transferred. 
As stated earlier, it is much more likely that the 
transfer process will be a success if the mechanism 
allows for more than the simple transfer of hardware 
equipment. According to some authors, developing 
countries have suffered in the past because this impor-
tant factor was not taken into account. Xiaofeng 
Gongs observations about the case of China are a 
good illustration of this: Unfortunately Chinas tech-
nology imports have fallen into the following cycle: 
importation, temporary narrowing of the technology 
gap, stagnation in efforts to adapt and upgrade imports, 
outdating of technology leading again to importation 
(Xiaofeng Gong 1995).  
The technology transfer literature demonstrates that 
there is considerable debate about which technology 
transfer mechanism is the most effective. Many studies 
have highlighted the increasing trend towards the es-
tablishment of joint venture companies within develop-
ing countries (Warhurst and Bridge 1997). Joint ven-
tures can be one of the most effective technology trans-
fer mechanisms since they bring both sides into close 
working contact, and give them a direct stake in the 
future success of the product or service concerned. By 
contrast, other mechanisms such as licensing agree-
ments do not involve as much direct contact. 
Despite their appeal, joint ventures have not been 
universally popular amongst foreign investors. In 
China for example, international companies are show-
ing a preference for wholly owned due to a perceived 
need for more management control (Xiao Zhang 2000). 
It is probable that such subsidiaries will provide fewer 
opportunities for technology transfer to Chinese firms. 
The Capabilities of Firms and Organisations that 
Acquire Technology 
As we have seen, the development of capabilities in 
the design and manufacture of new technologies by 
recipient companies is a key component of successful 
technology transfer process. 
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It has often been pointed out that recipient firms usu-
ally have some pre-existing knowledge of the technol-
ogy in question. In some cases, the extent of this 
knowledge is highly significant. This is particularly 
true of firms in transition economies in Eastern Europe 
and former Soviet republics. Technology transfer be-
tween these firms and collaborators in Western coun-
tries is often a two way process. There is a large litera-
ture showing evidence of East to West technology 
transfer in a range of different economic sectors (for 
example Dyker, 1999). 
For cleaner technologies concerned with the reduc-
tion of greenhouse gas emissions, the picture is rather 
different. Cleaner technology is one area in which two 
way transfer between Western countries and transi-
tion economies is less common. According to Michael 
Barz, [West to East] technology transfer is  required 
if [Multinational Companies] are to maintain internal 
and international environmental standards (Dyker 
1999: 120). As is the case in developing countries, 
capabilities in cleaner technologies amongst firms in 
transition economies are relatively weak. 
Because of this difference in capabilities, it is impor-
tant to take into account the level of knowledge and 
skills within the recipient country and/or firm. As Mar-
tinot et al (1997) have observed, the notion that tech-
nology can be transferred full-blown from one eco-
nomic and cultural context to another is now widely 
discredited. Therefore, there is a clear need to adapt 
technology to the host country, largely by involving 
domestic institutions and companies. In addition, the 
host country national innovation system  comprising 
firms, universities and research institutions  needs to 
be strengthened so that it can more effectively receive 
and assimilate new technologies from abroad (IPCC 
2000). 
One project that has addressed many of these issues 
is the Guizhou and Shanxi Energy Efficiency project 
funded by the UK and Chinese governments. It focused 
on low cost energy efficiency improvements at ten 
industrial sites in China (Minchener 1999). Since this 
project was funded by a UK government Department 
concerned with development rather than trade, it has 
been explicitly shaped by the needs of Chinese tech-
nology importers and users. 
The additional equipment installed at the case study 
sites to reduce emissions was sourced from both the 
UK and China. In general, Chinese equipment was 
used whenever possible, especially if this had been 
recently developed. Hardware from the UK was only 
used when it was clear that this would perform signifi-
cantly better than Chinese hardware. For example, UK 
firms supplied steam and water meters since it was 
essential that these should be accurate in order to as-
sess plant performance. 
The capital costs of the work at the case study sites 
varied from $6,000 to $68,000. The financial savings 
from implementation gave rise to payback periods 
ranging from 1 month (for a $21,000 investment at a 
cement mill that saved 325 tonnes of CO2 per year) to 
40 months (for a $68,000 investment at a beer factory 
that saved 1070 tonnes of CO2 per year). As these ex-
amples suggest, significant reductions in emissions of 
carbon dioxide, sulphur dioxide and dust were 
achieved in most cases. 
Implications for CDM and JI Projects 
The analysis in this paper has shown some of the 
problems that can arise when governments and compa-
nies in OECD countries set out to transfer new tech-
nologies to their counterparts in the developing world. 
At present, it is still unclear how future international 
agreements, including the Kyoto flexibility mecha-
nisms, will minimise the impact of these problems. 
Whilst the CDM and JI will lever finance for introduc-
tion of cleaner energy technologies, effective technol-
ogy transfer is not assured. 
Liu Xue of Beijing University has summed up one of 
the major issues from the perspective of China: Under 
the CDM framework presently discussed, it can be 
assumed that technologies China can acquire through 
the CDM are mainly mitigation equipment and tech-
nologies for maintaining and operating such equipment 
rather than technologies necessary to manufacture 
mitigation equipment (Liu Xue, 2000). 
Michael Barz has drawn a similar conclusion from a 
study of technology transfer to Russian firms. He ob-
serves that the know-why necessary to assimilate new 
technology and improve it has not been systematically 
incorporated into technology transfer to Russian firms 
(Dyker 1999: 122). 
These statements illustrate a crucial point. Whilst it 
is clear that some technology transfer will accompany 
CDM and JI projects, there is no guarantee that com-
panies within recipient countries will acquire new ca-
pabilities in the design and manufacture of cleaner 
technologies. As this paper has shown, the transfer of 
the wider technical knowledge necessary to generate 
and manage cleaner innovation is often problematic for 
international technology suppliers. This is either be-
cause it can compromise the commercial advantage of 
international firms or because it depends on relatively 
intangible tacit knowledge. Despite these difficulties, 
many firms and governments see both technological 
knowledge and hardware transfer as essential compo-
nents of their work with their counterparts in develop-
ing and transition economies. 
These conclusions suggest some lessons for govern-
ments and companies within developing and transition 
economies that will take part in projects under the 
CDM and JI. The following lessons may be particu-
larly important for accession States to the EU: 
• The transfer of technological knowledge or know 
why is as important as investment in new hard-
ware. Without the former, the recipient firm or in-
stitution may not gain sufficient insight in cleaner 
technologies to apply them effectively. 
• Host and donor governments should not prescribe 
JI and CDM projects in too much detail. It is im-
portant to remember that international firms (not 
governments) usually develop and apply cleaner 
technologies. Firms have their own commercial 
agendas and therefore need room for manoeuvre in 
their negotiations with recipient companies. 
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• Incremental technologies can provide a low cost 
route to reduced greenhouse gas emissions and 
improved capabilities in the developing world. 
There is a strong case for helping transition 
economies and developing countries to leapfrog 
their Western counterparts and use the best avail-
able technology. However, technology transfer 
programmes must build on existing capabilities 
and industrial structures within recipient countries. 
• Preferred technology lists and generic baselines 
for the calculation of emissions reductions under 
the CDM or JI can be counter-productive. If they 
are too rigidly applied, many low cost CO2 abate-
ment opportunities may be inadvertently disquali-
fied. However, it is also important to recognise 
that increased flexibility and project-specific ap-
praisal may lead to high transaction costs. 
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